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
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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

THE LIMITATION OF NAVAL GENERAL PURPOSE
FORCES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

by

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OCT 6 1977
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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract of

THE LIMITATION OF NAVAL GENERAL PURPOSE
FORCES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The concern for the dangers of a nuclear war has pre-occupied arms control talks since World War II. With the signing of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms in 1972, a new era of arms control negotiations seems to have been ushered in with Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks, which in turn may lead to further talks concerning limitations on conventional weapons.

The purpose of this study is to review the naval arms limitations conferences and proposals since the Hague Conference of 1899 and to point out the pitfalls which can result from being too willing to negotiate in search of accommodation or peace without due regard for both political and strategic factors. This study also looks at the newly emerging multipolar world and how the Nixon Doctrine has affected these new power centers and created a need for armaments rather than reductions in armaments. The perceived need for security by these emergent powers has led them to turn to the sea and acquire sizable navies throughout the world to protect their national interests and sea lines of communication. This naval build-up could very well trigger a naval arms race and lead to naval arms limitations negotiations, at least regionally.

Lastly, this study discusses the historic and geographic factors which have caused the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, to build large navies. The study further compares the probable aims of these two powers in possible future naval limitations negotiations from the standpoint the needs of a land power versus a sea power.

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THE LIMITATION OF NAVAL GENERAL PURPOSE
FORCES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Problem. With the United States once again moving towards a more conscious maritime strategy as a result of the Nixon Doctrine, it is apparent that further arms limitations negotiations and/or agreements could have an impact on the types and numbers of naval vessels the United States will possess in the future, in addition to where and how American naval forces might be deployed. Consequently, naval arms limitations have serious implications to Fleet make up and to the Fleet's ability to fulfill its peacetime missions of deterrence, projection, presence and sea control as presently enumerated. Arms limitations, therefore, have implications to strategic objectives and the ability of the Fleet to meet overseas commitments and to support national interests.

The Approach. This paper seeks to review the past attempts at naval arms control as they might relate to the present day. The military and political objectives that gave rise to these attempts will also be examined. In addition, a survey will be made of the myriad of arms limitations proposals under consideration today and how these proposals, if agreed to, could limit United States action in fulfilling its national

interests in the future. In conclusion, this paper will attempt to provide some meaningful direction for future arms control negotiations.

This study will deal primarily with conventional naval forces rather than central type forces used for strategic deterrence. Although a part of the Navy, the ballistic missile firing submarine is considered by this writer as but another means of firing an intercontinental ballistic missile and therefore is relegated to a very specific role in strategic deterrence vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and possibly the People's Republic of China.

The subject of historic factors bearing on arms limitations negotiations is of particular importance today with the termination of the United States involvement in Vietnam, the climate of arms limitations talks in what appears to be a period of increasing detente, the Nixon Doctrine and President Nixon's Three Pillars of Peace, the emergence of new power centers in a multipolar world, and the desires of American public opinion for a reduction in arms and military spending in order to prevent further military involvement overseas and to ease American economic woes.

CHAPTER II

A HISTORY OF DISARMAMENT AS BACKGROUND

General Overview: The Quest for Peace.

From time immemorial, man has looked to disarmament agreements in the hope of achieving peace on earth good will towards man. The often quoted verse from Isaiah (2:4) in the Old Testament puts the hope in these terms:

They shall beat their swords into ploughshares,
and their spears into pruning-hooks; nation shall
not lift sword against nation, neither shall they
learn war any more.

To this day, statesmen and writers repeat these biblical sentiments. But, in truth, we are not much further along the road to disarmament today than we were at any other time in the history of man. The trouble is that lacking mutual trust, each nation seeks to increase its own relative position vis-a-vis others, even when talking disarmament. For in truth, when nations come together for a disarmament conference there is always some political motive--whether evident or not--in mind, both by the sponsor and the participants. It is all very reminiscent of the Parable of the Animals at a disarmament conference:

The animals, according to the story, having decided to disarm, convened in order to discuss the matter. The Eagle, with an eye on the Bull, suggested that all horns be razed off. The Bull, with a squint at the Tiger, thought that all claws should be cut

short. The Tiger glaring at the Elephant, was of the opinion that tusks should be pulled out or at any rate shortened. The Elephant, staring at the Eagle, thought it indispensable that all wings should be clipped. Whereupon the Bear, with a circular glance at all its brethren cried: 'Why all these half-way measures? Let all weapons be done away with so that nothing remains in the Way of a fraternal all embracing hug.'

The Bear, of course, was motivated by enlightened self-interest. And it is this kind of thinking among nations that inhibits disarmament talks. Anthony Nutting has summed it up thusly: "...if there can be no real confidence without disarmament, there can certainly be no real disarmament with confidence."¹

Early political thinkers and writers, such as Hugo Grotius, Abbe de Saint-Pierre and Immanuel Kant, viewed disarmament and arbitration of disputes as steps to a peaceful world confederation based on international law. In 1693, William Penn, the founder of Pennsylvania, in An Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe, proposed a "general parliament" of European sovereign princes to formulate rules for interaction between states and to arbitrate differences. According to Penn, this would bring peace to Europe, and "...disarmament would follow,...the funds generally spent on military preparedness would be spend to better advantage." Penn's peace league is considered one of the first to look specifically at disarmament.²

John Bellers, a Quaker friend of Penn, who was motivated by the war between Holland and France, proposed to the English Parliament in 1710 the joining of all states of Europe into one and the division of Europe into 100 provinces. Each province would provide the league with 1000 "soldiers or an equivalent in ships or money" for enforcement of rules and defense of the league. He, too, envisioned disarmament in which "troops and ships of war" would be limited so that states could not invade their neighbor. Bellers believed that without disarmament..."peace may be little better than a truce."³

In 1738, Abbe de Saint-Pierre, a French social philosopher, continued with this theme of a "society of Europe."⁴ He too considered disarmament important. According to Saint-Pierre:

...all states, large or small, should have the same armies numerically. The commissioners of the European alliance were to review the troops of each power twice a year and thus prevent all new armaments except by the order of the union.⁵

Towards the end of the Seventeenth Century, Jeremy Bentham, an English political theorist, was one of the first "to stress the necessity of disarmament as a requisite for international peace."⁶ Bentham went even further, proposing that all nations renounce their colonies (directed mainly at England and France), and that England should reduce her naval forces to a level adequate "to defend its commerce against pirates."⁷ As might be expected, such proposals were shelved due to the commencement of the Napoleonic Wars.

In 1842, in an article War and Peace, the noted American jurist William Jay proposed that in all future treaties nations should agree to abstain from war and to submit their differences to arbitration. He was also aware of disarmament and the burden placed on the people by maintaining large armies.⁸ A French writer, Gustave de Molinari, influenced by the Crimean War, followed a similar line in which he pointed out that two-thirds of the national budget was slated for armaments and war debts.⁹

James Lorimer, a professor at the University of Edinburgh, in The Institute of the Law of Nations (1884) saw the reduction of armaments as the means to prevent war.

The risk of War...would be diminished by the limitation upon the combustible matter in each community, while the relief from taxation and compulsory service would increase wealth and furthermore direct the attention of each generation toward occupations of civil life.¹⁰

Disarmament, according to Lorimer, would be difficult, but not impossible, even though nations would rearm in time of stress. Once disarmed to a level of preservation of national security, states might hesitate to rearm.¹¹

Although the time was inappropriate for disarmament when these ideas were put forward, the ideas are considered important, because they have pervaded in disarmament attempts and arms control negotiations to the present day. These thinkers, jurists and statesmen generally considered disarmament in terms of general and complete disarmament:

A program to insure that states will have at their disposal only those...armaments, forces, facilities, and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens; and that states shall support and provide agreed manpower for a...peace force.¹²

It is clear, even through the cursory history that will be provided, that disarmament in these terms, to date, has been an unattainable ideal, but one that is sought after, nonetheless, by a humanity tired of war and tired of stress.

The Early Attempts at Disarmament: Up to World War I.

Having been exposed to the idealistic and philosophic approaches to disarmament and world peace of the past, it would seem only natural that states in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries - now spokesmen for the people - would focus their attention on disarmament. Their attempts, however, although outwardly based on these idealistic and philosophic principles of world peace, were in actuality based on deep political motivations. Put bluntly, people can be idealistic, whereas states cannot. For whether it is mistrust or lack of faith, each nation seeks to better its own position vis-a-vis other nations and improve its own perceived security.

Outside of these philosophic peace proposals, propositions were put forward by statesmen. An official proposal recommending a "reduction of three-fourths of the effectives of the two countries" was forwarded to Frederick the Great

by Prinz Karunitz, the Austrian Chancellor, after the Seven Years' War (1776) and again in 1779 by Joseph II of Austria. The proposition was declined on both occasions.¹³

Probably the first naval arms limitation agreement was made on 30 August 1787 when England and France agreed

...not to augment their naval armaments over and above a peace establishment and not to launch upon the ocean more than six war vessels. In case one of the powers found itself obliged to assume some other arrangements in this respect, it could only do so after having advised the other party.¹⁴

Two years later France declared war on England.

After the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, peace again became the watchword in Europe. The great devastation, particularly in Central Europe, and the loss of wealth had a deep impact on the statesmen and leaders of nations. Prussia and Austria, as a consequence, had already unilaterally reduced the size of their armies.

On September 1815, Tsar Alexander I announced his scheme for a Holy Alliance to guarantee the status quo in Europe. This was followed on 21 March 1816 by an informal letter to Lord Castlereagh, the English Foreign Secretary, proposing the "simultaneous reduction of the armed forces of every kind..."¹⁵ Because the proposal was made at a time when Russia was still maintaining her armed forces on a war footing when others were demobilizing, the proposal was doomed to failure. Although Count Metternich, the Austrian Foreign Minister, was generally disposed to the idea--as were others

as well--because of financial conditions and exhaustion in Europe, the proposal was ignored. Castlereagh and Metternich "were suspicious of Russia, Alexander had his eye on the unsolved Eastern question, and Europe in general was agitated and excited by French militarism..."¹⁶

This incident is stressed because it brings out two significant recurring points in disarmament and arms control negotiations with the Russians. One is the point Metternich made to Castlereagh at the time, noting:

...the difficulty always of obtaining any true data from Russia...to take the initiative here, uncertain of reciprocity of confidence would be impossible.¹⁷

The other point was made in the 1960's by Professor G. Warren Nutter:

...Soviet leaders would prefer to achieve world domination through relaxation of Western effort rather than through the intensification of Soviet effort. The ideal solution from their point of view would be unilateral disarmament of the West, and we should expect mounting enticements in this direction...¹⁸

The next attempt at naval arms limitations was the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1818 between the United States and Great Britain (Appendix I). The Rush-Bagot Agreement is of particular significance since it is the longest successful naval arms limitation agreement that has endured to the present day, even though it has been revised as re-interpreted on a number of occasions to meet existing conditions.

The Rush-Bagot Agreement was concluded in order to prevent a naval race on the Great Lakes after the War of 1812. Although Lord Castlereagh did not wish to enter into a treaty type agreement on which President James Monroe insisted, the "far-sighted Castlereagh took a chance, for which he was upbraided in Canada, when he consented to disarm in the face of the powerful and unrepentant Yankee."¹⁹

Throughout the remainder of the Nineteenth Century probes were made to limit arms races; however, these met with little success. Those states financially capable of competing in an arms race felt that any limitations on their part would be an advantage to financially weaker nations with large populations, like Italy and Russia, who could maintain very large armed forces cheaply through conscription rather than investing in modern warships or improvements in armaments. A reduction in size of land armies on the part of these financially weaker nations, however, might well have resulted in military expenditures available for prestige type navies.²⁰

By 1888 Great Power statesmen were becoming more concerned about the excessive expenditures in armaments. Consequently, there was a growing feeling throughout the decade 1888-1898 "that the competition in armaments was becoming ruinous and that some concerted steps should be taken to arrest it."²¹ Merze Tate concludes:

In short, in 1898 there existed in England, the United States, and to a lesser extent in France and Germany, an inchoate opinion in favor of a limitation of armaments, but this opinion did not exert a great influence on governments. At the close of the century it was beginning to affect statesmen only in what they said, not in what they did. When diplomats, kings and emperors approached the problem of limiting armaments they did so not on account of the pressure of public opinion but because they were finding their budgets increasingly more difficult to balance...²²

In fact, most people were uninformed and apathetic on the question of disarmament.²³

Shortly after the conclusion of the Spanish-American War in 1898, Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, on 24 August 1898, invited the major world powers to assemble at the Hague to consider "a possible reduction of armaments which weigh upon all nations."²⁴ (See Appendix II for Conference Note.) The Tsar had himself denounced war, stating that "the preservation of peace had become an object of international policy."

The First Hague Conference opened on 18 May 1899 to discuss three main topics: disarmament, mediation and arbitration, and regulation of warfare.²⁵

Colonel Gilinsky, the Russian delegate, presented the text of Imperial Russia concerning naval limitations:

As regards navies --

1. The acceptance in principle of fixing for a term of three years the amount of naval budget, and an agreement not to increase the total amount for the triennial period, and the obligation to publish during the period, in advance: --

- (a) The total tonnage of men-of-war which it is proposed to construct, without giving in detail the types of ships.
- (b) The numbers of officers and crews in the navy.
- (c) The expenses of coast fortifications, including fortresses, docks, arsenals, etc.²⁶

Gilinsky further pointed out that "it was neither practical nor desirable to discuss...(disarmament)...until an agreement had been reached regarding a limitation of existing armaments."²⁷

But before going into the disarmament results of the Conference it is edifying to look at the various positions of the leading naval powers and their reactions to the Tsar's invitation.

United States. The United States had emerged from the Spanish-American War as both a Pacific power and a world power with the acquisition of the Philippines and other possessions in the Pacific and Caribbean. As a result of this new American status, American and Japanese policies were on a collision course in the Pacific.²⁸ In fact, there had even been talk of war with Japan following a dispute over laborers between Japan and the Hawaiian government in March 1897. War plans had even been drawn up by Theodore Roosevelt.²⁹ There was also concern about German commercial and colonial expansion in the Pacific and Latin America, filling vacuums wherever they existed. Conflict between the United States and Germany had already taken place in the islands of the Western Pacific.³⁰ Consequently, the United States "was not primarily interested in...disarmament."³¹ Perhaps the best expression of the

American position at the Conference was Sir J. Paunceforte's comment concerning Captain Alfred T. Mahan, a member of the American Delegation:

Captain Mahan has not only stated that his Government will on no account even discuss the question of any limitation of naval armaments; he has also informed me that he considers that the vital interests of America now lie East and West, and no longer North and South; that the great question of the immediate future is China, and that the United States will be compelled, by fact if not by settled policy, to take a leading part in the struggle for Chinese markets, and this will entail a very considerable increase in her naval forces in the Pacific, which again must influence the naval arrangements of at least five Powers.³²

Much less blunt was President McKinley's report to Congress in reference to United States forces as being "so conspicuously less than that of the armed powers to whom the Czar's appeal is especially addressed that the question can have for us no practical importance."³³

Great Britain. Here there was much stronger public opinion in favor of the "noble Tsar's" proposals. However, British leaders saw a calculated Russian motive in capitalizing on limitations of armaments so that she might "concentrate her energies on a steady Asiatic expansion which in time might threaten the British position in India." Consequently, they were opposed to any agreement which would limit British military or naval forces.³⁴ Although he saw immediate advantages to arms limitations, the Marquis of Salisbury, the British Prime Minister, believed "that no peace in Europe is possible without an armed force behind it."³⁵

France. Public opinions generally opposed the Tsar's Rescript for fear that it might stabilize the status quo in Europe. France still had a score to settle with Germany over Alsace-Lorraine and had hoped for Russian assistance in this matter. France also felt slighted by her Russian ally because she had not been consulted before the Tsar sent his Rescript.³⁶

Germany. Germany was in the midst of a naval building program and relayed through her representative, Captain Siegel, that she would not consider any limitations of her naval armaments. Germany also was concerned because of the rapid growth of the American fleet, and the Kaiser even labeled Mahan Germany's "greatest and most dangerous foe."³⁷ Germany's distrust of the Tsar's motives are summed up quite completely in one of Kaiser Wilhelm's notes concerning the invitation:

The whole plan seems to me to be due merely to the financial exhaustion of Russia. Army increases, strategical railways, the rapid expansion towards China, the Siberian railway, all of this has drained the land, taxes can hardly be increased, and culture is at the lowest ebb. Witte had no further sources, since France has given out and Germany and England are no longer willing. Whereby it is clearly proven that so far Europe has paid for the Russian armaments. All this must be counted in, along with the young Tsar's humanitarian nonsense which has led him to this incredible step. There's a bit of devilry in it too, because any one who refuses the invitation will be said to want to break the peace and that at a moment when Russia cannot go further, while others--especially Germany--can now begin and make up for lost time.³⁸

Italy. The proposed conference was not well accepted in Italy. Money was what Italy needed most, not manpower. Italy still had territorial ambitions and "wished to keep her sword unsheathed." Consequently, Italy wished that the Conference should avoid disarmament, be "a simple exchange of ideas," and be "an exchange of views on economic and military questions."³⁹ The Italian Naval Delegate at the Conference was instructed not to agree to anything that would limit armaments.⁴⁰

Japan. During the latter quarter of the Nineteenth Century, Japan was expanding into the Bonin, Kurile and Ryukyu Islands. These new territorial responsibilities and Japan's future territorial ambitions called for an expansion of naval and military forces taking up approximately half of the national budget in 1890's.⁴¹ In addition, Japanese expansion and territorial ambitions in the Pacific and Far East - as has already been mentioned - were coming into conflict with American and Russian interests and the American Open Door Policy in China. Consequently, Japan would only consider naval limitations when her Navy "had reached the standard of the Great Naval Powers."⁴²

Russia. Why did the Tsar call the Conference and why was he interested in arms controls? Was he sincerely interested in the "preservation of peace" or peaceful coexistence as it might be called today?

No sooner had the Franco-Russian Alliance been concluded in 1894, than Russia turned her interests to the Far East. By 1898, Russian expansion had accumulated more territory than could be readily assimilated. The Sino-Japanese War in 1895 had also changed the political situation in the Far East with Japan's acquisition of the Liaotung Peninsula in 1895, which Russian statesmen viewed with great alarm. With the help of German and French diplomacy, Russia was able to force Japan out of Liaotung. In the next year, a secret Russo-Chinese pact was concluded granting Russia rights to build and police the Trans-Siberian Railway through Chinese territory.

Following these events, Russian warships occupied Port Arthur and Talienwan in December 1897; and, in the next month, Russia forced upon China an agreement to lease the Liaotung Peninsula to Russia for thirty-six years. The agreement was signed on 15 March 1898 just before the Tsar's Rescript was sent out.⁴³

Consequently, Merze Tate concludes: "A respite in the armament competition would have been advantageous to Russia for political, strategic, economic and financial reasons."⁴⁴ Count Sergius Witte, the Russian Minister of Finance, "wanted peace...to place the country's finances on a sound basis and to foster its industries by opening, through railways and 'peaceful penetration,' vast new markets in the East for Russian produce. This was the key to his grandiose scheme of railway building."⁴⁵ Russia was also very deficient in technical

and industrial development and in fact had to purchase most of her armaments abroad.⁴⁶

In Witte's opinion: Russia's national interest also called for "a policy of prudent neutrality in the West."⁴⁷ Witte further pointed out to his advisor, Dr. E. J. Dillon:

...Russia occupied a place in the hierarchy of nations to which she was nowise entitled; if ever the discovery were made by the Kaiser, he feared the consequences might be calamitous. The Russian Empire was weak, disunited, about to explode into tiny fragments, and a campaign against a great power like Germany would very soon reveal this condition. All wars had therefore to be avoided because of the fatal revelation to which they would lead.⁴⁸

As a result the Tsar's sincerity was subject to serious doubt. Worthy of particular note is an article that appeared in the Boston Evening Transcript in February 1899 describing Russia as:

...an immense glacier from northern Asia, 'steadily and silently sliding down from the Arctic frosts towards the rich plains of middle and southern Asia to the open sea beyond. The southern edge of this mighty avalanche can be outlined all the way from Turkey to the eastern shores of China. Obstacles may temporarily check, but cannot change this movement. Its objectives are never lost sight of...' other nations were not going to sit still while Russia thus climbs to greatness and grandeur. The most the powers could do would be to increase their naval armaments as fast as possible and thus present a threatening attitude towards this growing colossus of the North, and meantime compel her to maintain a naval force as nearly equal to theirs as she may be able...railroads as were contemplated and building must bring a tremendous strain upon the best treasury.⁴⁹

The First Hague Conference did not develop a program for disarmament because no power seriously wished to reduce

armaments. The Conference did succeed in bringing governments together for the first time to discuss the question of disarmament;⁵⁰ and all governments participating did unanimously agree on armaments as follows:

-Guided by the same sentiments, the Conference has adopted unanimously the following Resolution: The Conference is of opinion that the restriction of military charges, which are at present a heavy burden on the world, is extremely desirable for the increase of the material and moral welfare of mankind.

-The Conference expresses the wish that the questions with regard to rifles and naval guns, as considered by it, may be studied by the Governments with the object of coming to an agreement respecting the employment of new types and calibers.

-The Conference expresses the wish that the Governments, taking into consideration the proposals made at the Conference, may examine the possibility of an agreement as to the limitation of armed forces by land and sea, and of war budgets.⁵¹

On 15 June 1907, on the suggestion of President Theodore Roosevelt and the Tsar's formal invitation of 3 April 1906 (Appendix III), forty-four nations met for the Second Hague Conference. The Tsar's draft program indicates he was not seriously interested in disarmament at this time because of the defeat Russia suffered in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. He was more interested in rearming. In 1906, it was Great Britain that was anxious to bring up armament budget limitations. The French were opposed, even though in financial straits, unless the United States brought up the subject.⁵²

Germany regarded any attempts by Britain as attempting to arrest her naval growth.

About all the Conference accomplished in the way of naval armaments was to reaffirm the resolution of the First Hague Conference that it is "eminently desirable that the Governments should resume the serious examination" of military expenditures, and to consider the customs of naval warfare at a future conference.⁵³

In the years between the two conferences many events had taken place which changed or strengthened the attitudes of governments. The Boer War broke out in 1899, opening the Twentieth Century

...with conflicts fought in the Far East and South Africa. Russia struggled in distant Manchuria; a combined European and American Army avenged the outrages of the Boxers by sacking Peking; England fought in the Transvaal, five thousand miles from her base of supplies; the United States had just conquered and now held under military rule possessions an even greater distance from home waters. All these wars demonstrated the new significance of sea power in history and intensified the naval armament competition.⁵⁴

Naval building races continued at an increased pace in the United States, Germany, England and Japan. The development of the British all big-gun battleship, the DREADNOUGHT, exacerbated the situation, as every naval power saw a means to gain superiority by building these new vessels. By 1914 the number of dreadnoughts, by country, were as follows: Great Britain 18, Germany 13, France 8, United States 8, and Japan 4.⁵⁵

The tonnage of the United States Navy, in the meantime, passed from fifth in 1904 to second only to Britain in 1907.⁵⁶ German naval expansion also began to be felt not only by the United States but even more alarmingly by Great Britain, whose statesmen tried unsuccessfully in 1898 and in 1901 to come to an agreement with the German government on naval limitations.⁵⁷

Japanese sea power also grew, and her aspirations in the Far East had not changed. She entered into the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902 in order to "neutralize France and Germany and enable Japan to challenge Russia..."⁵⁸ After the Russian defeat in 1905 at the hands of the Japanese, Britain reduced her Pacific squadrons and "virtually gave adherence to a Japanese political principle in the Far East equivalent to the Monroe Doctrine of the United States."⁵⁹ The alliance had freed England's anxieties over Russia in the East and allowed her to concentrate her forces in European waters against the German Navy,⁶⁰ whose Emperor believed that "Germany's future lay on the water."⁶¹

Tensions between the United States and Japan continued not only because of policy differences in the Far East and the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War, but also because of discrimination against Japanese laborers in California.⁶² To calm the situation, President Roosevelt in December 1907 (three months after the Second Hague Conference adjourned)

sent the Great White Fleet of sixteen battleships with escorts around the world to:

...remind the Japanese that the United States had the second largest navy, and to convince them that it was prepared for any contingency...This gesture was not so much a threat at Japan as a demonstration for the benefit of Japan.⁶³

Roosevelt later commented that this action was "the most important service that I rendered to peace..."⁶⁴

The International Naval Conference, held in London from 4 December 1908 to 26 February 1909, completed the work of the Second Hague Conference of 1907 as to the customs of naval warfare. C. H. Stockton, the American senior delegate to the Conference, concluded that

...the declaration adopted by the conference, defining the relations between belligerents and belligerents, and between belligerents and neutrals, will, without interfering with legitimate belligerent or neutral action, remove many of the reasons for international friction and misunderstanding, which until the present time have frequently existed.⁶⁵

This was the last formal attempt to limit naval armaments before hostilities began in August 1914 and each nation pitted the mass of its armaments against each other.

The Naval Disarmament Conferences: 1919-1937.

The Stage. From 1919 to 1937 not a year passed without some kind of proposal being made to promote some agreement on limitations on armaments. These were rooted in financial, political or strategic considerations and in many cases in

the disillusionments which emerged from the Versailles Peace Conference.

The Treaty of Versailles had blamed Germany for the war and had disarmed her, parceling out her navy to the victorious Allies. Germany was also stripped of her overseas empire, was now a divided nation and only waited for the day to renounce the Treaty of Versailles. Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire were broken up into new national states, with Austria's Navy also divided among the victorious Allies.

Japan had come to the Versailles Peace Conference with the hope of gaining recognition for herself as a first-class power. She also wished to retain her claims on the Japanese occupied German holdings in the Pacific which had been recognized during the war by France, England, Italy and Russia.⁶⁶ Although Japan was included as one of the Big Five, she succeeded only in keeping Tsingtao as a possession and the German islands as Class C mandates under the covenant of the League of Nations because of American objections. This status prohibited the Japanese from fortifying the islands. Further, Japan had to relinquish Siberian occupied areas and the Shantung Peninsula.⁶⁷

Great Britain and France divided up the rest of the spoils of war as mandates or as outright territorial gains. France continued to maintain large armed forces to keep Germany in check. She had gotten back Alsace-Lorraine and intended to keep it. Italy, among the victorious Big Five, came away

from the conference unsatisfied. She did not get those spoils promised to her in Africa and Europe by the Treaty of London of 1915 because of "Wilson's idealism and Clemenceau's realism."⁶⁸ Thus, Italy, too, continued to maintain large armed forces not only for prestige but also in anticipation of a chance to gain by show of arms those territories she could not get at the negotiating tables. What Italy wanted was equal status with France.

The United States came to the Versailles Peace Conference with no territorial ambitions. She just wanted to see a "world free for democracy" emerge. One of President Wilson's Fourteen Points called for:

Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.⁶⁹

The other Allies found this point particularly objectionable. As a consequence, it was shelved on Britain's emphatic insistence. Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister was primarily concerned with wartime rights of stop and search and blockade. He commented as follows:

This point we cannot accept under any condition, it means the power of blockade goes; Germany has been broken almost as much by the blockade as by military methods. Therefore, my view is that I should like to see this League of Nations established first before I let this power go.⁷⁰

The abandonment of Wilson's point on Freedom of the Seas together with other disillusionments at the peace conference

had much to do with the United States decision to complete the 1916 naval building program, which would eventually provide a fleet equal to the strongest naval power.⁷¹

And so, at the close of the war, the gigantic naval race continued, particularly in Japan, Great Britain and the United States. Each had laid down ambitious building programs and each continued to build, each unwilling to stop while the others continued to build. The question was, against whom were these navies being built? Germany had been defeated. Europe was prostrate. Russia was in the midst of a revolution.

The obvious answer for the United States was against Japan, whose over-population and lack of resources made it almost imperative that she expand to the Asian mainland. United States support of Chinese territorial integrity was the only obstacle. Consequently, there was again considerable war talk on both sides of the Pacific and inflammatory books such as The Menace of Japan and Must We Fight Again? finding wide circulation.⁷² In 1920, President Wilson reorganized the Navy by concentrating fourteen of the newest and heaviest battleships in the Pacific with a total tonnage "equal to the entire Japanese Navy." This ended for the time Japanese dominance in the Pacific and resulted in a 1920 Japanese naval building program calling for the construction of sixteen new capital ships over the next eight years. This was also supported by Japanese air enthusiasts.⁷³

The United States emerged from the war as Great Britain's main potential antagonist. America's 1916 naval building program was viewed by the British as having replaced the German High Seas Fleet's challenge to the Royal Navy. Should the American program continue, the United States would by 1923 become the greatest naval power leaving Britain in second place if Britain built no new ship. The American naval building program, in the Admiralty's opinion, was not aimed "to satisfy essential needs as represented by the size of the American overseas empire, or of her sea-borne trade or merchant marine, or the length of her sea routes."⁷⁴ The British were also concerned about American expansion at Britain's expense, which was pushed in the Mediterranean and Near East (for oil) under the cloak of the American navy and relief teams.⁷⁵

Being in deep financial straits because of the war, Great Britain could not afford to participate in a naval race without great financial burden. At the same time, she wished to maintain her historic central position in Pax Britannica. Realistically, such a position tended to ignore the perils of the recent German submarine blockade and Japan's new hegemony and naval dominance in the Western Pacific.⁷⁶

The Washington Naval Conference of 1922. The avoidance of the possibility of another armaments race (particularly between the United States and Great Britain) which would heavily tax national resources, and anti-armaments sentiments

were the principal motives for the Washington Naval Conference in 1922.²² In addition to ending the naval building race, the Conference aimed at settling Pacific problems and bringing to an end the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was due for renewal.⁷⁸ This alliance was strongly opposed by the United States, Canada and the Commonwealth nations of the Pacific, who viewed it as a possible commitment to go to war against the United States on the side of Japan.⁷⁹

The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 fixed, by mutual agreement, the future strength of the navies of Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France and Italy based on a straightforward numerical scheme of tonnages and ratios for capital ships: 5:5:3:1.67:1.67 respectively. The following tonnage limits were set for capital ships:⁸⁰

| <u>Nation</u> | <u>Capital Ships (tons)</u> | <u>Aircraft Carriers (tons)</u> |
|---------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|
| United States | 525,000 | 135,000 |
| Great Britain | 525,000 | 135,000 |
| Japan | 315,000 | 81,000 |
| France | 175,000 | 60,000 |
| Italy | 175,000 | 60,000 |

These tonnage figures were much higher than initially proposed.⁸¹ Qualitative limitations were also set. Battleships were restricted to 35,000 tons and 16-inch guns; carriers to 27,000 tons and 8-inch guns; and cruisers to 10,000 tons and 8-inch guns.

The conference failed to set ratios for cruisers and other auxiliaries due to the objection of England because of her heavy reliance on cruisers for protection of commerce and security of her empire. France and Italy also opposed limitations on cruisers because of the inferior ratio they received on capital ships and carriers. Although attempts were made to do so, no limits were placed on submarines, again because of French and Italian objections.⁸²

In order to get Japan to accept an inferior ratio to the United States and Great Britain, a status quo on fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific was included in the Five Power Treaty on 15 December 1921,⁸³ as follows:

(1) The insular possessions which the United States now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands and (b) the Hawaiian Islands;

(2) Hong Kong and the insular possessions which the British Empire now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, east of the meridian of 110° east longitude, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of Canada, (b) the Commonwealth of Australia and its Territories, and (c) New Zealand.

(3) The following insular territories and possessions of Japan in the Pacific Ocean, to wit: the Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, and any insular territories or possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan might hereafter acquire.⁸⁴

The Four Power Treaty signed by the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan ended the Anglo-Japanese

Alliance. Each pledged to consult each other in case of controversy. The Nine Power Treaty (United States, Great Britain, Belgium, Japan, China, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Portugal) vowed to respect the territorial and administrative integrity of China.

Again, it is edifying to look at the motivations and positions of the nations involved in the Conference, why they came and what they hoped to achieve.

United States. "Protection of the recently completed Panama Canal, the expansion of the Japanese navy, the British blockade of the Central Powers, and the German submarine menace made our nation acutely conscious of the importance of maintaining adequate naval strength."⁸⁵ Further concern was over the defense of the Philippines and American political, economic and commercial interests in the Far East. Consequently the United States did not wish to engage in a naval race with Japan, whose dominant position was reinforced by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Many navy officials believed that the alliance was directed at the United States; and even British assurances in December 1920 could not make Americans believe that the alliance was not binding in case of war between the United States and Japan.⁸⁶ The United States wanted to see the alliance cancelled.

It was on the invitation of the United States, after Anglo-American consultation, that brought the nations together

for the Conference on 12 November 1921. It was Secretary of State Hughes who electrified the Conference with his proposal on warship limitations, as follows:

- (1) That all capital ship building programs, either actual or projected, should be abandoned;
- (2) That further reduction should be made through the scrapping of certain of the older ships;
- (3) That, in general, regard should be had to the existing naval strength of the Powers concerned.
- (4) That the capital ship tonnage should be used as the measurement of strength for navies and a proportionate allowance of auxiliary combatant craft prescribed.⁸⁷

The Hughes plan had two objectives: "to limit naval competition and to secure for the United States a navy equal to that of any other power in the world."⁸⁸ Naval limitations in this regard were directed principally at the United States, Britain, and Japan.

It was Hughes who also presented the proposal for no further fortifications in the Pacific.⁸⁹ The United States also wished to obstruct Japanese imperialism in China and Siberia in order to facilitate reconstruction of these areas.⁹⁰

Great Britain. Britain was in dire financial straits due to an immense national debt incurred in the war. She was also faced with unemployment and a faltering industry due to free-trade imports from Germany and the United States. To attempt to maintain British naval supremacy in a naval building race with the United States held possibilities of

bankruptcy.⁹¹ Based on the search for economy and the hope for a new world order, Great Britain was willing to abdicate her position of naval supremacy, accept parity with the United States, and bring to an end "the days of the two- and three-power standard."⁹²

Although willing to accept the 5:5:3 ratio in capital ships, Great Britain was not willing to accept the same ratio in lesser vessels. In this regard Lord Balfour, the British delegate, was given the following instructions:

The position of Britain, with her world-wide possessions and food supplies, on the one hand clearly requires an entirely different standard from that acceptable by self-contained nations. We apprehend, however, that there is very little chance of the abolition of submarines being agreed upon, and in this event we must insist at all costs upon absolute freedom in regard to the character and number of all vessels under, say, 10,000 tons..⁹³

As a consequence no agreement could be made on cruisers or auxiliaries to the battle fleet other than on the cruiser tonnage size and gun caliber limits.

Great Britain was also willing to agree to the other political issues concluded at the Washington Conference because it would eliminate heavy expenditures for naval bases and fortifications in the Pacific and prevent "incurring American displeasure."⁹⁴ Ending the Anglo-Japanese alliance supposedly also gave Britain greater freedom of action.⁹⁵

Japan. The Japanese favored renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, however, they feared a possible review of their

political and military actions recently taken in China and Siberia. Tokyo also feared that inclusion of political issues in the agenda indicated a new Western effort to limit Japan's freedom of operation in Asia.⁹⁶ As a consequence, Japan was the last nation to accept the invitation to the conference (26 July 1921) and qualified her acceptance by stating that "problems such as are of sole concern to certain particular powers or such matters that may be regarded accomplished facts should be scrupulously avoided."⁹⁷

The Japanese also opposed the inferior ratio being allocated to them, "ever sensitive to a suggestion of inferiority."⁹⁸ Japan vehemently insisted that this lesser tonnage ratio did not reflect her defense requirements. Eventually Japan accepted the capital ship tonnage ratio of 5:5:3 in return for the nonfortification agreements. The combination of the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the nonfortification agreement gave Japan greater security and a freer hand in Asia. Her only other choice was to continue the ruinous naval race in capital ships. The Japanese were pleased that the naval ratio did not apply to submarines and other classes of vessels. Consequently, with the funds saved from battleship construction a secret naval building program, "taking advantage of treaty loopholes," was approved in order to build "modern weapons in which the fleet was deficient."⁹⁹

France and Italy. France and Italy were to keep essentially what they had; however, France was obsessed with the desire for security against a German attack. By concentrating on her army during the war and thereafter, France's pre-war first-rank navy had been allowed to fall behind. Not wishing to accept an inferior position, the French insisted on 350,000 tons of capital ships, twice the level on which Hughes "existing navies" ratios were based. Finally, because of strong public opinion, France reluctantly accepted the 1.67 ratio assigned but refused to accept limitations on cruisers, destroyers or submarines.¹⁰⁰

Italy took a similar stand on cruisers, destroyers and submarines, because she could not afford capital ships.¹⁰¹ The limitations on submarines was a major obstacle with Italy, as she considered submarines extremely important as a defensive weapon for weaker nations. Great Britain wanted a conference agreement to abolish submarines, because of the World War I experience fresh in her mind. Lord Balfour considered the submarine "a class of vessel which in the last war was grossly abused," although he conceded that the vessel, properly used by a weak power, was a good defensive weapon.¹⁰² Many other arguments were put forward against submarines, and Secretary Hughes had even set up ratios for this type vessel which were never ratified.¹⁰³ But Italy could not be convinced. Italy's insistence on parity with France in all classes further clouded any agreement on lesser vessels.

Summary of the Washington Conference of 1922. In order to make some evaluation of the Washington Conference in retrospect, it is necessary to look at its successes and failures.

Successes.

1. A ten-year naval building holiday was established on capital ships in which only replacements could be built. After scrapping and within Treaty limitations, the navies of the five powers would stand as follows in capital ships:¹⁰⁴

| <u>Country</u> | <u>Number Scrapped</u> | <u>Number Retained</u> | <u>Tonnage Retained</u> |
|----------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| United States | 28 (1) | 18 | 500,650 |
| British Empire | 24 | 22 | 580,450 |
| Japan | 16 | 10 | 301,320 |
| France | - | 10 | 221,170 |
| Italy | - | 10 | 182,800 |

Note: (1) The United States scrapped eleven capital ships being built under the 1916 building program, while two battle cruisers (LEXINGTON and SARATOGA) were converted into aircraft carriers.

2. The termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance allayed the United States concern of an attack on the West Coast and gave the United States virtual control of the Eastern Pacific.

3. Although it has been hypothesized that the limitations placed on fleets weakened national power which resulted in Pearl Harbor, the American conference objectives to check

the naval race and to benefit from financial savings and reduced tensions were achieved for over a decade. The failure was that Congress and Presidential administrations would not appropriate funds to build to treaty tonnage levels, because people "had all the war, all the taxation, and all the military service that they want."¹⁰⁵

The United States was not totally without other coercive power in relations with Japan - still the "Number One Enemy" - since 40 percent of Japan's trade travelled across the Pacific to the United States and Canada and was still within reach of American naval power.¹⁰⁶

Failures.

1. Since the conference failed to set limits on all categories, a naval race began in the cruiser, submarine, and auxiliary craft classes. In addition, qualitative improvements came off the drawing board including battleships with higher speeds (DUNKERQUE) and major armaments concentrated forward (RODNEY) requiring less overall armor protection. Ships were also built capable of taking larger caliber guns at a later date and which sacrificed armor protection for speed (GNEISENAU).¹⁰⁷ As already indicated, many hulls were converted into aircraft carriers.

2. The fixed ratios restricted future British political freedom of action in the Far East and restricted her ability to meet new strategic threats which might have nothing to do

with either the American or Japanese fleets. Acceptance of this mistake was motivated, as Lord Balfour indicated, "by the desire to reach an agreement; by the instinct to appease."¹⁰⁸ As it turned out, the British search for economy and euphoria continued to see naval building programs reduced or cancelled, despite Admiralty warnings, until it was impossible to either properly fortify overseas bases or defend national interests. Prime Minister Massey of New Zealand, distrustful of Japan, warned British leaders against "hasty disarmament" and that re-arming, especially in the building of warships took a long time. He also reminded them that "there were no clouds on the horizon tonight, but there might be plenty here tomorrow."¹⁰⁹

3. Although the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was a shock to the Japanese, its termination, plus the nonfortification agreement, strengthened the strategic position of Japan and gave her virtually a free hand in the Far East and Western Pacific, including all Asiatic waters between Indo-China and the Aleutians.¹¹⁰ Continuation of the alliance and the close British relationship which had existed might have altered later events in the Pacific.

Perhaps best summarizing the Washington Conference is Merze Tate's conclusion:

...considering in retrospect the history...since the Washington Treaties were signed, it is difficult to hail the conference as a diplomatic victory for the United States. Instead of securing our national interests vis-a-vis Great Britain and Japan, we made

a double surrender. In consenting in advance to scrap our excess tonnage in capital ships, the United States relinquished the most effective means of obtaining British consent to parity in all other categories. Likewise, in pledging ourselves not to add to the existing fortifications on Guam, Tutuila, the Aleutians, and the Philippines, we surrendered our power to act in the Far East not only to preserve the "open door" and the territorial integrity of China but to protect our own outlying possessions. When war with Japan came, the Philippines, Guam, and Wake were hers. Even Hawaii was at her mercy had Japan realized it. Air Power, which has profoundly altered the strategy and use of naval strength, was left out of consideration. Nor was real progress in limitation or reduction of naval armaments achieved, for the restrictions in the treaty extended only to dreadnoughts and aircraft carriers. As a consequence, the naval race was transferred from capital ships to big cruisers, and in this category a new competition ensued.¹¹¹

The Geneva Three Power Naval Conference of 1927. Increasing tensions after 1924 between Japan and the United States and the continuing naval race in the unlimited categories of the Washington Naval Treaty -- in which the United States failed to keep up with other naval powers due to interests in economy and hopes for disarmament and world peace -- prompted President Coolidge, on 10 February 1927, to propose a meeting of the five parties of the Washington Naval Treaty to meet at Geneva to complete the work of the Washington Conference. The President was also trying to thwart big navy protagonists, who were demanding a large increase in auxiliary classes, and to bring about a success similar to President Harding's Washington Conference.¹¹²

Alleging a prior commitment to the disarmament program of the League of Nations, France and Italy declined the invitation. Actually both were still smarting from the inferior capital-ship tonnage ratio they received at the Washington Conference; and both hoped to regain their status as major naval powers by building extensively in the unlimited categories. Italy was also intent on attaining parity with France because of her "unfavorable geographic position."¹¹³

The American proposal presented in June 1927 to extend the Washington Treaty tonnage ratios to all other categories formed the basis for discussion and was as follows:¹¹⁴

Cruiser class

| | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| United States..... | 250,000 - 300,000 tons |
| British Empire..... | 250,000 - 300,000 tons |
| Japan..... | 150,000 - 180,000 tons |

Destroyer class

| | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| United States..... | 200,000 - 250,000 tons |
| British Empire..... | 200,000 - 250,000 tons |
| Japan..... | 120,000 - 150,000 tons |

Submarine class

| | |
|---------------------|----------------------|
| United States..... | 60,000 - 90,000 tons |
| British Empire..... | 60,000 - 90,000 tons |
| Japan..... | 36,000 - 54,000 tons |

The proposal invoked immediate and strong objection, particularly on the cruiser issue.

Japan had led in cruiser construction after 1922. Therefore she hoped to stabilize her ratio at existing levels which would have made her ratio seventy percent of American cruiser

tonnage.¹¹⁵ Although Japan had hoped for this higher ratio, the minimum tonnage levels proposed by the United States for Japan were acceptable to the Japanese delegates. Japan also did not object to limiting 10,000 tons cruisers only, as it would provide resources for smaller type warship construction.¹¹⁶

The real controversy at the conference arose between the United States and Great Britain. The British insisted on a minimum of seventy cruisers for defense of her commerce and security for her empire. Another stumbling block was the issue of the 10,000 ton cruisers. Twenty-five to thirty 10,000 ton cruisers were considered satisfactory for United States needs. Britain's naval requirements, including 7,500 ton six-inch cruisers, were presented on 8 July, as follows:¹¹⁷

Cruisers

| | | |
|----|---|--------------|
| 15 | 10,000-ton cruisers carrying 8-inch guns... | 150,000 tons |
| 55 | 7,500-ton cruisers carrying 6-inch guns... | 422,000 tons |
| | Total cruiser tonnage..... | 572,000 tons |

Destroyers

| | | |
|-----|------------------------------|--------------|
| 16 | Destroyer leaders..... | 29,600 tons |
| 128 | Destroyers..... | 192,000 tons |
| | Total destroyer tonnage..... | 221,600 tons |

Submarines

| | | |
|-------|---|--------------------|
| 40-45 | of 1,000-1,600 tons plus 15-20 of below 600 tons..... | 76,000-81,000 tons |
|-------|---|--------------------|

The British felt that six-inch cruisers provided the same security at reduced costs. The United States feared that six-inch guns placed on merchant vessels -- where Britain had an edge -- could change the whole picture.¹¹⁸ As a

consequence, the Conference foundered on the cruiser issue, since none of the powers considered themselves as having similar defense requirements. It should be noted that at this conference high-ranking naval officers dominated the national delegations, and they had a much different view of national security than their civilian counterparts.¹¹⁹

The Geneva Conference failed because it tried to set limitations without first trying to settle political differences. Trying to set parity to different strategic requirements was impossible. As Charles P. Howland wrote:

There is no 'technical base' for establishing ratios of armaments among nations; it is impossible to determine what type of ships or how many of them are 'needful' unless there is an understanding of the purposes for which they are intended.¹²⁰

Thus, geographical, political, economic and historical conditions made it impossible for each power to agree to any parity which would not result in superiority for each.

This was a bitter defeat for arms reductions, even though the Powers declared that they would continue to bring about further reductions in naval armaments. As a result, many Americans felt that the "only way to bring about disarmament was to build up such a large navy that the other navies, in self-defense, would be forced to accept limitations." The Senate of the United States, however, held off approving such a program pending the outcome of the Kellogg-Briand negotiations.¹²¹

Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. Immediately after the 1928 elections, President Coolidge surprised everyone by calling upon Congress to pass a bill for fifteen cruisers which the Senate had previously rejected. As a consequence, both the naval bill and the Kellogg-Briand Pact came before the Senate at the same time.¹²²

The Kellogg-Briand Pact came into effect on 24 July 1929 and reads as follows:

ARTICLE I

The high contracting parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

ARTICLE II

The high contracting parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.

Almost all the nations signed and ratified the Pact, each taking care to "exempt its vested interests from the confines of the treaty."¹²³ The United States exempted her commitments under the Monroe Doctrine, and Great Britain exempted her commitment toward her Empire and the Dominions.

The cruiser bill was approved in February 1929 with a provision that the building program might be suspended should a naval limitations agreement be negotiated.¹²⁴

The London Naval Conference of 1930. The failure to come to an agreement at Geneva threatened to start another

naval race. In the Autumn of 1929, Britain's Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald visited President Hoover. Both agreed to hold another naval conference in London in January 1930. This time all five parties to the Washington Naval Treaty agreed to attend. The Conference turned out to be a success, as far as the United States, Britain and Japan were concerned. France and Italy were still at loggerheads over their respective ratios and with their rivalries in the Mediterranean. This kept the Conference in session for three months. In the end, France and Italy did not ratify the Agreement. France also reiterated her view on the interdependence of naval, military and air armaments.¹²⁵

The primary purpose of the London Naval Conference was "to transform the process of naval armaments from a method of competition to one of mutual agreement and limitation." In this regard it aimed at removing secrecy, with less regard to economy, and to "leaving each nation free to provide adequately for its defense without becoming a source of worry and suspicion to its neighbors."¹²⁶

The American objectives at the Conference (taken from the Abstract of Testimony on the Conference to the Senate) were as follows:

1. To cooperate with the delegations in terminating naval competition by limiting all classes of warships;
2. To assure equality of naval strength for the United States with Great Britain;

3. To arrange a satisfactory relation between our Navy and that of the Japanese;
4. To bring about reductions in tonnage wherever practicable.¹²⁷

Japan's insistence on a more favorable parity in eight-inch cruisers with the United States (and Britain) also prevented an early agreement. In the end it was agreed that the Japanese could have seventy percent of United States (and British) cruiser tonnage rather than the sixty percent originally envisioned under the Washington Naval Treaty 5-5-3 ratio. Japan also gave notice that if the powers should meet again in five years, she might insist on parity in all categories.¹²⁸

The British and Americans came to a fast agreement on cruiser tonnage parity which called for no more than fifty cruisers for Britain. This agreement was possible by dividing the cruisers into heavy and light categories.¹²⁹

The limitations for the three naval powers was set by treaty in all categories as follows:¹³⁰

| <u>Categories</u> | <u>United States</u> | <u>Great Britain</u> | <u>Japan</u> |
|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------|
| 8-inch-gun cruisers | 180,000 tons | 146,800 tons | 108,400 tons |
| 6-inch-gun cruisers | 143,500 tons | 192,200 tons | 100,450 tons |
| Total | 323,500 tons | 339,000 tons | 208,850 tons |
| Destroyers | 150,000 tons | 150,000 tons | 105,500 tons |
| Submarines | 52,700 tons | 52,700 tons | 52,700 tons |

The United States was also given the option to duplicate Britain's tonnage figures if she wished to have fifteen instead of eight eight-inch cruisers.

The "naval holiday" on capital ship building was extended until 1936, and each agreed to scrap some older battleships (Britain-five, Japan-one, and the United States-three). The ratio thus became 15-15-9 for Britain, America, and Japan respectively.¹³¹

The London Naval Treaty also had an "escape clause" in which the Powers could give notice if they no longer wished to be bound by the treaty limitations. The United States and Britain, although accepting equality in submarine tonnage with Japan, agreed to continue efforts to abolish submarines.

Summary. The bickering that took place at the London Naval Conference of 1930 concerning naval requirements proved once again that disarmament was a question of politics and not mathematics.

Britain was willing for the time being to reduce her requirements in cruisers to fifty vice seventy as long as she had parity and a program for new construction.¹³² The Admiralty and the Dominions continued to warn the British Government of the dangers of reductions in sea power, but the Labour Government was intent on coming to an agreement for economic reasons and seemed content to depend on the League of Nations for enforcement of world peace.¹³³

The United States had concluded a naval armaments treaty which had by tonnages given her a navy "second to none" in all categories. But this parity was only on paper and in

order to achieve its real meaning the United States would have to spend a billion dollars to build up to the treaty limits. And it would take years to build the fleet up because of the business depression. The Senators at first refused to ratify the treaty because they and the Hearst Press insisted that Japan and Britain had "put something over" on the United States in giving Japan an increased capital ship ratio and equality in other areas. Japan was still considered the potential enemy. After seeing the President's confidential papers on the Conference, the Senate ratified the treaty with a resolution "that the United States was not bound by any secret understandings."¹³⁴

The Japanese were quite pleased with the London Naval Agreement as it was a victory in their civilian progress to constitutional government. Japan had gone to London to negotiate the ratio system and to give the Japanese Navy time to modernize. Since 1922, Japan had embarked on a secret naval program building prototypes of new experimental ships superior in speed and armament to anything the Western powers had.¹³⁵ Japan gained further concessions that strengthened her dominance in Eastern Asian waters. Although statistically inferior in ship numbers, Japan was safe in her home waters unless the combined strength of the United States and British navies were brought against her simultaneously. Prime Minister MacDonald's pacifism and growing Italian military power in the Mediterranean made such action unlikely.¹³⁶

After the signing of the Treaty in October 1930, Japan continued to expand and perfect her naval air power with her four carriers and embarked on a new building program. Admiral Yamamoto, the Japanese delegate at the Conference, who saw the future potential in aircraft carriers, was most pleased that no limitations were placed on these.¹³⁷

Italy's inferior position to France was Benito Mussolini's bete noire. Italy had offered to reduce her naval forces "to any level not lower than any other Continental power" and to do away with submarines, which she considered an excellent weapon for a weak nation. Though Italy had no intentions of building a fleet equal to France's, Italy resented the French position "that Italy should agree never to do so."¹³⁸

The London Naval Treaty again brought on qualitative changes. The Japanese replaced twin eight-inch turrets with triple six-inch turrets in some cruiser classes, thus nearly doubling the broadside firepower against other six-inch cruisers.¹³⁹ Other improvements were also made in types, such as five-inch guns for destroyers and larger torpedo tubes.

The Preparatory Commission for The World Disarmament Conference of 1932-1933. The League of Nations Council had been entrusted by Article 8 of the Covenant to formulate plans for the reduction of armaments to be considered by the world governments. Article 9 further called for the establishment of a permanent commission to assist the Council in formulating

plans to reduce armaments. As a result of these two articles, each Council member named three representatives - an army, a navy, and an air expert - to a Permanent Advisory Commission on Military, Naval and Air Affairs.

The United States had not joined the League of Nations after World War I and did not participate officially in League disarmament discussions until 1924. In January 1923, the United States had been asked for its position on the St. Germain Convention on the regulation of arms traffic. After the State Department replied that it approved of efforts to regulate arms traffic (although it could not get Congressional approval for adherence to the St. Germain Convention), the United States was invited to participate in the League Draft Convention on the Traffic of Arms.¹⁴⁰

In December 1925 the Preparatory Commission replaced the Permanent Advisory Commission. The new Commission was tasked to determine what arms should be limited and how the limitations should be accomplished. The task of the Commission was complicated, however, because disarmament could not be separated from the problem of security.

The nineteen nations on the Preparatory Commission included Great Britain, Italy, France, Japan, Germany, the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States had joined in January 1926 with President Coolidge's special message to Congress as follows:

The general policy of this Government in favour of disarmament and limitation of armaments cannot be emphasized too frequently or too strongly. In accordance with that policy, any measure having a reasonable tendency to bring about these results should receive our sympathy and support. The conviction that competitive armaments constitute a powerful factor in the promotion of war is more widely and justifiably held than ever before, and the necessity for lifting the burden of taxation from the peoples of the world by limiting armaments is becoming daily more imperative.¹⁴¹

This statement only committed the United States to participation in preliminary planning and not to participation in any future League disarmament conference.

The work of the Preparatory Commission is presented because various schemes for limitations on naval armaments were considered and are worthy of note.

One of these concerned "limitations on naval effectives," i.e., men in the navies. The United States, Japan and Britain favored only limiting ships and guns as this would automatically limit manpower. The Continental powers opposed this argument because well trained naval forces, even without naval material, could be used for occupation duties or to supplement land forces. The United States and Britain agreed to concede this point should a satisfactory agreement be reached on warship limitations.¹⁴²

Another dealt directly with naval limitation, an area in which the United States was particularly interested since the navy was considered as the first line of defense, as it was also in Britain and Japan. Consequently, these three wished

to deal "directly and separately with the problem of naval material." The Continental nations viewed navies as only one part of a whole. The French, supported by Italy, declared that:

...any method which arbitrarily separated the three categories of armaments on the combination of which the security of a country depends would be going beyond the degree of simplification which can be accepted.¹⁴³

The smaller nations wished to arrange their tonnages according to needs, whereas the larger naval powers were intent on "limitations by categories since it offered greater security by prohibiting sudden shifts in the character of navies."¹⁴⁴ In 1927, the French delegates presented a compromise proposal based on total tonnage and tonnage by categories. No agreement could be reached on naval limitations; and, by 1930, it was generally accepted that this was in the purview of the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy to settle.

The American position aimed at continuing discussion, and what became known as the "yardstick" was presented by Hugh Gibson, the American delegate, in 1929, as follows:

My Government is disposed to give full and friendly consideration to any supplementary method of limitation which may be calculated to make our proposals, the French thesis, or any other, acceptable to other Powers, and, if such a course appears desirable, my Government will be prepared to give consideration to a method of estimating equivalent naval values which takes account of other factors than displacement tonnage alone. In order to arrive at a basis of comparison in the case of categories in which there are

marked variations as to unit characteristics, it might be desirable in arriving at a formula for estimating equivalent tonnage, to consider certain factors which produce these variations, such as age, unit displacement, and calibre of guns.¹⁴⁵

The "yardstick" was of importance as it made possible the cruiser agreement at the 1930 London Conference.

The Preparatory Commission also discussed maximum specifications for warships. The United States position was that it needed large warships with long cruising radii because of a lack of bases and for the defense of the Panama Canal.¹⁴⁶ The other naval powers were amenable to reductions; however, no progress was made because of the American stand. In the end the Washington Naval Treaty limits were accepted.

Budgetary limitations on armaments was another approach considered. France and the Continental nations supported this approach as an "auxiliary method of arms reduction." France probably advocated this policy to prevent the defeated powers, whose budgets were unrestricted, from building small, efficiently mechanized armies.¹⁴⁷ The United States was the leading opponent of budgetary limitations. In November 1926, the United States, together with the British Empire, Chile, France, Italy, Germany, Japan, Finland and the Netherlands supported the following:

The percentage of its total budget expenditure which a given country devotes to its national defense could not be regarded as a factor for estimating the military effort made by that country without inducing comparisons, which would be both misleading and unfair, between the

different countries. The total budgets are framed on principles which are peculiar to the respective States, and military expenditure must be estimated with reference to the requirements of national security and not to the financial situation of the country as shown by budgets.¹⁴⁸

Other proposals included limiting war potential:

"merging of the peace activities of a nation into the means of making war at all points in science and industry." War potential included manpower, economic wealth, geographic locations of a nation, efficiency and potential enemies. France again attached great significance to this proposal. The United States, again, was opposed, and supported by the British Empire, Germany, Chile, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and Spain.¹⁴⁹

Limitations on civil aviation and aerial bombardment were also proposed but nothing came of these. Again, these proposals were opposed by the United States.

An item worthy of note occurred in the Commission immediately after the failure of the Geneva Naval Conference of 1927. Maxim Litvinov, the Russian delegate to the Preparatory Commission, proposed that "all armies, navies and air forces should be immediately abolished, and all war materials and arms factories destroyed."¹⁵⁰ This proposal was again put forward by Litvinov at the World Disarmament Conference but again received no support.¹⁵¹ This was a sound policy for the Soviet Union to pursue at a time when security was stronger than ever in the Soviet Union, when she was militarily

weak, and when she was engaged in an immense industrial and economic recovery program. The proposal bears a striking resemblance to that made by the Tsar at the Hague in 1899 and in post World War II Soviet proposals. No one was about to accept this proposal of complete and general disarmament.

The World Disarmament Conference 1932-1933. The World Disarmament Conference met in Geneva on 2 February 1932 with sixty-one states attending. The French wanted an international police force and security guarantees. The United States and Britain opposed a supranational force. The British recommended "qualitative limitations" -- that is, limitations, not by numbers, but by the complete abolition of armaments lending themselves to offensive rather than defensive warfare. The Germans demanded equality -- which was opposed by France -- maintaining that "all armaments prohibited by the Versaille Treaty were offensive, all others defensive." In July 1932 Germany dropped out of the Conference and did not return until December when she received a guarantee that Germany would have equality at future conventions.

With this brief background, how were limitations in naval arms treated?

The United States was still genuinely interested in a step by step reduction of great power armaments, which was a policy "in harmony with our national interests from both the realistic and idealistic points of view."¹⁵² On 9 February, Hugh Gibson presented the following United States position:

1. The American Government advocates consideration of the draft convention as containing the outline of a convenient basis for discussion, while expressing its entire willingness to give full consideration to any supplementary proposals calculated to advance the end we all seek.
2. We suggest the possibility of prolonging the existing naval agreements concluded in Washington and London, and we advocate completing the latter as soon as possible by the adherence of France and Italy.
3. We advocate proportional reduction from the figures laid down in the Washington and London agreements on naval tonnage as soon as all parties to the Washington agreement have entered this frame-work.
4. We advocate, as we long have done, the total abolition of sub-marines.
5. We will join in formulating the most effective measures to protect populations against aerial bombing.
6. We advocate the total abolition of lethal gases and bacteriological warfare.
7. We advocate, as I have already stated, the computation of the numbers of the armed forces on the basis of the effectives necessary for the maintenance of internal order plus some suitable contingent for defense. The former are obviously impossible of reduction; the latter is a question of relativity.
8. We agree in advocating special restrictions for tanks and heavy mobile guns; in other words, for those arms of a peculiarly aggressive character.
9. We are prepared to consider a limitation of expenditures on material as a complementary method to direct limitation, feeling that it may prove useful to prevent a qualitative race, if and when quantitative limitation has been effected.¹⁵³

The position was further clarified by President Hoover's policy statement on 22 June, as follows:

First: The Briand-Kellogg Pact to which we are all signatories can only mean that the nations of the world have agreed that they will use their arms solely for defense.

Second: This reduction should be carried out not only by broad general cuts in armaments but by increasing the comparative power of defense through decreases in the power of attack.

Third: The armaments of the world have grown up in mutual relation to each other. And, speaking generally, such relativity should be preserved in making reductions.

Fourth: The reductions must be real and positive. They must effect economic relief.

Fifth: There are three problems to deal with-land forces, air forces and naval forces. They are all interconnected. No part of the proposals which I can make can be disassociated one from the other.

Based on these principles, I propose that the armies of the world be reduced by nearly one-third.¹⁵⁴

It is ironic that many years and a World War later proposals similar to those proposed by President Hoover were advanced repeatedly, not by the United States, but rather by the Soviet Union.

As to naval arms limitations, Hoover recommended a one-third reduction in battleships, and that the categoric tonnages of aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers be reduced by one-fourth. submarine overall tonnages should be less than 35,000 tons for each nation, divided into not more than forty units, with each submarine limited to 1200 tons. Hoover also proposed that France and Italy accept the tonnage limits for cruisers and destroyers proposed at the London Treaty.¹⁵⁵ No direct action was taken on these proposals.

In the discussions on the prohibition of submarines as offensive weapons, the British and Germans took opposite sides.

The British claimed they were offensive because of their ability to attack lines of communications and commerce. The Germans maintained that the submarine was a defensive weapon against the fleets of the great naval powers. The French and Italians also valued submarines for their defensive capabilities.¹⁵⁶

On 20 July, Sir John Simon presented a draft resolution calling for the prohibition of (1) chemical, bacteriological and incendiary warfare, and (2) air attack on civilian populations. Forty-one nations voted for the resolution on 23 July, two voted against, and eight abstained. Germany voted against the resolution because of her claims to equality. The Soviet Union opposed the resolution because it did not go far enough toward disarmament.¹⁵⁷

The World Disarmament Conference failed because of the unwillingness of France to disarm in advance of security guarantees, the impracticability of treating disarmament as a simple problem of arithmetic, and the Japanese attack on Shanghai while the Conference was in session.

Great Britain, at the World Disarmament Conference had tried to satisfy both France and Germany and thereby establish a secure peace in Europe. Japan's takeover of Manchuria, commencing in September 1931, also stirred grave doubts in the British Government as to the prudence of further naval disarmament. The naval agreements and the cutting of the

fleet for economic considerations had left British sea power incapable of confronting Japan in the Far East. On top of this, Britain had reduced her navy and sacrificed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to "obtain American goodwill; and now that they were face to face with Japan in arms, goodwill was exactly what they got from America."¹⁵⁸ In 1933, Britain accelerated completion of Singapore and commenced a navy building program. As Correlli Barnett states:

All this proved a painful and dangerous lesson that it took longer for England to build ships and naval bases than for a foreign country to change its government and policy.¹⁵⁹

About all the United States did was to protest the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. In March 1933, Japan walked out of the League of Nations.

A further difficulty of additional cuts in naval tonnages was that the United States was not up to treaty limits. If Britain and Japan reduced further it would have tended to give the United States more combat parity vis-a-vis the others. Japan and Britain were now reluctant to do so. The United States was not concerned in late 1932 with the world beyond the seas for she was in a deep economic depression, which showed no signs of ebbing.

With a new administration under the "Navy-minded" President Franklin D. Roosevelt, a new navy building program was inaugurated calling for four new cruisers, two aircraft carriers, sixteen destroyers, and four submarines to bring

the United States Navy up to the 1930 London Treaty limits. Japan and some European powers viewed this program as the initiation of a new naval race. The Japanese considered this program as aimed at them. Consequently, in December 1933, Japan announced a program to construct twenty-two ships to build up to treaty limits. The United States was in fact planning for a contingency of war against Japan.¹⁶⁰

In addition to strengthening its position in the Pacific with its new naval building programs, the United States also did so diplomatically by recognizing the Soviet Union in November 1933 in order to check Japanese influence in Northern China.

The London Naval Conference of 1935. Preliminary conversations took place in 1934 to set up the agenda for the second London Conference. The United States recommended a twenty percent reduction in the tonnages fixed in the Washington and London Treaties. The United States was also willing to continue these treaty limitations if an agreement could be worked out. Britain was in agreement, but wished further qualitative limits in capital ship size and gun caliber. Britain also wanted to increase her cruiser level to seventy.¹⁶¹

The qualitative limits proposed by Britain were opposed by the United States, who reiterated her needs for larger warships because of lack of bases. Concessions on the cruiser issue were acceptable to the United States since she had been

converted to the utility of six-inch cruisers; and with twenty-seven 10,000 ton cruisers the United States had superiority in this category.

The British and Americans were also amenable to a reduction in maximum aircraft carrier tonnage. And, although they wanted to stop further submarine construction, they realized that France, Italy and Japan would oppose such an agreement.

Discussions with Japan during the latter part of the year centered around Japan's insistence on naval parity. These discussions ended while the delegates considered the following British proposals which aimed at salvaging as much of the previous naval treaties as possible:

- (1) retention of the provisions for non-fortification of bases in the Far East;
- (2) qualitative limitations;
- (3) a statement of building programs to cover a period of say--six years; and
- (4) retention of existing clauses in the Washington Treaty regarding notification of the laying down of new ships.¹⁶²

Japan continued in her demands for equality with the United States and Britain. France and Italy objected to the "six years" program as it smacked of a continuation of the ratio system.

Consequently, when the delegates of the five nations met on 9 December 1935 in London there was little hope for an agreement along previous lines. Two possibilities existed:

either to exchange building information or to set qualitative limits (which according to the British would affect savings and reduce naval competition).¹⁶³ The Japanese would not, however, accept qualitative limitations without concomitant quantitative limitations. This view was unacceptable to the other nations. Great Britain and the United States could not grant naval equality to Japan either, because it would give Japan absolute supremacy in the Pacific.

After five weeks of negotiations, the Japanese delegates withdrew from the Conference. Hirohito had secretly directed Admiral Yamamoto to break off discussions. The London Naval Treaty of 1930 was due to expire on 31 December 1936 and Japan wished to launch ships she was building over and above treaty tonnage limitations both in quality and quantity. Prior to announcing Japan's withdrawal from the treaty, Yamamoto made a dramatic proposal to do away with aircraft carriers.¹⁶⁴

All efforts to make concessions to the Japanese failed. In the end, only a limited agreement full of loopholes was concluded between the United States, Great Britain and France.

This was the last formal attempt at naval arms limitations before World War II. Too much had taken place in the meantime. Japan had taken the North Chinese provinces in 1933. Germany had repudiated the Versailles Treaty, re-armed, and concluded the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935, which allowed for the building of a German surface navy up to

thirty-five percent of British tonnage and as many submarines as Britain had. The Italians had invaded Ethiopia, and the Civil War in Spain had broken out. The world was rearming once again, building bigger and more ships in preparation for the wars to come.

Merze Tate again very well summarizes the period with her comment:

Sixteen years of attempted limitation of naval armament by the conference or legislative method had ended with the great naval powers returning to virtually unrestricted competition. Efforts in behalf of naval disarmament based upon security ratios had begun with the scrapping of capital ships and agreements not to fortify Pacific bases. All attempts to bring about limitation ceased in 1938. Japan's rivals in that year were in a far less favorable position than they had been in 1921. Neither Great Britain nor the United States was any longer capable of protecting by force of arms territory in the western Pacific. Both, therefore, were to face humiliating and catastrophic defeats as a direct result of the concessions they had made at Washington in 1922.¹⁶⁵

And as Frederick L. Schuman in his book International Politics, and Introduction to the Western State System states:

After sixteen years, the circle of frustration was closed. Efforts at world disarmament through the League had begun with the unilateral disarmament of Germany. The efforts ceased with the unilateral rearmament of Germany. The collective intelligence of Europe, having failed to achieve security, turned towards preparation for suicide.¹⁶⁶

It must be remembered, in retrospect, that naval disarmament was a restricted and relatively simple matter except for the Treaty of Versailles provisions limiting German naval

rearmament. The parties were former allies, and the naval treaties were intended to do no more than to discourage building programs. By the 1930's, the powers tried to tie disarmament to security. But it was soon realized that there could be no disarmament without security and no security without disarmament on good faith. By 1937, the search for a balanced system of armaments was abandoned. As the authors, Spanier and Noguee, conclude: "Indeed the tragedy of the 1930s was that the Western democracies did not rearm sufficiently or speedily enough to deter World War II."¹⁶⁷

The Nuclear Age: To SALT I

In the introduction, it was stated that this paper would concentrate on conventional armaments rather than on nuclear weapons or on strategic deterrence systems designed specifically for the purpose of delivering nuclear weapons. Inasmuch as strategic nuclear deterrence is a recognized fact, the following discussion will be limited to proposals reflecting controls on conventional armaments, even though these armaments might have secondary strategic nuclear capabilities. This discussion will also look at Soviet and American trends in arms control proposals. Further discussions on the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) and other pertinent arms control treaties will appear in later chapters.

The search for disarmament did not end with the commencement of World War II. As early as 1941 the Allies were

looking forward to some system of disarmament after the war which would provide for security as well. This hope was embodied in Article 8 of the Atlantic Charter, which reads as follows:

They believe that all the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.¹⁶⁸

After the war, it appears that the drafters of the United Nations Charter gave primary emphasis to security as a first step to disarmament. The two Charter Articles dealing with disarmament bear this out.

Article 11.1: The General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments...

Article 26: In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating plans to be submitted to the members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

Considerations were even given by Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt to disarming all nations except the "Big Three" (with some reservation to France) and in this way maintaining

peace and security in the world. The dropping of the atom bomb on Hiroshima in August 1945 after the Charter was signed in San Francisco and the continued occupation of Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union after the conclusion of the war negated the possibilities of such a plan taking place. Security with disarmament was viewed as impossible, and the political events which followed in Berlin, Greece, the Suez, Hungary, Cuba and the Middle East proved that armaments and the capability to project power provided deterrence and security.

The Security Council of the United Nations attempted to cope with the atomic weapons problems initially with the establishment of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in January 1946. Subsequent disarmament commissions dealt with both conventional and atomic armaments. The major part of the discussions on disarmament, however, centered around nuclear weapons. The United States, supported by Great Britain, had hoped to regulate atomic energy and to eventually promote its use "for peaceful and humanitarian ends" (Baruch Plan of 1946) as only they knew the technique of making atomic weapons. But on 19 June 1946, the Soviet representative to the Atomic Energy Commission called for "an international convention to prohibit immediately the production and employment of weapons based on the use of atomic energy."¹⁶⁹ This point is emphasized because it shows once again the Russian/Soviet position of others disarming to increase Russian/Soviet

security without an inspection mechanism to ensure that they themselves were observing their part of the commitment, a theme that has perpetuated itself to the present day.

In October 1946 the Soviets surprised the West and the General Assembly by putting forward a proposal for the reduction of conventional armaments. In effect the proposal called for general disarmament with the control and reduction of all types of armaments and armed forces.¹⁷⁰ The problem of verification by inspection was avoided.

The Soviets have continued this type of propaganda campaign within the United Nations and outside -- e.g., the Stockholm appeal to "Ban the Bomb" in March 1950 -- to secure disarmament without safeguards. Such other campaigns to abolish overseas bases, to bring the boys home, and to prohibit biological and chemical warfare were also conducted. At the same time, the Soviets were consolidating their gains in Europe and establishing new spheres of influence within their orbit. It does not take much to see the strategic and political intent of these Soviet proposals and rhetoric to unilaterally disarm the West -- whether formally or informally made -- and to shift the military balance to favor the Soviet Union.

In October 1949, at the United Nations Conventional Armaments Commission, the French called for a "census and verification of armed forces and armaments" as a system of

regulating arms and armed forces. This proposal was vetoed by the Soviets with a counterproposal that:

...prohibition of atomic weapons should take place simultaneously with any conventional reductions, and second, that conventional disarmament should consist of a flat-rate one-third cut all round in armed forces.¹⁷¹

When the West refused, the Soviets walked out of the Commission.

By the early 1950s, it became evident to the West that disarmament negotiations would remain stalemated until some agreement could be made to settle political differences and "to correct the strategic imbalance favoring the Soviet Union in conventional weapons" before the elimination of nuclear weapons by the United States could be carried out. Based on this premise, the United Nations General Assembly agreed to discuss nuclear and conventional armaments together. Consequently Western proposals until 1956 were based on the following framework:

1. Regulation and balanced reductions of all armed forces and all armaments;
2. elimination of weapons of mass destruction;
3. international control of atomic energy;
4. safeguards.¹⁷²

In August 1953 the Soviet Union detonated its first H-bomb and the strategic balance changed.

It was also in the early and mid-1950s that the emphasis on disarmament (as defined earlier) changed to a concept of

arms control on United States initiative.¹⁷³ Arms control is defined by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as follows:

Formal or informal international action placing limitations on armed forces, armaments, and military expenditures. Includes restrictions on the use, levels, or deployment of weapons or forces; disarmament; actions to prevent the spread of weapons; and any other measures for preventing, controlling, or terminating hostilities. In a broad sense, also includes steps to produce a peaceful international environment conducive to such matters.¹⁷⁴

With this background, a review of those proposals which followed and which applied to conventional naval forces is appropriate. It should be kept in mind throughout that verification and inspection was a principle desired by the West, and one to which the Soviets repeatedly objected. This attitude of the Soviets concerning inspection goes back to the days of Ivan the Terrible and the Russian xenophobia. Aside from considering Western inspection as a means of espionage, the Soviets also fear too much Western influence which might tend to create serious internal disorder. Western influence could also threaten the tight hold Russian leaders have traditionally had on the population.

In May 1952, a British-French-American proposal was made in reply to the Soviet one-third cut proposal calling for numerical limitations of armed forces at ceilings of 1.5 million men each to the United States, the Soviet Union and China and 700,000 to 800,000 men each to Great Britain and

France. The Soviets rejected it, proposing only a plan for prohibition of atomic weapons and international control to be put into effect simultaneously.¹⁷⁵ This plan stated only a conclusion and not a subject of discussion, and was, therefore considered as propaganda.

In April 1954, the Five-Power Subcommittee -- consisting of the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France -- was formed by the Disarmament Commission to discuss in private "a solution to the disarmament deadlock."¹⁷⁶ One of the most balanced plans proposed was the Anglo-French Plan of 11 June 1954 which included phasing and timing for the disarmament program with each level subject to inspection and control. This three-stage disarmament scheme called for:

1. A freeze on military establishments and budgets at the 31 December 1953 levels.
2. An agreed first half reductions in conventional armaments and forces, plus a "cut-off" on production of nuclear weapons.
3. Completing the remaining half of the agreed conventional reductions; and when this was accomplished, proceeding to the complete prohibition and elimination of all nuclear weapons and the conversion of existing stocks to peaceful use. The plan was saying in essence: "We will ban the bomb if you will accept proper controls plus parity in ordinary armaments and armed forces."¹⁷⁷

The Soviets rejected the proposal and refused to budge from their position that reductions and prohibitions must precede controls. The Soviets called instead for an immediate ban on atomic weapons and the renunciation of their use, in addition to a one-third cut in armed forces.¹⁷⁸

In September, the Soviet delegate proposed a plan similar to the Anglo-French plan as the basis for a treaty. The West failed to act, and by February 1955, the Soviets had reverted to their original intransigent, xenophobic stance on inspection as a Western plan for espionage. On 29 March the West proposed a cut in the armed forces of China, the United States, and the Soviet Union to 1.5 million each and to those of Great Britain and France to 650,000 each "at the end of a comprehensive disarmament scheme."¹⁷⁹ The Soviets rejected this plan because the reductions were too small and called once more for a one-third cut in armed forces. The Soviets also refused to divulge the size of their forces until a treaty was concluded.

On 10 May, the Soviets again reversed their position. The demand for a one-third cut was dropped, and they accepted the 29 March 1954 Anglo-French Plan force levels. They abandoned their insistence on beginning any disarmament scheme with the elimination of nuclear weapons; and they accepted the Anglo-French proposal to undertake these measures after 75 percent of the reductions of conventional

armaments and armed forces had been completed. The Soviets included a nuclear test ban in the first stage and a proposal that the use of nuclear weapons in self-defense should be subject to the approval, and veto, of the Security Council. The last "joker" obviously could never be approved by the West. The United States also had a new negotiator, Mr. Harold Stassen, so the whole plan, although originally acceptable had to be rethought. The West had been caught flat-footed by the Soviet willingness "to proceed with partial measures that would improve world confidence."¹⁸⁰ The Subcommittee, therefore, adjourned until after the Geneva Summit Conference in July.

At the Summit Conference President Eisenhower made the "open skies" proposal for aerial inspection. Prime Minister Eden proposed a trial inspection zone between NATO and Warsaw forces in Central Europe. Premier Bulganin suggested setting up control posts in "tinderbox areas" to prevent large military formations.¹⁸¹ Bulganin also criticized the Western approach to disarmament as being "inspection without disarmament" and reemphasized the Soviet 10 May proposal adding that

...each power should...undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

...the forces of each state other than the Big Five should be limited to between 150,000 and 200,000.¹⁸²

Obviously, the latter was aimed at preventing the rearmament of Germany, which was being considered by the West at the time.

On 29 August, Stassen presented the new United States position, as follows:

The United States does now place a reservation upon all of its pre-Geneva substantive positions taken in this Subcommittee, the Disarmament Commission, or in the United Nations on these questions in relationship to levels of armaments pending the outcome of our study jointly or separately of inspection methods and control arrangements and of review of this important problem. I make it perfectly clear that we are not withdrawing any of these positions...¹⁸³

The statement did in effect withdraw the previous United States positions and especially the prestigious Baruch Plan. It has been suggested, that instead of taking this about face, the Soviet bluff on controls should have been called.¹⁸⁴

By 1955 "technology had outrun policy" with large quantities of fissionable materials on hand in the Soviet Union and in the United States. Inspection was therefore impossible. Attempts were now made to prevent sudden nuclear attacks. The Foreign Ministers at Geneva in October 1955 were willing to accept aerial photography as a first step, however, the Soviets, fearing attacks from overseas bases rejected the plan, even though Mr. Dulles agreed to include overseas bases in the proposal. This type of proposal was part of our confidence building program.¹⁸⁵

When the Subcommittee reconvened on 19 March 1956, a new, less specific Anglo-French Plan was presented. The plan, which was a compromise of the United States and Soviet position called for:

1. A declaration renouncing the use of nuclear weapons except in defense against aggression.

2. A freeze on current armament levels plus effective air and ground inspection.

3. A reduction in conventional armaments, and restrictions on nuclear tests as a next step.

4. A cut in conventional arms, a ban in nuclear tests, and a prohibition of production and use of nuclear weapons in the last stage.

Jules Moch, the French delegate, summed up this proposal by saying: "Neither control without disarmament, nor disarmament without control, but progressively, all the disarmament which can be controlled."¹⁸⁶

The British at this time were on the verge of testing their H-bomb; and the French made it clear that if no agreement could be reached they reserved the right to test their own weapons.

By 1956, the Soviet Union had probably closed the gap with the United States on nuclear weapons development with their H-bomb test in August 1955 and wanted to avoid any commitments which would inhibit their nuclear program. Therefore, the Soviet proposals of 21 and 27 March took the following positions:

1. They omitted their demand for a ban on nuclear weapons as a first step towards arms limitations.

2. While calling for a freeze on current military levels, they also called for an international disarmament control agency with unimpeded access at all times to all objects of control.

3. They called for the reduction of troops to 1.5 million each for themselves, the Communist Chinese, and the United States. Great Britain and France would be limited to 650,000 each. All others would be limited to 150,000 to 200,000 each. Germany and adjacent states behind the "Iron Curtain" would constitute "a zone of limitation and inspection of armaments" in which foreign troops would be limited and nuclear weapons banned.¹⁸⁷

The United States could not accept this force limitation, as they required at least 2 to 2.5 million men in order to maintain overseas bases and commitments, especially in Asia and Europe. The Soviet proposal seemed to aim at dissolving NATO and SEATO.¹⁸⁸

On 3 April, Stassen presented a new United States plan, calling for exchange of technical missions and establishment of demonstration areas where control and inspection methods could be studied and tested. Also proposed was reducing American and Soviet forces to 2.5 million each, the British and French forces to 750,000 each, and the other states to 500,000 each during the first stage. This was to be followed by a reduction in armaments and budgets, and freezing budgets

as of 31 December 1955. The control and full inspection system would then go into effect concurrently by an Armaments Regulation Commission. Following a freeze on fissionable material produced for nuclear weapons, a limitation would be placed on nuclear testing and on armed forces.¹⁸⁹

The Soviets refused to accept aerial inspection in the first phase, wanted the control action subject to Security Council decision, wanted phased reductions in conventional forces independent of political settlements, and wanted predetermined dates from one stage to the next. The Stassen Plan was important in that "it could be carried out without political settlements."¹⁹⁰

In May the Soviets denounced the Open Skies proposal; and in July, Andre Gromyko stated at the Disarmament Commission that the Soviet Union intended to reduce its armed forces by 1.2 million by 1 May 1957. This was in addition to the reduction of 640,000 announced in 1955. But no indication as to the size of Soviet forces was made.¹⁹¹

In 1956, when the Subcommittee adjourned in a deadlock, the Soviets seemed to have backed off on two issues: "(1) the link between political settlements and disarmament; and (2) the link between nuclear and conventional weapons." By indicating once again a willingness to accept Stassen's 3 April proposal -- but linked with a nuclear test ban, a ban on use of nuclear weapons, and limitations of other states armed forces to

200,000 each -- the Soviets were hoping to break up NATO and again prevent West German rearmament. Retreat on the second point was probably due to a Soviet drive for nuclear parity.¹⁹²

In January 1957, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. made further United States proposals at the General Assembly on nuclear weapons and stockpiles and reiterated the United States position on conventional weapons. The Soviets promptly "denounced the Western view that political settlements were inseparable from general disarmament."¹⁹³

When the Subcommittee reconvened in March 1957, three proposals were made. The Anglo-French proposal dealt with nuclear testing and controls. The American proposal was a reiteration of Lodge's statement with slight modification. The Soviet proposal, to be accomplished in two years, was as follows:

- (1) a reduction of armed forces by two stages, first, to 2 1/2 million for the three major powers and 750,000 for Britain and France, and second, to 1 1/2 million and 650,000 respectively;
- (2) reduction of all other armed forces to 200,000;
- (3) abolition of all foreign bases;
- (4) unconditional ban on the use of nuclear weapons;
- and
- (5) 'cut-off' of production, and destruction of nuclear stocks.

The Soviet proposal went further, calling for disengagement in Europe as follows:

(1) reduction of the forces of the four powers in Germany by one-third in the first year and by an unspecified further amount in the second;

(2) substantial but unspecified reductions of all other NATO and Warsaw Pact forces;

(3) inspection and limitation of armaments of the four powers in a trial zone covering Germany and adjacent states;

(4) complete prohibition of nuclear weapons in the above zone;

(5) measures to guard against surprise attack, including fixed observation posts and aerial surveys over an area extending 800 kilometres each side of the dividing line in Europe.¹⁹⁴

On 30 April, the Soviets zig-zagged again on their position. Although still reaffirming acceptance of the U.S. proposed force goals, they called for a 15 percent cut in conventional armaments and military budgets, and for a more limited control organ. They insisted on an unqualified prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, but dropped their demand for prohibiting their manufacture and eliminating them in the first stage of an agreement. They further dropped their demand for elimination of all foreign bases, but called instead for the liquidation of some in the first years. It was also indicated that inspection zones could be subject to negotiation. The new Soviet position seemed to represent a willingness to move. The Subcommittee, however, quickly ran into trouble on the issue of policing a test ban.¹⁹⁵

On 14 June, Mr. Zorin accepted the Western position that any cessation of tests should be subject to controls.

In addition he proposed a two to three year moratorium on tests under the supervision of an international commission, answerable to the Security Council. The proposal was acceptable to the West, subject to reservations.

The Soviet Union was willing to go along with a second stage reduction in armed forces to 2.1 million for each, and to negotiate further reductions as the inspection system was expanded; however, the Soviets refused to join working discussions unless the West abandoned their insistence on political settlements as a prerequisite to further reductions.¹⁹⁶

Negotiations became deadlocked again on controls and unconditional suspension of nuclear tests. On 29 August the Comprehensive Western Plan was proposed to resolve the differences and which included the proposal for: "Limitation of armed forces in the first step, to 2.5 million for the Soviet Union and the United States, 750,000 for Britain and France. Further reductions to follow."¹⁹⁷

The Soviets rejected the proposal on the grounds that it would prevent achieving nuclear parity with the West. In addition, the Soviets refused to participate further in deliberations in committees as constituted and called for a commission composed of all the members of the General Assembly. This proposal was defeated. The Soviet Union walked out of the disarmament talks and a temporary end came to disarmament talks through United Nations organs. The Soviet attitude at this juncture is best described by Anthony Nutting, as follows:

Probably the simplest explanation is the nearest to the truth. That is, that the Soviets realized that, although there was agreement on several of the things to be done in a disarmament scheme, there could be no agreement of the timing of these measures, since Western timing would conflict with the Soviet programme for developing their nuclear armory and its means of delivery and Soviet timing would not allow for the political settlements required by the West. Also, it is likely that they got tired of being always in the minority in the Disarmament Commission and Sub-Committee; a position which they considered failed to do justice to their new-found relative strength as a nuclear power.¹⁹⁸

It should, however, be pointed out that the first "serious" negotiations occurred between 10 May 1955 and August 1957. On balance it appears the Soviets -- no doubt encouraged by growing confidence in their own nuclear forces and therefore expecting eventual recognition of nuclear-force parity -- were prepared to negotiate for substantial arms controls (including ground and air inspection of their own territories under explicit limits) in return by the United States to abandon the rearmament of Germany and the policy of nuclear sharing. The United States was not interested in negotiating on these terms.

At the Foreign Ministers' Conference at Geneva in 1959, it was agreed to attempt other disarmament negotiations. The Ten-Nation Conference was set up, expanding the membership which was now equally balanced between East and West.

On 18 September 1959, Khrushchev delivered a speech before the 18th General Assembly calling for "total and complete disarmament" to be achieved within a period of four

years. Land armies, navies, air forces, atomic weapons, missiles, overseas bases, general staffs, war ministries, and even military schools would all be abolished.¹⁹⁹ It was pie in the sky and no one took it seriously.

The West once again called for verification at each phase and reductions of armed forces to levels necessary for internal security. The West would not accept the idea of general and complete disarmament as a requisite for negotiations.

When the Ten-Nation Conference reconvened in June 1960, the Soviet Union had a revised plan calling for the abolition of nuclear delivery weapons in the first stage, the creation of a United Nations peace force, and the elimination of overseas bases.²⁰⁰ Acceptance of this plan would surely have given the Soviets an edge. The United States again insisted on controls at each step prior to dealing with the subject of general disarmament. The Soviets walked out of the Conference.

In the General Assembly, discussions continued and resolutions were forwarded. The Western proposals reiterated previous packages. The Soviet proposals seemed to have been more favorable to the West but always had something -- such as the "troika" -- that was bound to kill acceptance of any Soviet plan.

A plethora of proposals have continued to the present day primarily in the direction of General and Complete Disarmament (GCD), however, most of the emphasis has been on nuclear weapons and safeguards.

It is interesting to note that when the Foster Panel was formed in the Spring of 1962, one of the first tasks of the Panel was to seek a response to Premier Khrushchev's call for general and complete disarmament. One approach was a three-stage general disarmament program which took into account the asymmetry between the Soviet Union and the United States. This program embraced large weapons of war, including tanks, capital ships, surface ships and conventional submarines. The plan called for a 30 percent reduction of certain weapons systems by the United States and a 30 percent reduction of something else by the Soviets. At the time the United States had superiority in naval forces, whereas, the Soviet Union had superiority in land forces. The plan also called for a check for compliance at each stage with an eventual goal of a residual left for defense only. The proposal was to be tabled at the Geneva Conference in 1962, but due to world events was not. Until SALT I, no further naval limitations were considered by the United States except for those limitations that were self-imposed.²⁰¹

Two types of disarmament discussion committees emerged in the early sixties. The first is the Conference of the

Committee on Disarmament (CCD) which meets at Geneva. The CCD is a multinational forum. Discussions at this forum have led to the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), the Seabed Arms Control Treaty (1971), the BW Convention (1972) and the "Hot Line" agreement of 1963.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) is the second forum. This forum is bilateral between the United States and the Soviet Union. Out of SALT has emerged the Direct Communications Agreement ("Hot Line") of 1971, Nuclear Accident Agreement of 1971, and the SALT I Agreements of 1972.

Other agreements which have been made are:

- The Antarctic Treaty of 1959
- The Outer-Space Treaty of 1967
- The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

in Latin America of 1967.

Although more will be said about some of these agreements later, two points are worthy of note: (1) They were limited in scope and to areas which did not reduce the respective superiority of either side or where parity existed (at the time). And, (2) they provided a basis for further negotiations.

After 28 years of zig-zagging at the disarmament talks, we are still very close to the starting line, and very far from the Soviets' all embracing proposal for a world free

of arms. Spanier and Noguee refer to the disarmament talks as a study in gamesmanship, with each power seeking to maximize its own military position while making a broad propaganda appeal to world public opinion. The aim is to "weaken the other side, without ever disarming a single soldier."²⁰⁸

America's objectives have been to maintain her armed strength -- particularly in strategic nuclear weapons; to maintain NATO and her alliance system; to prevent the slipping of neutral nations into the Red camp; to push back Russian influence everywhere; and to see what is behind the iron curtain.

Soviet objectives were pretty much on the other side of the coin. The Soviets would like to paralyze America's will to use strategic nuclear weapons, and if possible, to see the end of American nuclear superiority. Another aim is to break up NATO and the rest of the American alliance system and to see American bases and forces removed from Europe and from overseas. And she would like to isolate West Germany. A strong unified German is a Soviet nightmare.

Since neither side cares to compromise on conventional weapons, Spanier and Noguee contended that a "joker" or totally unacceptable provision had usually been thrown in with other reasonable and conciliatory provisions in every proposal. The "joker" forced the other side to reject the whole plan, and placed the onus for deadlock on the other

side while protecting the vital interests of the proposing side.

Today, we see new approaches to disarmament and arms control based on a feeling of detente, that there is no threat of war. Economic and budgetary considerations reenforced by a public opinion tired of wars and anxious for the material pleasures of life are once again pushing arms control and economies in military spending. As a consequence we have seemingly come full cycle back to 1920 and the naval treaties seeking parity (such as in SALT I), reduced budgets and fewer commitments. Are we at the same time, going to accept a false security view while seeking economic well-being as in the twenties and thirties, completely ignoring strategic implications created by reducing armaments?

CHAPTER III

THE SOVIET UNION

What does the Soviet Union seek? That is a question that has mystified scholars and diplomats alike. But if one looks at disarmament and arms control negotiations, one readily sees three well-defined Soviet national interests:

1. The preservation of its security and stability against outside threats.

2. Its recognition as a great power.

3. The expansion of its spheres of influence.

The principles are not new to Russian or Soviet foreign policy. For even if the Soviet Union does not want to be Russia, Finland is still Finland, Japan is still Japan, and China is still China. One's antagonists do not change because of a change in name or form of government. To survive, a nation must be strong and viable to protect its security.

The methods used by the Soviets today date back to Tsarist days. As L. E. Dobriansky puts it:


Every conceivable communist technique today has an able institutional precedent in the empire-building enterprise started by Ivan the Terrible in the 16th century; divide-and-conquer, conspiratorial networks, genocide, Russification, two steps forward and one backwards, broken treaties, a self-assuring mystical messianism, smoke-screens of totalistic ideologies, political partitionism, the police state, inventions and distortions of history, incitement of class struggle, slave labor,... 'peaceful coexistence'--in brief the fashioned implements of cold war gaming aimed at eventual conquest.¹

Shorn of all rhetoric, the Soviets want a place in the world and not just "a place in the hierarchy of nations to which she was nowise entitled," as Count Witte put it, but a real place, a credible place.

The Commissars, just like the Tsars, want security for their nation based on a system of weak, independent and prosperous neighbors as buffers from stronger powers or as a part of some Soviet sphere of influence. And when this situation does not exist, the leaders look to arrangements either through alliances or agreements with friendlier strong neighbors on the borders of antagonistic, strong neighbors or with nations or movements which have differences with the strong neighbors. History is filled with expedient examples in this regard. One remembers Moscow's military assistance to Ataturk in 1919 in order to get the British, French and Greeks out of Turkey, even though Ataturk was fiercely anti-communist. The Soviets also hoped for some concessions as to the Turkish Straits.

In May 1919, strong moral support was given to the Afghan revolutionaries in order to get British forces out of Afghanistan. From 1923 on, the Soviets with characteristic ambivalence provided military assistance to the Chinese Nationalists in order to have a friendly China on her eastern flank. And when the Sino-Soviet split intensified, the Soviet Union sought a military assistance pact with India as a counter to China.

"A QUESTION OF GEOGRAPHY"



(Lewis in Milwaukee Journal)

FIGURE 1. A QUESTION OF GEOGRAPHY.

Another method used by the Russians is to create a detente or easing of tensions on one flank while seeking to consolidate her gains or protect her interests on other flanks. Another method is to seek agreements to limit armaments -- with or without verification -- so as to reduce the power of other nations vis-a-vis Russian forces. Another objective of arms limitations has been wrapped up with detente and a desire to use savings from defense budgets to improve the economic, technical and industrial base of the nation so as to better compete with other, more industrialized nations. Tsar Alexander's proposal to Castlereagh in 1816, the Hague Conference of 1899, and the arms control and trade talks taking place today are examples of these approaches.

All these aspects to achieve security are deeply wedded to geography and history. Technology has not overcome geography, as some proponents believe. Geography is still viable, and the Russians know it and think it. As to history, they have had many setbacks and have lost considerable manpower. They have learned their lessons well from both history and geography and know that it takes all kinds of power, and in particular military power, to be a great power.

Why a Soviet Navy?

In dealing with naval arms limitations, then, two questions emerge. One is: With whom is the United States competing, and with whom would the United States want to

make naval limitations? The United States Navy, at least, feels this way:

Today there are two dominating navies that we view with confidence or apprehension--our own and that of the Soviet Union. One is an "active" navy in constant use around the world--ours.

The other is a navy active only in posing a constant question--theirs. One question mark, for instance, is the Soviet submarine force of some 400 operational vessels, including a growing number of nuclear-powered units. The real importance of this force lies not so much in its actual size, but in the strategy behind it: An awareness by the men in the Kremlin of the world's dependence upon the ocean.³

And so, if the answer is the Soviet Union, then we must answer the second question. Why does the Soviet Union want such a large powerful navy, since she is primarily a land power? This second question is very reminiscent of the question posed by the British Admiralty in the 1920s as to why the United States wanted a navy second to none. The United States did not have a vast empire to defend and to trade with. And just as Britain was concerned about American economic and political expansion throughout the world at British expense, so too is the United States now concerned about Soviet economic and political expansion at American expense. This expansion of Soviet influence worldwide has been through the rapid increase in the size of the Soviet naval, oceanographic, merchant marine and fishing fleets. In other words, through Soviet sea power. The Soviets have also increased their world wide influence through both military and economic aid programs (See Figure 2 for an example of aid to the Middle East and North African area).




FIGURE 2. SOVIET AID RECIPIENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Although still primarily a land power, the Russians have always considered sea power important. In 1904 the Russian Navy ranked fourth among the great powers although its status waned considerably after its defeat in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 by the sixth-rate Japanese Fleet. However, the Russian and later the Soviet fleets have been hampered by geography and lack of warm water ports with absolute free access to the world's sea routes. And so since about 1780 the Russians, and later the Soviets, have tried to gain control of the Baltic, the Dardanelles, and the warm access to the Pacific.⁴

The Russians also have always considered themselves a Mediterranean power even though they were barred by the Turkish Straits, which they have historically hoped to dominate. Strategically this was intended to guarantee free access to and from the Black Sea and to bar potential enemy sea powers from entering. Political restrictions also kept the Soviets out of certain sea areas, either by tacit or implicit agreement, which were considered the domain of other sea powers. In the post World War II period, the Soviet Union filled the vacuum left in certain seas and oceans by departing or weaker naval powers in order to expand her spheres and areas of interest.

In dealing then with the question "Why a Soviet Navy?" it would do well to look at the answer in the context of

the three Soviet long range goals presented: great power status, security and stability, and expansion of spheres of influence.

Great Power Status. Why do nations seek this status and what is meant by great power status? Lerche and Said define the term as follows:

Great powers are those few states whose capabilities are sufficiently great to permit them to establish and implement a totality of interest; in other words, a great power asserts and acts upon the political right to interfere in and be consulted with regard to the resolution of any issue anywhere in the world at any time.⁵

Dr. William R. Emerson further defines a great power as follows:

Great powers are those powers which have the capacity to interest and involve themselves to some degree in areas of their political interest.⁶

The Tsars and the Commissars have long desired great power status, although both Russia, and later the Soviet Union, had at times been granted what Count Witte might call great power-by-courtesy status. The Russo-Japanese War in 1904 resulted not only in a major defeat for the Russian Imperial Fleet but also in a considerable loss of prestige as a great power at the hands of a lesser power, Japan. In addition to the humiliating defeat suffered, the Russian Baltic Fleet was hampered by British and French neutrality and passage restrictions which prevented the major part of the Russian Fleet from transiting the Suez Canal. As a

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consequence, the Russian Fleet had to make the 18,000 mile cruise around Africa and through the Indian Ocean depending on French ports and German colliers for coal. As a result of the battle of Tsushima, the Russian losses included six battleships, three coastal defense ships, seven cruisers and seven destroyers of the thirty-seven ships participating in the battle.⁷

The long cruise accentuated the need for a new and modern navy and better sea lines of communications between East and West. The cause of this humiliation was, therefore, not lost on the Russians. She needed a viable navy and free access to the sea lanes. Both of these adverse situation had to be corrected. And, as almost a conditioned response, every defeat Russia, and later the Soviet Union, suffered was followed by a new naval modernization program. (See Table I)

TABLE I
MIX OF SOVIET FLEET*

| | Number in Commission (Number Building) | | | |
|-------------------------|--|-------------|-------------|---------------|
| | <u>1904</u> | <u>1914</u> | <u>1940</u> | <u>1946-8</u> |
| Battleships (all types) | 28(6) | 13(8) | 3(1) | 4 |
| Aircraft Carriers | - | | (3) | (1) |
| Cruisers (all types) | 24 | 15(4) | 7 | 8 |
| Destroyers | 52(12) | 121 | 55 | 60 |
| Destroyers Minelayers | - | - | 39 | 5 |
| Torpedo Boats | 63(8) | 31 | 3 | - |
| Submarines | 14 | 36(19) | 170(70) | 360(approx) |

*Information derived from Jane's Fighting Ships 1904, 1914 1946-47, and 1948.

Ten years later, on 28 June 1914, with the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand at Savajevo, Russia was forced once more to prove her virility as a great power in support of Serbia and Pan-Slavism against Austria-Hungary or fade into second-rate status.⁸ The war which followed confirmed Witte's worst fears.

Following the Bolshevik Revolution, the new Soviet Union went into isolation in order to construct a new nation and to rebuild Soviet military might, including a modern navy. This navy, under the guidance of Premier Stalin, was to be built to fulfill a "large, balanced fleet strategy." However, limitations of resources, dire economic conditions, and the military purges inhibited the fulfillment of Stalin's naval strategy until after 1928. This strategy was primarily based on "active defense" dependent on limited "coastal engagements using light surface forces, submarines and aircraft."⁹ In the late 1930s, influenced by the growth of both Japanese and German naval armaments, an all-out warship construction program began, which was to include four aircraft carriers and intended to make the Soviet Union a major naval power with an offensive capability.¹⁰ This "big ship" strategy commenced with the Third Five Year Plan in 1937 and was described by Admiral Nikolai G. Kuznetsov, its future commander, as follows:

It was decided to build battleships, heavy cruisers, and other classes of surface warships; that is, a big surface navy. A large number of submarines was also to be built. Not excluded either was the construction of aircraft carriers; rather they were only postponed to the last year (1942) of the Five Year Plan...(because of) the complexities of construction of warships of this class and aircraft designed especially for them.¹¹

By the outbreak of World War II, 200 naval vessels were under construction including 10 cruisers, 45 destroyers, and 90 submarines.

Although the Soviet Union was not invited to participate in the naval limitations conferences except for those under the auspices of the League of Nations, Stalin was further impressed by the participants' of the 1936 London Conference lack of interest in navies whose strength was based on submarines, as the Soviet Navy was. As a consequence the Soviet Union was not recognized as a major naval power. This realization gave further emphasis to Stalin's large, balanced navy concept of sufficient rank to support Soviet foreign policy, a navy "equal to that of any foreign power."¹²

Another strategic move that Stalin took in 1932 and 1933 was to reorganized the Soviet Navy by the establishment of the Pacific and Northern Forces.¹³ The establishment of these two fleets corrected in part the restricted access to the open seas and to some degree the lines of communications problem between east and west.

Although the Soviet Navy was on the increase, Robert W. Herrick very interestingly points out the defensive attitude and effectiveness of the Soviet Baltic Fleet in World War II:

The German naval forces assigned to oppose the Soviet Baltic Fleet were composed solely of thirty-eight motor torpedo boats, ten mine layers, and five submarines. By contrast, the Soviet Baltic Fleet in June 1941 consisted of two modernized battleships, two new and one old heavy cruiser, thirty-seven destroyer-type vessels, twenty mine layers, and over eighty submarines.¹⁴

With the conclusion of World War II, the Soviet Union was again given great power-by-courtesy status and was made a member of the Big Three along with the United States and Great Britain. The Soviets, however, saw themselves contained once again as they tried to expand their security perimeters with buffer states and spheres of influence using their new-found power status. The deployment of the United States Sixth and Seventh Fleets to the Mediterranean and Western Pacific, respectively, provided the deterrence necessary to put a halt to further Soviet expansion in the Middle East and Far East. Taking this containment into account and the tremendous manpower and wealth lost in previous wars, the Soviets probably reappraised history and geography and applied them to a new strategy. They probably also realized that no matter how greatly they increased the size of their army and air force or how many intercontinental ballistic missiles they had after the Cuban Crisis, they could not be and would

not be formally recognized as a "real" great power. To be a real great power required a formidable navy and a maritime presence throughout the world.

Consequently, Stalin embarked on a strategic mix of naval forces around 1948, combining the defensive la guerre de course strategy of the young school with "two other strategies of 'fortress fleet' and 'fleet in being.'" Herrick describes these fleets as follows:

The "fortress fleet" elements consisted of the forces of the Soviet Navy's Coastal Defense Service, including coastal artillery, fortifications, antiaircraft artillery, Naval Infantry troops (Marines), shore-based fighter aviation, and coastal patrol craft. These were forces intended primarily to provide a last-ditch, largely immobile, and passive defense against amphibious invasion.

The "fleet in being" elements were to be the destroyer leaders and cruisers that Stalin was intent on constructing to serve initially as strategically defensive but tactically offensive naval forces, to be kept in Soviet coastal waters but concentrated in the fleet areas considered to be most vulnerable or threatened at any given period of international relations. Ultimately, at least according to the Navy's plans, the large destroyers and cruisers were to serve as the major screening and supporting elements of the carrier task forces envisioned as the main striking forces of the large balanced fleets.¹⁵

When Khrushchev came to power in 1955, he and his defense minister appear to have relied heavily on technology and thought nuclear missiles would suffice for deterrence. Therefore, naval concentration was again focused on submarines and small

surface units rather than on a more balanced fleet.¹⁶ The Lebanon Crisis of 1958 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 were enough to change Khrushchev's mind.

In September 1962 the Soviet government made the following statement concerning Cuba:

We have said and do repeat that if war is unleashed, if the aggressor makes an attack on one state or another and this state asks for assistance, the Soviet Union has the possibility from its own territory to render assistance to any peace-loving state and not only to Cuba. And let no one doubt that the Soviet Union will render such assistance.¹⁷

The Lebanese Crisis and in particular the Cuban Crisis showed that missiles were not enough and that they could not provide assistance from their own territory despite their truculent rhetoric. The naval forces they had on the scene brought forcibly to mind that they lacked the credibility and capability to intimidate the United States. The Vietnam war also showed them once again that they lacked the capability to bring their power to bear in distant places.

It is therefore quite evident, as John Lukas points out, that:

Here on this earth what still counts in strategy is whose troops and ships are where. Let us remember that after all is said, even the long-range rocket is but a tremendous gun with a tremendous powerful projectile.¹⁸

Although many attribute the increase in the Soviet surface navy to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, it is probably more likely that this crisis reaffirmed the need for an all-round

navy rather than giving impetus to a large navy program. It takes a long time to plan for and build a navy. The base year for the planning of today's Soviet navy was probably made in 1953-54 by Stalin's successors, and ships under that program started appearing around 1958.¹⁹ The Cuban Crisis just accelerated this program, with inclusion of new technologies and weapons systems. The trend in Soviet naval growth is illustrated in Table II. In 1962 the navy was "accorded its own position as an individual service."²⁰

If one looks at history, it becomes readily evident that no great world power has ever survived that has not, at the same time, been a naval and maritime power. The histories of Athens, Carthage, Rome, Genoa and Venice all bear this out. As soon as they abandoned sea power and became land oriented, they soon lost their great power positions and their empires. And even in modern times the retrenchment of Great Britain, the giving up of her empire and the reduction in her naval forces was probably a very strong lesson to the Soviets that to be great required a navy equal to or better than the best.

Another reason for a large Soviet navy is precisely to be as great as the United States. Mr. William C. Foster, a former director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), relates a conversation with one of the Soviet first deputy foreign ministers in 1958 at the Surprise Attack talks at Geneva. The minister remarked:

TABLE II

SOVIET NAVY 1958 AND 1972²¹

| | <u>1958</u> | <u>1972</u> |
|---|-------------|-------------|
| <u>Major Surface Warships</u> | | |
| ASW Helicopter Carriers | 0 | 2 |
| Cruisers | 31 | 27 |
| Destroyers | 146 | 101 |
| Ocean-going Escorts (Over 1000 tons) | 66 | 124 |
| Mine Capacity (Maximum Listed) | 19,110 | 12,170 |
| Surface to Surface Missile Rails | 0 | 88 |
| Surface to Air Missile Rails | 0 | 132 |
| <u>Submarines: Attack and Cruise Missile</u> | | |
| Diesel | 474 | 286 |
| Nuclear Powered | 0 | 61 |
| Total Number Torpedo Tubes | 2478 | 2208 |
| Total Number Cruise Missiles | 0 | 402 |
| <u>Submarines: Ballistic Missile</u> | | |
| Diesel | 7 | 25 |
| Nuclear | 0 | 34 |
| Total Number Missile Tubes | 14 | 499 |
| <u>Other Soviet Naval Forces</u> | | |
| Coastal Escorts | 133 | 258 |
| Surface-to-Air Missile rails | 0 | 16 |
| Mine Capacity | 2690 | 3000 |
| Missile Patrol Boats | 0 | 151 |
| Surface-to-Surface Missile Rails | 0 | 566 |
| Motor Torpedo/Gun Boats | 500 | 225 |
| Amphibious Warfare Vessels (including Amphibious Craft) | 120 | 200 |
| Ocean-going Minesweepers | 149 | 189 |
| Coastal and Inshore Minesweepers | 161 | 130 |
| Naval Aircraft | 3000 | 1200 |

You know, the one ambition the Soviet Union has is to be as great as the United States is. People say that you have to have armaments in order to maintain your economies. But I know that's nonsense. You are such an economic giant that you don't need armaments--probably it's a handicap for you. We are determined to be a great power, as great a power as you are, and we will give up everything to achieve it.²²

Ambassador Charles W. Yost, in his dealings with the Soviets at the United Nations, further supports this opinion as follows:

I'm sure that one of the major motivations for Russian policy in general and for their armament policy in particular is their determination not to be second to any one, and first of all to us. Given their status as a super-power, we will be uncertain as to their intentions until they are equal to us in most major respects. Of course, armaments is the one they have put first. And I think this syndrome was strengthened first by our very large build up in the early sixties in strategic arms, and second by the Cuban Missile Crisis which no doubt the Russians perceived as a humiliation which they attributed at least in part to their strategic inferiority. These convinced them to do everything they could to overcome it.²³

With the acquisition of atomic weapons in the 1950s and the SPUTNIK flights in the 1960s, the Soviet Union received both great and superpower status. The United States, however, in acceding to this recognition has not recognized the Soviet right under world power status to interest herself and intervene in what the Soviets might consider their political arenas. Whether the Soviets will insist on this right, only the future will tell. As Ambassador Yost conjectures:

It (intervention) is resented by nine-tenths of humanity. It isn't a question of right... The Soviets have tried to be more cautious about it, both because they don't want to get into a major confrontation with us and because they realize that, carried very far, it's apt to be counter-productive vis-a-vis the countries intervened in.²⁴

Security and Stability. In looking at the drive for great power status, a glimpse of the concurrent drive for security has been presented. Traditionally, Russian, and later Soviet sea power was used primarily for defense in depth, support of land forces, and security of maritime commerce.²⁵ One of the first priorities after World War II was to tailor the Soviet Navy to deter seaborne attacks from the NATO Navies and their capability to conduct strategic nuclear attacks on the Soviet Union from the sea.²⁶

This inferiority (or "security") complex exhibited by the Russians has also been accentuated by three land invasions in one generation and by the historic containment policies used against them and their traditional drive to break out. During the Nineteenth and on into the mid-Twentieth Century, containment was accomplished by Great Britain, fearing Russian expansion into the Mediterranean, the Middle East, India, the Indian Ocean, and the Far East. These areas were considered British spheres of influence. After World War II, the United States assumed the British commitment as a weakened Britain bowed out. Just as Great Britain had concluded the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 to contain Russian expansion,

so too did the United States develop an alliance system to further contain the Soviets and their so called exploitation of world communism.

Once again the utility of sea power comes forth. With the burgeoning growth of their merchant, fishing and naval fleets the Soviets were able to jump the northern tier of Western containment and move into the Southern tier of Third World nations along the northern coast of Africa and into Iraq and Syria. (See Figure 2.) These fleets ranged into every ocean of the world expanding their presence, increasing their deterrence and the credibility of their sea power.

This expansion of Soviet sea power and influence has also had the effect of reducing Western influence and weakening the Western alliance system. Thus, Soviet sea power has tended to improve Soviet security and stability.

Expansion of Spheres of Influence. Expansion of Soviet influence is very closely tied to the desire for great power status and security. As a superpower, it is obvious that the Soviet Union feels that a large navy is an essential component of its foreign policy in order to make its diplomatic initiatives more credible. As it has been pointed out, all great world powers have had navies and superpower status requires it. As former Secretary of the Navy John Chafee put it:




FIGURE 3. SOVIET FLEET LOCATIONS

I think its a flexing of muscles on their part. They're big boys in the world and they've got the economic power to support a navy. I think furthermore the whole Cuban thing shook them up, and they saw that navies were important things to have. I think they look on the world like--sort of like the Germans did at the turn of the century. Everybody else had colonies, why don't they have any colonies? The Russians think that other people are showing their flags in all corners of the world, why not the Russians. And I say, they've done very well.²⁷

Mr. Frank R. Barnett further expands on this point, as follows:

My view is that this extraordinary growth in Soviet naval power is based on their very pragmatic hope of widening their own options for whatever targets of opportunity may arise of giving Russia a full hand, so to speak, so she could play the part of a superpower, diplomatically, economically and politically all over the world. Which I don't think one could do with only nuclear weapons, since in any situation short of a direct mortal threat to one's heartland it wasn't very likely that you would use it. But a navy is much more flexible. It could be used. And I suppose, maybe part of it--and I don't want to turn psychoanalyst--but it's part of the main drive from the typical Soviet massaging of its own inferiority complex. And since it caught up with nuclear weapons and had a first rate army, maybe it decided since its two most fastidious and ancient foes, the British Empire and the United States had had sea power par excellence, it was about time for the poor boys from across the tracks to really acquire a first rate navy so they could play that game.²⁸

The point that a navy widens a nations options and gives a nation the capability to project its power, prestige, and influences has, therefore, not been lost on the Soviets. With her well rounded merchant, fishing and naval fleets she has been able to project her influence and power overseas

successfully in all areas of the world despite the continuation of a less-effective Western containment.

One might conclude that the Soviets have done successfully exactly what Mahan said they should not attempt. He warned against a land power with extensive land frontiers to defend dividing the total of its resources in order to build a large navy. Victor Basiuk comments on this point, as follows:

With the Soviets, it may be different, because their pushing into naval power gives them the capability to project their power abroad in a relatively cheap way. They could do it by airpower, but then the air power cannot stay. Must fly over and then come back. Now they can stay and it gives them presence. The net effect is neutralization of United States power at each point of the globe in theory.²⁹

A Navy for What Missions?


If one reviews the history of the Soviet Navy since World War II it is quite evident that the Soviet Navy has three primary missions which have already been touched on:

1. Defensive Force, which includes those naval forces used to defend the Soviet Union from invasion or attack from seaward, to protect Soviet maritime commerce and trade, and to support Soviet land forces.

2. Strategic Force, which includes the ballistic missile submarines used for deterrence.

3. Projection Force, which includes those naval forces used for presence (showing the flag) and support of Soviet national interests overseas.

FIGURE 4. THE RUSSIAN NORTHERN ROUTE:



Based on present estimates and force make-up it would appear that current Soviet naval strategy is still essentially defensive and deterrent.³⁰ It is a strategy largely dependent on a large number of missile armed, light, fast surface craft, minesweepers, coastal missile batteries and land-based aircraft. The disposition of the Soviet Navy into four separate fleets (Black Sea, Baltic, North and Pacific) (See Figure 3) shows the strong influence that geography still has. Although ships have more endurance today and can replenish, the closure of the Suez Canal and the seasonably restricted northern route still present logistical and reinforcement problems in lines of communications between east and west. The northern route, (See Figure 4), when usable has reduced the transit distance from Murmansk to Vladivostok from approximately 8750 miles via the Panama Canal to approximately 3750 miles. It is not unusual to encounter ice eleven feet thick along this route with progress often limited to 2.5 miles per day.³¹

The other end of this primary Soviet naval strategy is deterrence embodied in the nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine. Although some analysts consider these submarines the "backbone of navies," in reality they play a very narrow role in the overall utility of a peacetime navy except for strategic deterrence.

These two missions may remain primary for some time in the future, particularly because of the predominantly heavy

Army representation in the united Soviet defense ministry. Because of this imbalance and party politics, Robert W. Herrick sees a reluctance of the Kremlin to expand into the projection mission for the following reasons:

- a. The land-oriented outlook of the leaders and of the military theoreticians of both the Party and Army.
- b. The tradition of the Party's omniscience which, in naval strategy formulation at least, holds not only that the subject is the prerogative of the Party, but that the naval leaders could not possibly say anything worth listening to on such matters.
- c. The compelling desire to keep military expenditures to a minimum so to permit larger budgetary allocations to other sectors of the economy.³²

However, this does not mean that the Navy under Admiral Gorshkov's leadership will not continue to expand its presence role and eventually the projection role in the years to come. Beginning in the early 1950s, Soviet warships began to make out of area port visits (See Table III).

TABLE III
SOVIET SHIP-OPERATING DAYS IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN SEA AND INDIAN OCEAN, 1965-72³³

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Mediterranean Sea^a</u> | <u>Indian Ocean^b</u> |
|-------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1965 | 4,000 | c |
| 1966 | 4,500 | c |
| 1967 | 8,500 | c |
| 1968 | 12,000 | 1,800 |
| 1969 | 14,000 | 2,800 |
| 1970 | 17,500 | 3,200 |
| 1971 | 19,000 | 3,400 |
| 1972 | 18,000 | 8,800 |

- a. Rounded to nearest 500.
- b. Rounded to nearest 200.
- c. Indicates a total of less than 100.

Today we see a formidable naval force in the Mediterranean which has been reinforced from time to time by MOSKVA class ASW Carriers. Fairhill chronologizes this rise in the Soviet Naval presence as follows:

- 1961 - Soviet warships carry out modest exercises in the Norwegian Sea instead of merely shuttling between the Northern and Baltic fleet areas.
- 1962 - Ships from the Black Sea venture out into Atlantic in order to join the Northern Fleet in the arctic.
- 1963 - What is to become a regular pattern of exercises in the North East corner of the Atlantic is established; one group of ships circum-navigates the British Isles.
- 1964 - A small squadron spends part of the year in the Mediterranean; ships visit Cuba.
- 1965 - The Mediterranean exercise is repeated, with more ships for a longer period.
- 1966 - For the first time Soviet vessels conduct basic work-up exercises out in the Iceland-Foroes gap.
- 1967 - The Mediterranean squadron becomes permanent and, after the June War, Soviet warships steam into Alexandria; research vessels begin to survey the Indian Ocean.
- 1968 - A Soviet naval squadron appears in the Indian Ocean.
- 1969 - The Soviet naval squadron in the Mediterranean is at times numerically superior to the U.S. Sixth Fleet.
- 1970 - The world wide exercise 'Okean,' celebrating the hundredth anniversary of Lenin's birth, puts massive emphasis on the oceanic nature of Soviet naval power.³⁴

The building of additional KIEV carriers (or large ASW ships as they are called by the Soviets) coupled with improved replenishment techniques copied from Western practices and overseas bases should make the Soviet Navy more capable in the field of projection.

Maybe as a land power the Soviets did not need a surface Navy, since they could defend their maritime routes with conventional and anti-ship missile submarines and have credible deterrence with their SSBNs. But these vessels have no visibility, as they are rarely seen. The Soviet surface navy is a visible entity in terms of power and global prestige and as a means to confront the United States on a basis of equality. Now that they have it, they will necessarily find other uses for it in support of their national interests.

In review of Table II, it is quite evident in the latter part of the 1970s that the Soviets will experience block obsolescence problems, primarily in their surface navy. This obsolescence problem is found primarily in the destroyer force of which the over 20 year old SKORYI-Class destroyers made up almost twenty percent of the 1972 Soviet naval force.³⁵ Another item worthy of note in the Soviet Navy of today is that although force levels have remained fairly stable in total numbers the mean tonnage of the forces has decreased. This has shown a tendency for smaller type vessels with more quality and firepower, although larger vessels such as the KIEV are being built and older gun cruisers are being maintained as flagships.

A Soviet Maritime Strategy and the Brezhnev Doctrine.

The projection role of Soviet sea power has been mentioned, however, it is important to look briefly at the growth of the ancillary aspects of this military sea power to see how they fit into the picture. Westcott and Stevens comment on sea power as follows:

The term sea power, in its widest interpretation, must be taken to include not only the navies of nations but their total strength and interest in the sea--their extent of coast line, overseas bases and colonial possessions, merchant shipping and sea-borne trade. When the term is given this breadth of meaning, the history of sea power becomes not merely a record of naval warfare but an account of the rise and decline of the great maritime nations and of their rivalry for sea trade and sea control. Among the western nations, this rivalry has always been a dominant motive, and naval history thus maintains an almost continuous relationship with the development of their commerce and the changes in their foreign policy.³⁶

It is in this context and in Admiral George H. Miller's definition of maritime strategy, as follows, that the Soviet growth of sea power should be viewed.

Maritime strategy is the process of optimizing the employment of a nation's maritime assets in accordance with national interests. Maritime assets include overseas airlines and merchant service. They include ground troops that are used in a maritime way for projection. Foreign trade, overseas finance, and all the international economics are parts of maritime strategy.³⁷

Merchant Marine. The rapid rise of the Soviet merchant marine has impressed the world. Although the Soviet Union did not start building its own merchant ships until 1950 because

her major shipyards at Leningrad, Odessa, Nikolayev and Sevastopol were destroyed during World War II, the Soviets came out of the war with 2.4 million tons of shipping. This was more than they went into the war with and included lend lease ships never returned and German reparations.³⁸ During the years that followed, ships were built by Soviet satellites and Western nations (including Japan) to build up the Soviet merchant fleet embodying the latest technology. Table IV shows the growth of the Soviet merchant fleet as compared to the world's principal fleets. In 1973, the Soviet merchant fleet ranked fifth in the world.

TABLE IV
GROWTH OF THE WORLD'S PRINCIPAL MERCHANT FLEETS³⁹

| | <u>USSR</u> | <u>UK</u> | <u>USA</u> | <u>LIBERIA</u> | <u>JAPAN</u> | <u>NORWAY</u> | <u>GREECE</u> |
|------|-------------|-----------|------------|----------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|
| 1950 | 2.1 | 18.2 | 27.5 | 0.2 | 1.9 | 5.5 | - |
| 1955 | 2.5 | 19.4 | 26.4 | 4.0 | 3.7 | 7.2 | - |
| 1960 | 3.4 | 21.1 | 24.8 | 11.3 | 6.9 | 11.2 | - |
| 1965 | 8.2 | 21.5 | 21.5 | 17.5 | 12.0 | 15.6 | - |
| 1970 | 14.8 | 25.8 | 18.5 | 33.3 | 27.0 | 19.3 | - |
| 1972 | 16.2 | 27.3 | 16.3 | 38.6 | 30.5 | 21.7 | - |
| 1973 | 16.7 | 28.6 | 15.0 | 44.4 | 34.9 | 23.5 | 15.3 |

Source: Lloyd's Register of Shipping

When Khrushchev came to power in the mid-1950s he placed economics in the center of contemporary Soviet foreign policy. It was at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 that he announced that the Soviets would "bury the West" economically and that "Russia was no longer 'encircled.'"⁴⁰

Giving further impetus and raison d'etre to this merchant marine growth is the Soviet objective quoted from Soviet Ships on World Sea Routes by V. Bakayev, as follows:

The maritime policy of the USSR stems from the task of extensive participation by the cargo fleet in the economic competition between the socialist and capitalist systems, of fully satisfying the demands of the economy and its external trade, of fulfilling the country's own transport needs at home and abroad, and increasing the Soviet fleet's share of international sea transport.⁴¹

Part of this might be the reason for the Soviets not building supertankers and supercargo ships. Smaller vessels have given them the opportunity to service Third Power countries with meager and/or shallow port facilities and with inadequate merchant marines of their own. Based on Lloyd's of London figures the average tonnage of the 6575 Soviet merchant ships in 1972 was approximately 2460 tons.⁴²

Smaller vessels have also given the Soviets greater operational flexibility. When and if the Suez Canal is reopened, the Soviets will have a greater advantage with its smaller merchant ships than the western powers, who have gone to super-ships, unless the Canal is widened and deepened.

The Soviet Union has also become a new petroleum giant. Rather than being dependent on Western shipping, the Soviets have made use of foreign shipyards from Finland to Japan to increase the size of their tanker fleet as rapidly as possible. (See Table V for origins of foreign-built Soviet Merchant Shipping).

TABLE V

ORIGINS OF FOREIGN-BUILT SOVIET MERCHANT MARINE⁴³
HULLS AND ENGINES (1965 AND 1966)

| <u>COUNTRY</u> | <u>GROSS TONNAGE</u> | <u>PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL</u> | |
|----------------|----------------------|----------------------------|--------------|
| | | Hulls | Engines |
| Poland | 259,530 | 21.34 | 20.83 |
| Yugoslavia | 229,884 | 18.90 | 17.60 |
| East Germany | 201,852 | 16.50 | 14.63 |
| Japan | 139,850 | 11.49 | 10.70 |
| Finland | 92,681 | 7.62 | 6.32 |
| Czechoslovakia | ----- | ----- | 6.49 |
| West Germany | 90,364 | 7.43 | 6.65 |
| Sweden | 83,343 | 6.85 | 6.38 |
| Denmark | 32,893 | 2.70 | 4.21 |
| Italy | 31,133 | 2.56 | 3.21 |
| Holland | 20,088 | 1.65 | 1.64 |
| Romania | 11,808 | 0.97 | ----- |
| Hungary | 8,734 | 0.72 | 0.68 |
| France | 8,425 | 0.69 | 0.64 |
| Bulgaria | 5,864 | 0.48 | ----- |
| | <u>1,212,449</u> | <u>99.99</u> | <u>99.95</u> |

In 1950 the Soviet Union had only fifteen tankers. In 1955 it had seventy-three. Today there are well over 200 tankers in the Soviet tanker fleet and this number is still insufficient to supply Soviet client states' needs.⁴⁴

Although the Soviet Union has made tremendous strides in expanding her merchant marine, one half of her trade is still carried in foreign ships, and Soviet shipping tonnage represents only six percent of the world's total.⁴⁵ But the most significant aspect of the growing merchant marine fleet is that it has been able to carry more of its own foreign trade

plus most all of its military and economic assistance to Third World countries in its own ships. This provides an additional advantage of expanded Third World trade carried in Soviet shipping when these new nation's become more economically viable and have developed their own resources.

There are three other aspects that should be considered. One is that the Soviet merchant marine has become a means of showing the Soviet flag throughout the world and giving the Soviet Union prestige as a maritime nation. The tempo of this Soviet merchant shipping visibility is shown in Table VI.

TABLE VI

THE PATTERN OF SOVIET MERCHANT SHIPPING - 1967⁴⁶

| | <u>No. of Calls</u> | <u>Percent</u> |
|--|---------------------|----------------|
| North-West Europe | 7,270 | 38 |
| Mediterranean, Black and Red Seas | 4,960 | 26 |
| North, Central and South America | 2,330 | 12 |
| West Pacific, including Japan | 1,890 | 10 |
| Indian Ocean, including East Africa | 1,290 | 7 |
| South-East Asia, Oceania and Australia | 760 | 4 |
| West Africa | 480 | 3 |

Source: V. Bakayev: Soviet Ships on World Sea Routes

Another aspect of the Soviet merchant fleet has been to provide logistic support for the Soviet Navy throughout the world. More than likely this has also included intelligence collecting and reporting.

The last aspect of the Soviet merchant fleet is the contribution that can be provided by the East European fleets.

The satellite nations have the same objective of minimizing reliance on Western shipping; and, by the mid-1970s the Soviet bloc should have deployable some 26-28 million dead weight tons of shipping.⁴⁷

Fishing Fleets. The Soviet fishing fleets have ranged in all corners of the earth's seas and are the most modern in the world. Modernization of the Soviet fishing fleet began in earnest with an order of twenty vessels from Great Britain.⁴⁸ Working in small fleets, like naval squadrons, the Soviets work as a team to seek out fishing areas and process their catch on station in mother ships. Although economically the fisheries industry has not been as profitable as other Soviet industrial sectors, it has efficiently alleviated the national food protein shortage.⁴⁹ Again one might say the missions of the Soviet fishing fleets are:

1. Economic. To reduce imports of foreign protein food and to be self-reliant. (See Table VII)
2. Political. To show the flag.
3. Military. To provide manpower for the navy and conduct auxiliary missions in time of war and to collect intelligence in time of peace.

TABLE VII

THE TRADE IN FISHERY COMMODITIES - THOUSAND METRIC TONS⁵⁰

| Year | Soviet Union | | | United States | | | United Kingdom | | |
|------|--------------|-----|-----|---------------|-------|-----|----------------|-----|-----|
| | Catch | Imp | Exp | Catch | Imp | Exp | Catch | Imp | Exp |
| 1958 | 2,620 | 140 | 30 | 2,700 | 590 | 70 | 1,000 | 470 | 50 |
| 1963 | 3,980 | 100 | 170 | 2,780 | 910 | 150 | 960 | 650 | 60 |
| 1967 | 5,780 | 60 | 320 | 2,380 | 1,230 | 80 | 1,030 | 900 | 80 |
| 1968 | 6,080 | 40 | 320 | 2,440 | 1,550 | 70 | 1,040 | 970 | 80 |

Source: FAO Yearbook of Fishery Statistics

Oceanography and Surveillance. Again the Soviet Union has one of the most modern and extensive oceanographic fleets. Although difficult to ascertain exactly what this fleet is doing, it is quite evident that it shares its tasks among scientific, military and economic requirements. They also make ideal platforms for electronic monitoring equipment. One must add that in developing this fleet, just as in developing the other fleets, the object is to go first class to satisfy the inferiority complex of the Soviets.

The intelligence collectors are the last of the group. This fleet is composed of trawlers specifically fitted out for electronics intelligence collection and keeping tabs on other fleets, and in particular United States aircraft carriers. Today these intelligence collectors are being built as a separate class of vessel phasing out the older conversions.

The Brezhnev Doctrine as a Maritime Strategy. In 1968, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at the United Nations General

Assembly presented what became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine.

The countries of the socialist commonwealth have their own vital interests, their own obligation, including those of safeguarding their mutual security and their own socialist principles of mutual relations based on fraternal assistance, solidarity and internationalism. This commonwealth constitutes an inseparable entity cemented by unbreakable ties such as history has never known...The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have on many occasions warned those who are tempted to try to roll back the socialist commonwealth, to snatch at least one link from it, that we will neither tolerate nor allow that to happen.⁵¹

Although the idea of limited sovereignty, wherein each socialist state may proceed to socialism in its own way, is not new to Soviet theory, the Brezhnev Doctrine

...stands for the fact that once nations become communist controlled they stray from the fold at their own peril. Such acts of straying are particularly perilous if the errant state has geographic contiguity to the USSR.⁵²

The concept of the doctrine was used in 1956 in Hungary (a state with geographic contiguity with the USSR) when Soviet troops marched in to put down a Hungarian drive for independence and neutrality. But the Brezhnev Doctrine was voiced in 1968 in regard to the uprising in Czechoslovakia, another contiguous state. This time the Soviet modus operandi was to send in troops by air rather than on the ground as had been the case previously. Thomas M. Franck recounts the air invasion of Prague as follows:

The sky now seemed to be raining Soviet aircraft. The Antonov-12's were landing at Ruzyně 'in precise one minute intervals,' each one disgorging an armed detachment of the Soviet Army.

Gradually, people came to realize why that first plane had remained parked at the end of the runway. The Russians had sent it to replace the control tower; throughout the occupation, it and it alone directed all air traffic in and out of Ruzyne.

By dawn the airport was completely in the hands of the Soviet Army.⁵³

The efficient manner in which this operation was carried out indicates that a like contingency was among Soviet plans. This would also indicate that the Soviets might use a similar projection of force in a similar manner in some distant place -- across the seas and not contiguous to the Soviet Union -- in conjunction with other forces, naval or local, were the situation favorable and in their perceived national interest.

Of course, one could argue this point because of over-flight problems, etc., but projection of power in this sense is precisely a maritime strategy. With three divisions of approximately 50,000 airborne troops, of which up to one-third could be air-dropped or air-lifted within range of military or commercial transport aircraft;⁵⁴ one can be sure that the Soviets have some mission for them, and the West should not get too locked in on excluding these troops from both a projection and maritime strategy role, while concentrating on the existence of only 15,000 Soviet naval infantry.

CHAPTER IV

THE UNITED STATES

What does the United States seek? Perhaps this can best be answered in the context of its colonial experience and the principles upon which the United States emerged a nation in 1783: isolationism, nonintervention in wars of others, freedom of trade (the Open Door), freedom of the seas, and security. It was through the balance of power in Europe and nonintervention in European Wars until 1917 that the United States was able to expand its continental territorial limits and to become a great industrial and mercantile power.

In many circles the nostalgic desire for isolation still persists to the present day, because those were the "good old days," free from world commitments and in which the United States was free to trade. But the world has changed and the United States must change with it in order to preserve those fundamental principles it strives for.

Had the United States wished to be a great power it could have done so in 1815 when Tsar Alexander I invited the United States to join the Holy Alliance. The Tsar's navy had protected American commercial interests in the Baltic during the Napoleonic Wars and the War of 1812. Because of this, the Tsar had hoped to induce the United States to help preserve the European status quo, but the United States declined.

The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 further entrenched the United States into its policy triad of isolationism, nonintervention and nonentanglement. The United States was intent on working out its own destiny without outside interference or involvement. The Monroe Doctrine continued to have a powerful hold on American public imagination until 1940.¹ It was not, however, American sea power that initially enforced the principles of the doctrine, but rather the British Navy. By proclaiming the Monroe Doctrine, Ludwig Dehio argues that the United States

...ranged herself for the moment at Britain's side; but with her gigantic claim, which might someday clash with British interests, the United States also reached out for a preferential position on both American Continents--or, to put it more precisely, she was making a bid for insularity within the broadest of all frameworks.²

The United States was presented with another chance after the Civil War to become a great power with the development of the most modern navy in the world and with the acquisition of Alaska. But again, the strong desire for isolationism pervaded, and the United States immobilized its great army and navy and retrenched. Even the forcible opening of Japan by the United States in 1854 had been but a means of expanding trade.

Along with those ideals of isolationism, nonintervention, and nonentanglement must be added "business." As a mercantile and maritime nation, the United States has consistently

insisted on the right to do business in times of war or peace "with a minimum of interference from the belligerents." It is this principle of freedom of the seas which resulted in United States involvement in the wars with the Barbary pirates in 1803, the War of 1812, World War I and World War II. The issue of freedom of the seas was also a predominant factor in the United States declining to join the League of Nations. As Bernard Brodie so aptly points out:

One would expect that the President and his lieutenants would at least be able to project with some clarity and assurance their own responses to various kinds of crisis situations that might develop in the future; but the historical record suggests caution even in this limited area of prediction. Who, for example, would have forecast before World War I that a virtually disarmed America would enter that great holocaust over an issue labelled "freedom of the seas?"³

Another aspect of freedom of the seas and business is the Open Door Policy. Although it has been generally applied to China, the Open Door policy "means the right of American citizens to engage in trade and industry abroad on an equal basis with other foreigners."⁴ As the Open Door applied to China, William A. Williams points out that:

...two main issues had to be resolved. One involved the best way to guarantee the principles of the policy, and the structural framework for its operation. The choice was between cooperating with Japan, with Russia, or with China, and the decision called for working with and through Japan, in order to control its actions, and at the same time helping China unilaterally. The United States used force and the threat of force to support that tactic during the Boxer Rebellion, during the Russo-Japanese War when Japan intervened in Siberia, and at the Washington Disarmament Conference. And it ultimately went to war when Japan's actions threatened to destroy the Open Door Policy.⁵

American foreign policy, then, up to 1914 may be summed up as follows: "in the Caribbean, predominance; in Europe, abstention; in the Far East, cooperation."⁶

Why an American Navy:

The United States has traditionally been a mercantile power and in its isolationistic policies it hoped to expand its sea trade without interference. But the United States soon learned that a nation could not trade freely on the seas without a navy to protect its commerce and lines of communications during times of international disputes. As a consequence, American naval expansion and sea power progressed through the Nineteenth Century with high points and low points depending on the administration in power, the degree to which Americans looked outward, and the level of the threat to American trade policies.

The phenomenal growth of the United States Navy at the end of the Nineteenth Century was to some degree spurred on by the writings of Captain Alfred T. Mahan, who advocated the establishment of bases in the Pacific to protect American trade. Mahan also saw the strategic implications of building an Isthmian canal to link east and west. Another factor influencing the building of an Isthmian canal was the completion of the Suez Canal, which significantly shortened the route to Asian markets for Europeans thus increasing competition for American industry vis-a-vis other industrialized

powers. The need for such a canal (just as Russian efforts were made to find a shorter route between east and west) were also made manifest by the long distance the Atlantic Fleet had to travel in order to participate in the Spanish-American War in the Pacific.

Mahan defined seapower as not only including a nation's military power afloat, but the basis upon which this strength is derived: commerce, shipping, foreign markets and colonies, and industrial power. To Mahan, sea power is also based on a nation's geographic position, physical configuration, extent of territory, number of population, character of the people and nature of the government.⁷ In addition, a "nation's sea power is affected by the spirit of the age."⁸ According to Mahan,

...the national interest, whether that interest was the expansion of power or of profits, was the sole criterion by which a nation's policy should be judged.⁹

With the acquisition of the Philippines and other possessions in the Pacific Ocean, the United States became a Pacific power and continued its naval expansion. The United States position on limitations of naval armaments at the Hague Conference in 1899 was indicative of the American desire to continue its naval building and modernization program and to protect this newly won "empire." By 1904, the United States Navy ranked fifth among the great power navies and by 1917 had attained a rank as the third greatest navy in the world after Great Britain and Germany.

With the completion of the Panama Canal in August 1914, the United States was rising in importance in the Pacific Ocean, as the Canal "doubled the effectiveness of United States' naval rearmement as did the Kiel Canal for Germany." In addition, the opening of the Canal, coupled with Great Britain's preoccupation with the rise of German naval power and the ensuing war in Europe, gave preeminance to the United States position in the Pacific. This division of British predominance in the Atlantic and United States predominance in the Pacific was even more evident after World War I.¹⁰

During the interwar years, United States efforts (as presented in Chapter II) at noninvolvement and achievement of world peace and security through naval disarmament failed in the long run. The outcome of naval limitations underlined the predominance of the various naval powers regionally and left world powers incapable of meeting threats and of supporting national interests singly, with sufficient power, to deter aggression. Failing to retain balanced forces, or forces in being, because of desires to appease, of fears of being second, or to economize, eventually resulted in a more costly naval arms race and war. The naval conferences emphasized to the United States that one cannot negotiate from a position of weakness in trying to coerce others to agree to parity or to some political concession. The naval conferences also proved that each nation must decide for itself what it

considers to be its own needs and not allow itself to be placed in a strategic strait jacket of ratios, which allow no flexibility to meet future changes in the world situation, unperceived at the time.

The United States emerged from World War II as the predominant power in the world militarily and economically. The United States might have reverted back to isolationism had it not been for the fact that while the United States was dismantling its military power, the Soviet Union was maintaining its armed forces on a wartime footing and consolidating its position in wartime occupied areas and elsewhere. Senator Gale M. McGee explains this paradox in American foreign policy as follows:

...World War II was the obvious turning point in the direction of American foreign policy. As a consequence... the United States found itself strangely on the front lines of the world, no longer able to hide behind the protective balance of Europe or the facade of isolationism. Throughout our history we had enjoyed the luxury of choosing one of the two sides whenever conflict threatened the balance of power structure in Europe. But the option disappeared in 1945. For the first time in our national life we emerged as one of the two sides.¹¹

Since World War II, Mr. David W. Tarr states:

...the United States government has been attempting to resolve its two major foreign policy problems--the threat of expanding Communist power and the danger of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, these issues have converged...The answer has generally been to employ the second to deter the first.¹²

As a consequence, the United States was forced to maintain a large conventional military posture and to deter the expansion

of the Soviet Union through the use of American sea power and alliance agreements, a policy which came to be known as "containment." Because the United States has been unwilling to use atomic weapons since World War II, reliance on regional deterrence has been based primarily on regional application and use of conventional forces, generally through sea power.

World War II had also widened America's insight as to its strategic interests. John G. Stroessinger comments that:

Soon after hostilities had ended in Europe, the entire North Atlantic, from the Azores to Iceland and Greenland had come within the sphere of American influence. And as a result of the occupation of Japan, the Pacific was transformed into what was virtually an American strategic lake. Indeed, World War II had created several power vacuums which the United States had decided to fill long before the cold war actually crystallized.

Hence, American expansion, too, must be seen in terms of a syndrome. Reaction to Soviet expansionism, while very important, is not the only factor in the picture. The analysis must also include such factors as a broadened conception of the American national interest, changing strategic goals and objectives, and economic considerations.¹³

These spheres of American influence, as Stroessinger calls them, plus United States' commitments to its allies have made emphatic the need for a continuation of a large naval presence throughout the world. The growing Soviet fleet, the possibility of new naval powers, and the need to protect lines of communications as American demands for overseas resources expand, all further influence the need for sea power in the future.

The Nixon Doctrine and a Maritime Strategy.

In July 1969, at Guam, President Richard M. Nixon made a policy statement which became known as the Nixon Doctrine.

This doctrine established the following guidelines:

(1) ...The U.S. will keep all of its treaty commitments. (2) ...We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security. (3) ...in cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.¹⁴

Since its inception, the Nixon Doctrine has been subject to many interpretations. In one sense the doctrine is very explicit in its meaning as to treaty commitments, nuclear shields, and military and economic assistance. But on the other hand, one is left with such questions as to how much involvement, where specifically does it pertain, and what is considered a threat to United States security? This dilemma of impreciseness is the ingredient that provides the Nixon Doctrine with flexible options and leaves a potential aggressor with doubts as to American response. The previous Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird has therefore called the Nixon Doctrine "a mix of basic principles and pragmatic approaches."¹⁵

Although the Nixon Guam statement was seen to apply more specifically to United States involvement in Southeast

Asia, the Nixon Doctrine has been accepted as a United States foreign policy strategy worldwide replacing the Truman and Johnson Doctrines. In referring to his new doctrine, President Nixon has said that:

...it seeks to reflect certain realities: a major American role remains indispensable, other nations can and should assume greater responsibilities, a changing strategic relationship requires new doctrines, and emerging poly-centrism in the communist world presents different challenges and new opportunities.¹⁶

With the removal of United States ground forces from Vietnam and reductions elsewhere, the return of Okinawa to Japan, and the improved relations with the People's Republic of China (hereafter referred to as China), a strong argument can be made for increased viability of sea and air lines of communications and forward bases to support national interests overseas. It is in this context -- to get United States forces and support to places rapidly where they might be needed -- that the Nixon Doctrine calls for a maritime strategy. In this context, George W. Ashworth sums up the implications of the Nixon Doctrine for the Navy as follows:

First...as we contemplate reductions in the size of forces stationed overseas, naval forces assume greater political psychological and military significance. They are a constant visible reminder to allies and potential adversaries that forces removed can be returned swiftly and that any adversary intending to usurp the use of the oceans must first contend with our naval forces.

Second, whether our forces are constituted as holding units or as mobile forces, their deployment from the

United States will inevitably establish a dependence on sea lines of communications for sustained support...

Finally, having vital overseas interests, we must give consideration to situations in which our interests are involved and our allies' vital interests or treaty commitments are not. In such cases....our deterrent mobility forces must be capable of carrying out their missions without support of allies...¹⁷

Therefore, the doctrine implies an increased requirement for rapid deployment of ground forces as opposed to maintaining them overseas. It does not necessarily imply that the projection of forces have a complete reliance on sea power (although it is expected that, as a result of experience, over ninety percent of resupply will go by sea); but as Rear Admiral George H. Miller has stated, the flexible mobilization of a nation's maritime assets includes commercial air, navy and mobile army troops. However, primary reliance will be on conventional air and naval forces.¹⁸ This is what provides the backbone to the doctrine. As a result of this more conscious maritime strategy, one sees a greater stress on a Navy budget during the last two fiscal years.

| DEPARTMENT | <u>Fiscal 1968</u> | <u>Fiscal 1971</u> | <u>Fiscal 1972</u> | <u>Fiscal 1973</u> |
|----------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Army..... | \$24,987 | \$22,596 | \$22,207 | \$22,131 |
| Navy..... | 20,788 | 21,886 | 23,775 | 25,197 |
| Air Force..... | 24,967 | 23,191 | 23,565 | 23,549 |

To many, the Nixon Doctrine also indicates less and not more involvement in the world. Consequently, Congressional

action against further United States commitment in Southeast Asia adds to what Senator Gale M. McGee cautions concerning the Nixon Doctrine:

.....The Nixon Doctrine is also vulnerable in that it so far has capitalized on the resurgent spirit of isolationism with its appeal for requiring other nations to share the burdens of their security. Many Americans are supporting the doctrine because they see in it an American withdrawal from the world.¹⁹

In referring to a maritime strategy for the United States, it must be remembered that as an island type power there has always been a maritime strategy. However, this type of strategy -- among others -- has been emphasized depending on the international environment. And today, with some American retrenchment and a movement toward world detente, a more conscious maritime strategy is being called for, because of its flexibility and the requirement for a low profile stance to facilitate diplomatic maneuvering. With the balance of power changing, the world game must be played in a different fashion. This enhances the relative importance of a navy under different situations as it allows the United States to balance United States power, as Victor Basiuk states, "not against one, but against many nations."²⁰

The idea of a maritime strategy was given further emphasis at a news conference in July 1970 when President Nixon stated in comparing United States and Soviet naval forces:

What the Soviet Union needs in terms of military preparedness is different from what we need.

They're a land power, primarily, with a great potential enemy on the east. We're primarily a sea-power and our needs, therefore, are different.²¹

From this statement and others by the President, Nixon's maritime strategy has been called by many military writers the "Blue Water Strategy."²²

With the significant Navy cuts taking place and the steady decline of merchant fleet tonnage, there have been many skeptics who have questioned the meaning of the Blue Water Strategy and whether it does in fact exist. Navy Magazine in February 1971 made the following comment:

If only President Nixon and his defense advisors weren't, possibly unknowingly, the prisoners of their land-oriented staffs and industry pressures, and could hear and understand the maritime options, a 'Blue Water Strategy' could become reality.²³

Although there is much merit to the comment, budgetary limitations, the national mood for noninvolvement after Vietnam, interservice priorities, and a national attitude of looking inward have also hindered a true understanding of the need for a maritime strategy.

United States Merchant Marine. The maritime service is a very essential element in a maritime strategy as the effectiveness of the Nixon Doctrine foreign policy is dependent to a large extent on the United States cargo-carrying capacity (although it is expected that non-U.S. flag ships will also be available) by sea in support of some forty treaty commitments. The merchant marine is also

an instrument of foreign policy in that it fulfills those additional functions of showing the flag at sea and in foreign ports and proving the importance of the United States as a maritime and commercial power.

A strong national merchant marine is also a key element in correcting the balance of payment problems, for he who controls his own shipping controls his own outflow of money. It is interesting that the United States has always been anxious to be number one in all endeavors and indeed still leads the world in industrial output. But the merchant marine has been neglected to such an extent that today foreign shipping carries over ninety-four percent of American trade and commerce.²⁴ Perhaps this lack of interest has been due to a false impression that a reserve merchant fleet contributed to greatness, but it does not.

The rank of the United States merchant tonnage dropped from first in 1950 to a rank of seventh (See Table IV) with the Greek and Soviet merchant fleets moving ahead of the United States at the end of 1972. The existing 15,024,000 gross tons under United States registry is actually much less, when one considers that approximately six million gross tons of this tonnage is employed on the Great Lakes or is in the reserve fleet.²⁵ The total fleet in September 1972 was composed of 1,204 ships, with 658 vessels privately owned. Of the remaining 546 ships assigned to the Maritime Administration,

the majority were in reserve fleets.²⁶ Jane's Fighting Ships 1972-73, citing the United States merchant reserve fleet, reported that approximately half of this fleet was to be scrapped in the near future because of age.

As part of this "Blue Water Strategy," President Nixon also included the United States merchant service, as follows:

Our program is one of challenge and opportunity. We will challenge the American shipbuilding industry to show that it can rebuild our merchant marine at reasonable expense. We will challenge American ship operators and seamen to move toward less dependence on government subsidy. And by making a long range commitment to the future of American merchant shipping, we will create the opportunity to meet that challenge.²⁷

In initiating the Merchant Marine Act of October 1970 the intent, therefore, was not only to rebuild the shipping industry but also to revitalize the shipbuilding industry, which has dropped from first to a rank of fourteenth. The key elements of this program are to build thirty ships per year for ten years and to increase maritime research and development programs for such things as nuclear propulsion and faster ships using new technologies. In order to get this program moving Congress authorized \$384.6 million for 18 to 20 ships.²⁸

In revitalizing the shipbuilding industry it was cited that from 1942 to 1945 the United States built 5,000 merchant ships, 1,500 naval vessels and tens of thousands of service craft. From 1958 to 1963, 174 merchant ships were built at

the rate of twenty-nine per year.²⁸ It might also be pointed out that in September 1972, seventy-five ships, totalling 3.7 million deadweight tons, were being built in American shipyards, with an additional eleven undergoing conversion. Construction costs for these vessels totalled \$1.75 billion, of which \$61.5 million was for conversions.²⁹

Aside from the very important function of commerce, the United States Merchant Marine -- particularly those vessels assigned to the Maritime Administration -- has an important albeit a secondary mission of providing logistics support in wartime. Lane C. Kendall pointed out that the ships under construction or authorized as of October 1971 were mainly tankers or bulk carriers and other specialized vessels. The bulk carriers were considered by Kendall as unsuitable for military use. These included 22 oil-bulk-ore carriers, 9 liquified natural gas carriers, 5 roll-on/roll-off ships, 13 LASH type ships, 21 container-carrying ships, 32 tankers (all sizes), 4 bulkers, and 3 Great Lakes ore carriers.³¹

Although this writer agrees with Kendall's concern, the point must be made that the American shipping industry has suffered somewhat because merchant vessels have been tied to military needs during national emergencies in peace time without compensation. Vietnam was a prime example where shipping companies lost markets because their ships were on call for Vietnam contingencies. As a result, foreign shippers stepped

in and picked up this lost trade. At the end of the war, much of this trade was not recouped. Another problem in the shipping industry is that contractors may not want to hire ships if they might be directed to other purposes.

Another point is that if the American merchant shipping industry is to be viable, then it must have specialized vessels that are inexpensive to operate and competitive. Perhaps it is important to get the industry on its feet first and then find some suitable compromise for military requirements concurrently. It is not inconceivable that privately-owned ships designed for commercial rather than military purposes can be used for military resupply. That in itself would be the subject of a paper.

It should also be pointed out that during the Vietnam War the United States had insufficient shipping assets available in commission to meet Vietnam needs. As a consequence, reserve fleet ships had to be commissioned and heavy reliance had to be placed on foreign carriers. It was also during the Vietnam War (in 1971) that the United States had its first balance of payments deficit in seventy-eight years.³²

Another aspect of the United States merchant shipping assets which should not be ignored in its standing as the seventh largest merchant marine is that of American-owned vessels flying "flags of convenience." Many of these vessels are registered elsewhere (Panama and Liberia primarily) so

as to avoid high labor costs, governmental controls, or stringent safety requirements.³³ As of 30 September 1971 vessels registered under flags of convenience included 409 ships of approximately 20.7 million tons, broken down as follows:³⁴

| <u>TYPE</u> | <u>NUMBER</u> | <u>TOTAL TONNAGE</u> |
|--------------------------|---------------|----------------------|
| General cargo ships | 27 | 302,700 |
| Bulk cargo carriers | 80 | 4,103,200 |
| Refrigerated cargo ships | 11 | 52,200 |
| Coastal cargo ships | 1 | 5,900 |
| Passenger-cargo types | 6 | 47,100 |
| Major-type tankers | 255 | 15,970,600 |
| Coastal tankers | 7 | 28,200 |
| Special products tankers | 12 | 185,700 |

These ships would also be available to augment military needs if required, however, the question arises as to how much reliance can be placed upon them. The Maritime Administration is presently studying the dependability of foreign crews to handle the defense features of "flag of courtesy" vessels which might be used in times of national emergency. However, as has already been pointed out, reliance on privately-owned vessels for resupply is quite feasible.

Studies are also underway into the feasibility of using Maritime Administration tankers which ply the seven seas to provide oil to naval ships in remote places. This evaluation has two primary purposes: to train merchant crews and to reduce the requirements for naval oilers. An ancillary benefit might be to reduce balance of payments by refueling

from American tankers rather than in foreign ports. Admiral Zumwalt has also recently reestablished the Merchant Marine Reserve which should improve merchant marine capabilities to meet national emergency needs.³⁵

With the incentive provided by the Merchant Marine Act of 1970, the Maritime Administration has forecast an increase of eighty percent in ocean going tonnage during the 1970s. Much of this new tonnage will be bulk cargo carriers, and the total carrying capacity will triple that of the present fleet.³⁶ Of course, this means going to larger ships which will create port problems and restrict United States shipping as to where it might go.

Fishing Fleet. The Congress in June 1970 also sought to upgrade the United States fishing fleet through an amendment to the United States Fishing Fleet Improvement Act of 1960. The upgrading was embodied in the statement: "...the vessels will be modern in design and equipment, be capable, when appropriate, to operate in expanded areas..."³⁷ The amendment also authorized the Maritime Administration to pay subsidies in fiscal year 1970 and thereafter for fishing vessel construction in American shipyards. Should the vessels incorporate any equipment required for national defense, the Defense Department was authorized to subsidize these features. To get the program moving, \$20 million ~~per~~ fiscal years 1970, 1971, and 1972 were appropriated to carry out the Act.³⁸ As yet, none of the funds authorized under the Merchant Marine

Act of 1970 and the amendment to the Fishing Fleet Improvement Act have been provided.³⁹

One of the reasons for this emphasis on the fishing fleet is that since 1957, when the American fishing fleet was second only to that of Japan in size of catch, the American fishing fleet has steadily declined to a position in 1972 below that of Peru, Japan, Mainland China and Norway.

Aside from the lack of an effective modernization program, the United States fishing industry has suffered for two additional reasons:

1. The invasion of American traditional fishing grounds by modern foreign flag factory fishing fleets in search of food protein.

2. The restricted use of traditional fishing areas off foreign coasts due to extra-territorial claims by continental nations.

Although both of these have been the subject of many fisheries treaties, the fishing resources in the sea will continue to be a cause for conflict (such as the recent Icelandic-British controversy) for the future as the demand for fish as food and export increases.

It is interesting to note that in 1971, the Coast Guard-Fisheries team made over 160 aerial patrols sighting more than 3,000 foreign vessels (primarily Japanese and Soviet) in near United States waters. Eleven foreign vessels

were seized and their masters were fined \$245,800.⁴⁰ As national fishing industries expand, the need for additional enforcement vessels will also increase concurrently to protect national fishing areas and prevent future conflict. The Law of the Sea Conference scheduled for October 1973 will more than likely address this area of sea resources, however, it will probably be a long time before any tangible results are seen.

Once again, the fishing fleet provides an adjunct to foreign policy for the United States in showing the flag, particularly if the fleet is modernized. The fishing fleet is also useful during wartime for surveillance (intelligence collection in peacetime) and coastal mine sweeping.

United States Navy Missions.

The post-World War II missions of the Navy were formulated at the Key West Conference from 12-14 March 1948. The Conference called upon the National Military Establishment to integrate "the armed forces into an efficient team of land, naval and air forces" and to coordinate "armed-forces operations to promote efficiency and economy and to prevent gaps in responsibility."⁴¹ Specifically, within this framework, the Navy's primary functions were laid out as follows:

- (a) To seek out and destroy enemy naval forces and to suppress enemy sea commerce.
- (b) To gain and maintain general sea supremacy.

- (c) To control vital sea areas and to protect vital sea lines of communications.
- (d) To establish and maintain local superiority (including air) in an area of naval operations.
- (e) To seize and defend advanced naval bases and to conduct such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.⁴²

The Army and Air Force were also provided with collateral functions pertaining to sea power. The Army was charged with interdicting "enemy sea and air power and communications through operations on or from land." The Air Force was charged with more specific collateral roles as follows:

1. To interdict enemy sea power through air operations.
2. To conduct antisubmarine warfare and to protect shipping.
3. To conduct aerial mine-laying operations.⁴³

The Key West agreements on service missions are still applicable today. However, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, the present Chief of Naval Operations, has reinterpreted these missions as they pertain to the Nixon Doctrine. According to Admiral Zumwalt, "the Navy has a responsibility not only to contribute to the deterrence of nuclear war, but also to assure our free use of the seas and continued support for our allies..." and "...must also bespeak continued American will and undiminished purpose."⁴⁴ Accordingly the Navy's tasks fall out into two parts: nuclear deterrence as represented by POLARIS and POSEIDON submarines and general forces

that contribute to the broad national security strategy. Since this paper is not concerned primarily with strategic nuclear deterrence, only the conventional force mission will be discussed.

The three tasks, other than deterrence, to which conventional forces contribute to the national security strategy are projection, presence and sea control. The Navy has viable and ever increasing functions in these mutually interdependent roles, as has been evidenced by the increased defense budget share which the Navy has received during the past two years. Admiral Zumwalt comments on this increased reliance on conventional forces as follows:

...by their nature, (they) are flexible and mobile and provide deterrence over land as well as sea. The Navy's conventional capabilities also can constitute highly visible evidence of U.S. interest and commitment usable where the situation may require. If U.S. presence demands a less visible presence, the Navy can establish one and imply a potentially larger exercise of force. In short, we seek the forces necessary to complement diplomatic, political, and economic policies in establishing an effective balance of world power.⁴⁵

In this statement Admiral Zumwalt reiterates the presence and projection roles of the Navy. Presence is accomplished by forward-deployed forces. "Projection includes rapidly deployable, highly credible forces based in the United States." Both projection and presence forces constitute a non-nuclear deterrence force and are "tailored...to assure use and control of sea lines of communication" for ourselves and our allies, and "to project power ashore if required."⁴⁶

Consequently , one sees the Navy's interpretation of a maritime strategy for itself under the Nixon Doctrine. One also sees that these functions by the very nature and definition of the term "forces based in the United States" include projection forces of the other services. In addition, the Navy has gone a significant step further. By supporting arms limitations to reduce tensions and increase world stability,⁴⁷ the Navy has established for itself both wartime missions under the Key West Agreement and peacetime functions under Admiral Zumwalt's interpretation of the Nixon Doctrine.

The United States and Soviet Navies - A Comparison

President Nixon stated that there are differences in the navies of the United States and the Soviet Union. In reflecting on these differences, a comparison of these two navies is important in order to see how these differences might influence national strategies and arms control negotiations.

Size. Table VIII is a comparison listing of the major units in the United States and Soviet active fleets. Although the numbers of units are constantly subject to change, there are points that should be emphasized. The size of the Soviet Navy has remained relatively stable over the past three to four years. There has been some shift in stress on types, such as in small, close-in defense type warships, and naval manpower -- including naval air -- increased slightly from 460,000 in 1968 to approximately 500,000 men in 1972.⁴⁸

TABLE VIII

COMPARISON OF U.S. AND SOVIET NAVAL CAMBATANTS

Active (Building)(Programmed)

| <u>TYPE</u> | <u>U.S.^a</u> | <u>U.S.S.R.^b</u> |
|--|-------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Attack Carriers | 16(2)(1) ^c | 0 |
| Sea Control Ships | 0(0)(12) | 0(1)(7) ^d |
| Helicopter Carriers | 7(5) ^e | 2 |
| Cruisers (all types) | 9 ^f | 21(1) |
| Destroyers (Nuclear) | 2(5) | 0 |
| Destroyers and Escorts (all ocean types) | 168(41)(50) | 195 |
| Ballistic Missile Submarines | 41 | 60 ^g |
| Attack Submarine (Cruise Missile) | 0 | 68 ^h |
| Attack Submarines (Nuclear) | 60(12)(6) | 25 |
| Attack Submarines (Diesel) | 24 | 190 |
| Amphibious (major types) | 58 | 100 |
| Mine Warfare (all types) | 10 | 330 |
| Auxiliaries (major types) | 150(13) | 46 |
| Patrol Craft (coastal, missile and torpedo boats) | 37 | 603 |
| Icebreakers | 10(1)(1) | 38(3)(1) |
| Naval Air | 4471 | 1000 |

a. Figures as of 1 January 1973. (Source: NAVSCO P-3523 May 1973)

b. Figures as of February 1972 and Jane's Fighting Ships 1972-73.

c. Includes two ASW carriers to be decommissioned in 1974 and one nuclear powered carrier. Those carriers building and programmed are nuclear powered.

d. New Soviet carrier is considered by writer as a sea control ship since its designation is Large ASW Ship.

e. Includes LPH and LHA types.

f. Includes one nuclear powered.

g. Only 35 are nuclear powered.

h. Only 40 are nuclear powered.

On the other hand the United States Navy decreased in number of units by approximately one-third over the same period of time. This unilateral reduction in the American fleet was due to retirement or scrapping of older vessels

in order to make way for accelerated fleet modernization and new ship construction programs. (See Table IX for comparison of age of ships).

TABLE IX

COMPARATIVE AGE OF MAJOR UNITS IN THE U.S.
AND SOVIET NAVIES, ACTIVE SHIPS AS OF JULY 1, 1972⁴⁹

In Percent

| Type of Ship | Under 10 years | | 10-19 years | | 20 years or more | |
|---------------------------------------|----------------|------|-------------|------|------------------|------|
| | U.S. | USSR | U.S. | USSR | U.S. | USSR |
| Strategic submarines | 76 | 58 | 24 | 42 | 0 | 0 |
| Attack aircraft carriers | 14 | n.a. | 50 | n.a. | 36 | n.a. |
| Amphibious warfare ships ^a | 64 | 74 | 34 | 26 | 2 | 0 |
| ASW carriers ^b | 0 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 100 | 0 |
| Cruisers/frigates | 46 | 46 | 32 | 32 | 22 | 22 |
| Destroyers/escorts | 32 | 39 | 25 | 51 | 43 | 10 |
| Cruise missile submarines | n.a. | 74 | n.a. | 26 | n.a. | 0 |
| Torpedo attack submarines | 45 | 22 | 22 | 78 | 33 | 0 |
| Mine warfare ships | 64 | 47 | 34 | 44 | 2 | 9 |
| All major units | 45 | 45 | 28 | 50 | 27 | 5 |

Source: Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-906D), "Memorandum for the Chief of Legislative Affairs, May 5, 1972."

n.a. Not applicable.

a. Excludes landing craft.

b. Fixed-wing aircraft for the United States; helicopters for the Soviet Union.

Three other factors caused this reduction: budgetary constraints, cost of manpower, and phasedown of American participation in

the Vietnam War. Manpower also decreased significantly from 760,000 in 1968 to 580,470 men at the end of 1972.⁵⁰

This current reduction in the United States Navy has given what appears as an edge in strength to the Soviet Navy. This edge, however, is not due to Soviet naval growth, but rather due to United States reductions. This edge will probably increase in the next few years as further cuts are made in forces. One is cautioned, however, in making assumptions in strength as what counts is how one uses the forces one has and whether they are effectively tailored to meet the national needs.

And again, ship type for ship type, American warships are generally heavier than Soviet warships, probably giving the United States more tonnage overall. Comparatively speaking, in the last ten years, the United States Navy has built 200 ships of 1000 tons or over. On the other hand, the Soviets have built only 100 ships of 1000 tons or over. Just half. Another problem that arises in size is that the United States calls some of its 8000 ton warships destroyers and Soviet 6000 ton ships cruisers. The same caution, however, is forwarded. Tonnage is therefore not the only measure of a ship or a navy. Its utility is dependent on its designed missions, endurance, weapons suits, etc.

Geography. In any discussion of navies, geography is a primary element and cannot be ignored. Although ships

today are faster and new technologies and weapons systems provide them with increased capabilities, time-distance factors and access to the sea lanes are still crucial to the effectiveness of any navy if it is to be anything but a fleet in being.

Access to the sea has never been a problem for the United States with its fine coastal ports and extensive coastlines on the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the Caribbean Sea. The Panama Canal has been an important factor in American sea power because it has dramatically allowed the United States to shift units of its fleet quickly to bring power to bear on either coast. This capability was dramatically demonstrated in World War II, the Korean War, the Cuban Crisis of 1962 and the Vietnam War. Since the Spanish-American War and through treaty arrangements and bilateral agreements in recent years the United States has gained access to extensive bases throughout the world. With its built-in endurance, mobility forces, and base agreements the United States Navy has been able to virtually sail the Seven Seas uncontested. (Figure 5.) As a consequence, most Americans and most strategists fail to take geography properly into account.

The Russians are more conscious of geography, having been contained not only by foreign powers but also by nature in their quest to expand and break out. These natural handicaps, where some of the Soviet fleets are partially iced in




FIGURE 5. U.S. and SOVIET NAVY OVERSEAS BASES

during winter months plus narrow passages (or choke points) are shown in Figure 6. Consequently, it has been necessary for the Soviet Union to divide its navy into four fleets (See Table X). Four separate fleets provide sufficient naval forces available to meet potential contingencies should access to the sea lines of communications be blocked by closure of choke points or the whims of nature.

TABLE X

SOVIET FLEET DISTRIBUTION^a 51

| | <u>Baltic Fleet</u> | <u>Northern Fleet</u> | <u>Black Sea Fleet</u> | <u>Pacific Fleet</u> |
|--|-------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|
| Submarines | 65 | 150 ^b | 40 | 100 ^b |
| Helicopter Carriers | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Cruisers | 6 | 5 | 10 | 6 |
| Destroyers, Frigates, Larger Escort Ships | 35 | 35 | 50 | 50 |
| Patrol, Missile Torpedo Craft | 200 | 60 | 150 | 150 |
| Naval Aircraft | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 |

-
- a. Numbers are approximate and rounded off.
 - b. Virtually all ballistic missile and cruise missile-armed submarines are assigned to the Northern and Pacific Fleets. 49 SSBs in the Northern Fleet and 19 SSBs in the Pacific Fleet.
 - c. Each of these fleets is backed up with strike/reconnaissance and antisubmarine aircraft.




FIGURE 6. USSR FLEET OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS

As Robert McClintock points out in this regard:

Strategic considerations fixed by the configuration of the world still bind upon the Russians the historic handicaps that geography has always imposed. The Soviet land mass is shut in closed waters, and egress to the high seas in most cases can be had only by passing through narrow straits or channels blocked by Arctic ice. The closed seas of Russian naval dominance, such as the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk, may prove in each case to be a Russian *mare clausum* but *mare clausum* is not equivalent to *mare nostrum*, and here U.S. naval power places most of the oceans of the earth in the latter category for the United States.

Although there has been much recent comment on the emergence into the Mediterranean of increasingly formidable Soviet naval units, these ships must still transit narrow waters to get there. For example, the helicopter carriers from the Black Sea must ask permission of the Turks to transit the Dardanelles; while submarines and other units coming from the White Sea or the Baltic must pass through the Straits of Gibraltar. The Baltic itself is plugged by the Skaggerak, while even the Barents Sea, from which vessels from Murmansk and Petsamo might emerge into the Norwegian Sea, is frequently blocked by ice.

On the other side of the world, Vladivostok is located on the closed Sea of Japan. Petropavlovsk, with its great submarine base supporting nuclear boats which cruise off the west coast of the United States, still finds itself at the end of the remote Kamchatka Peninsula and below the U.S. Aleutian barrier to the Bering Sea, which itself is separated by a narrow strait from the ice clogged Arctic Ocean.

The geometry of geography is therefore anti-Russian, and the capability of the Soviet admirals to use their fleets is significantly reduced by comparison with the ease with which U.S. admirals can deploy their forces.⁵²

On the other hand, even with more commitments, the United States Navy have been able to balance its navy with half in the Pacific and half in the Atlantic-Mediterranean area.

Another interesting point that should be mentioned is the significance of the Suez Canal to the Soviets strategically. Were the Suez Canal opened today the distance between the Black Sea and the Far East would be 11,600 miles. With the Canal closed, the distance is increased by almost 5000 miles in order to make the transit around the Cape of Good Hope. The Northern Sea Route (See Figure 4.) is shorter but the voyage is difficult and slow and the route is open only three months during the year.⁵³

Fleet Make-Up. It is quite evident from Tables II and VIII that the Soviet Navy is still heavily defense oriented, even though larger ships have been built for possible projection roles. The first of the two MOSKVA class helicopter carriers appeared in 1967, and within a few years we may likely see the first KIEV class carrier which will probably carry vertical take-off and landing jets with which the Soviets have been experimenting. It is reported that eight KIEVs were requested by the Soviet Navy probably to be distributed on the basis of two per fleet, however, only two may be authorized. The probable missions of these ships will most likely be to offset their lack of tactical air-power at sea and for long range operations against American ballistic missile submarines. Based on mission description and the Soviet nomenclature of "Large ASW Ship" for the vessel, it appears to be a sea control ship.

Soviet fleet make up is characterized by an emphasis on strategic deterrence through its SSBNs. The fleet additionally utilizes smaller vessels with short range but packed with advanced weapons suits, and with some larger vessels for presence and projection roles, such as the patrolling naval force off Guinea to prevent Portuguese incursions.

The United States Fleet, on the other hand, is built around the attack carrier for offensive and/or projection roles. Mobility and long-range, self-sustained operations are the modus operandi of the United States Fleet. Many of the American allied (the British, French and Dutch, in particular) are familiar with these operational techniques. In addition, allied fleet exercises stress rapid replenishment at sea methods and strive for compatibility in operations. The Soviets are just beginning to get into this field.

Keeping these types of requirements in mind and applying Admiral Zumwalt's new peacetime navy mission to them, a fleet modernization program is underway to construct more inexpensive conventional warships with long-endurance for presence, sea control, and projection roles. The trend is towards a more balanced force with possibly somewhat less dependence on aircraft carriers for every contingency, whether large or small.

Operations. Appendix IV provides a resume of Soviet and American fleet operations as of February 1972.

The Soviets have made an extensive drive to obtain bases or use of facilities throughout the world. Not reflected in Appendix IV are Soviet efforts to turn Cuba into a major Soviet naval base. Submarine bases are already available at Cienfuegos and Mariel.⁵⁴

In addition, Syria agreed to allow the Soviets to build up naval facilities at Latakia and Tartus. These new facilities are probably to make up for lost Egyptian installations at Mersa Matruh, Alexandria, and Port Said after President Anwar el-Sadat unceremoniously ordered the Soviets out in July 1972.⁵⁵

The Soviets have also built a communications station at Berbera, Somalia in the Gulf of Aden, and have been using the anchorages off Berbera for their fleet visits, which amounted to twenty in 1972.⁵⁶ The Soviets hope to operate medium-range jets from the airfield at Berbera in exchange for aid and improvement of facilities. The strategic importance of this base near the southern entrance to the Red Sea is self-evident.

The "historic turning point"⁵⁷ for the Soviet break out came in 1956 with the Suez Crisis.⁵⁸ Secretary of State John F. Dulles stated at a press conference on 26 September 1956:

We have no legal power to direct ships to particular voyages. But we assume if they cannot get through the Canal upon reasonable terms and in view of the decision of the United States...not to shoot its way through the Canal, that they would in fact go around the Cape.⁵⁹

The Soviets construed this to be a tacit, though not intentional, invitation for them to roam the seas unhindered by fear of massive retaliation. Since that time the Soviet Navy has moved out of its traditional home waters, generally providing a presence role in heretofore traditionally Western spheres of influence.

Fleet operations have been minimal with surface units spending most of their time at anchor or trailing American carrier task forces. During the Lebanon and Jordan Crises and in the Tonkin Gulf, the Soviets tried to deter United States action without success. Generally speaking, if their presence did not successfully deter American operations, the Soviets retreated and avoided a major confrontation. Similar restraint was shown more recently during the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. As Dougherty and Lehman point out:

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, they deprecated the seriousness of the crisis in the U.N. Security Council. At one critical point, they ominously moved part of their fleet from the Black Sea through the Straits, and called for the withdrawal of the U.S. Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean. Yet when the war broke out, they behaved with restraint while watching their allies suffer a quick and decisive defeat.⁶⁰

Whether they would continue to retreat in the future is questionable. It will depend on how much power they can put on the scene and the risk potential as they perceive it.

With improved techniques in replenishment, new naval auxiliaries, and some longer endurance ships, the Soviet Navy will probably increase out-of-area operations in projection and fleet operational roles.

Appendix IV also does not reflect that in September 1972, Athens became the homeport for one United States carrier task force including one attack carrier and six destroyers.⁶¹ Another carrier with escorts has been homeported in Yokosuka. Overseas homeporting of vessels provides an excellent opportunity for the navy to reduce back up rotation forces and proceed with its modernization program while still meeting its world wide commitments. The general navy practice has been to have two vessels as back-up for everyone on the line.

In summation, it is perhaps an exercise in futility to try to arrive at an exact comparison between the United States and the Soviet Navies as to capabilities at this moment in history because of the plethora of variables involved -- tonnage of ships, types being augmented, differing names given to the same classifications, geographic and national needs and differing naval missions.

A useful analysis, however, can be made of the naval advantages held by the two leading navies of the world. The Soviet advantages in part are as follows:

- . They have an easier mission than the U.S. Navy's in so far as the United States seeks control of the sea and the Soviet mission is in essence to block such American control.

- . The Soviet Navy is equipped with newer ships. Most all of their combatant ships are under twenty years of age, whereas thirty-seven percent of American ships particularly in the destroyer force are twenty years old and older.

- . Soviet fighting ships are faster than their American counterparts.

- . Soviet guns are more efficient than those of comparative American ships, and the Soviets have moved beyond the United States Navy in many areas of sophisticated electronics warfare.

The U.S. advantages are listed in part as follows:

- . Experience.

- . Attack carriers offer the United States flexibility and the ability to project power inland.

- . Excellent underway replenishment, with American warships generally possessing longer at sea endurance.

- . Nuclear powered surface warships. The Soviets have yet to enter this field.

- . Unmatched amphibious forces.

One can conclude that the United States Navy is still vastly superior to the Soviet Navy in most situations. The Soviet Union, however, has been improving its capabilities, hitherto mainly for close-in defense, but with limited seaward extension. Another factor which should be added to United States advantages is the fact that most all the major naval powers in the world are either allied with the United States or neutral. These other navies contribute to a regional balance and result in additional concerns for soviet seapower.

CHAPTER V

OTHER MAJOR POWER CENTERS

With the emergence of new power centers in a multipolar world and with an apparent concomitant easing of international tensions world-wide, new implications for United States national security and foreign policy present themselves. These new implications are especially important today when the United States finds itself deeply involved in domestic and foreign economic and political straits coupled with on-going arms limitations talks. The Nixon Doctrine and the three pillars of the President's Strategy for Peace--strength, partnership, and a willingness to negotiate--recognize some of these implications.

In the previous chapters, the focus was on the major elements of Soviet and United States naval strengths and weaknesses, aims and reasons for their navies. These relate to strength. The second element of the pillars is "partnership," and it is the purpose of this chapter to look at the strategic contributions provided by other navies both world-wide and regionally. This approach is considered necessary, as one cannot really discuss the implication of naval arms limitations on strategy unless the navies of all the major power centers are taken into account. Germane to this examination is how these navies contribute to the deterrence effect and strength of each side, and how the navies of supposed neutrals and non-aligned powers contribute to a

regional balance. All these navies have functions and are tailored to national needs as well as to alliance commitments within budgetary limitations, where applicable.

The five major power centers present today are the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, China and Western Europe. In addition to these, there are nations--such as Australia, India, Israel, Brazil, Sweden and Indonesia--which have the capacity to be regional powers in their own right either because of their economic prowess, resources, strategic location, military power or population. It might also just be a strong desire on their own part to exert regional power to fulfill regional ambitions or to make regional gains. To illustrate the significance of these other navies, one need only look at the formidable size of the British and French Navies in comparison, not only to their NATO allies in Europe, but also to other Nth Power navies in the world. Both still have world-wide commitments. In NATO, West German industrial and economic viability and manpower provide a potential base for expanded military power in the future.

A regional approach will be taken in examining these power centers because of the distribution of the Soviet Fleet geographically and the United States Fleet strategically in support of its world commitments. It is in this sense that the relative strengths of either side vis-a-vis the other side and/or other major power centers should be viewed in a balance


of power context. It is also in a regional sense that each side might try through arms control negotiations to increase its own relative power position by eroding the presence and power of the other side.

Appendices V, VI, and VII provide a listing of the navies of United States and Soviet alliance systems and commitments and of the neutral and non-aligned powers as they appear today. These arrangements are as seen by the writer and may be subject to change as easing of tensions and new agreements result in less or greater commitments by the nations involved.

The NATO-Warsaw Pact Area

For the purposes of this paper, the NATO-Warsaw Pact Area includes Europe and the contiguous waters: the Mediterranean-Black Sea area; the Baltic-North Sea area; the Norwegian-Barents-White Sea area; and the North Atlantic. Within this area are three groups of nations which contribute to what might be called the balance of sea power: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); the Warsaw Pact or Soviet bloc; and the quasi-neutrals--Sweden and Finland. Figure 7 provides a visual presentation of the distribution and alignment of the naval forces within the area. If elements of the United States Second Fleet are added to the North Atlantic Region and the Sixth Fleet (Tab to Figure 7), the weight of naval forces in the NATO-Warsaw Pact Area increases considerably.

FIGURE 7. NAVIES IN NATO-WARSAW PACT AREA
(SOURCE JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS 1972-73)



NATO. NATO's defense policy, since its inception, has been one of deterrence and of holding an enemy "as far forward as possible."¹ Nils Orvik of the University of Oslo defines NATO's missions as deterrence and defense (if deterrence fails), conflict prevention and non-military ideological protection.² NATO documents further expand on NATO's strategic role as follows:

The new strategic concept, with its increased emphasis on the need to be prepared for attacks of varying scales in any region of the NATO area, calls for a comprehensive range of mobile and well-equipped forces, conventional as well as nuclear.

Should deterrence fail and an armed attack be made against any member of NATO, there is available a considerable sea, land and air conventional combat potential, over and above NATO's strategic nuclear forces...³

Table XI provides a listing of the NATO allies (less the United States) and the relative strengths of their navies. Forces assigned to NATO generally fall into the following three categories:

1. Forces Assigned to NATO. These are forces which are either already under the operation control or command of SACEUR (currently only certain air defense units) or which would come under SACEUR's operational control or command during periods of emergency under conditions agreed by each member country....
2. Forces Earmarked for Assignment to NATO. These are forces which nations have agreed to assign to the operational command or operational control of a NATO commander at some future date.

3. Forces Remaining under National Command. They include land, sea and air forces not specifically assigned or earmarked for a NATO command but which might be placed under the operational command or control, or co-operate with a NATO Commander in certain circumstances...⁴

TABLE XI

THE NATO NAVIES (LESS THE UNITED STATES)
ACTIVE (BUILDING OR PROGRAMMED)

| | Attack and ASW Carriers | Helicopter Carriers | Cruisers | Destroyers & Escorts Corvettes Frigates | Submarines | Mine Warfare | Patrol Craft/ Missile/Gun- boats | Amphibious | Support |
|----------------|----------------------------|------------------------|----------------|--|---------------------|--------------|--|------------|---------|
| United Kingdom | 2 | 3 | 3 | 76(4) | 34 ^a (7) | 60 | 13 | 33 | 35 |
| France | 2 | 1(1) | 2 | 48(20) | 20 ^b (6) | 96 | 7(2) | 9 | 27(1) |
| Canada | 0 | 0 | 0 | 20 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| Denmark | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 6 | 15 | 42 | 0 | 2 |
| Netherlands | 0 | 0 | 2 | 24(6) | 5(3) | 54 | 8 | 2 | 1(1) |
| Italy | 0 | 0 | 3 | 29(2) | 9(2) | 61 | 13 | 4 | 1 |
| Norway | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 15 | 14 | 48 | 0 | 0 |
| Greece | 0 | 0 | 0 | 17(3) | 4(4) | 23 | 17(4) | 14 | 1 |
| Turkey | 0 | 0 | 0 | 21(1) | 12 | 27 | 17 | 0 | 4 |
| West Germany | 0 | 0 | 1 ^c | 20 | 12 | 73 | 40(30) | 24 | 27 |
| Portugal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 4 | 16 | 15 | 66 | 3 |

Source: Jane's Fighting Ships 1972-73

a. Includes 4 SSBNs

b. Includes two SSBNs with two more programmed.

c. Training ship cruiser type.

Most all the naval forces in NATO fall into the latter two categories.

In order to coordinate NATO naval forces in time of war, two commands were established. Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), established in April 1951, is assigned the responsibility to:

...ensure the security of Western Europe by unifying Allied defense plans, strengthening Allied military forces in peacetime and planning for their most advantageous use in time of war.⁵

Under SACEUR, there are two major naval commands: Allied Naval Forces Scandinavia at Stavengar, Norway and Commander Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe located at Naples, Italy.

The other command which is almost entirely naval is the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) located at Norfolk, Virginia. SACLANT is also the Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet. Established in the spring of 1952 and embodying a multitude of subordinate commanders, SACLANT's mission within NATO is:

...to develop defense plans in the North Atlantic area. He also organizes and conducts combined training exercises. In wartime, his main duty would be to assure that the lines of communications of the Atlantic Ocean are maintained intact, to conduct conventional and nuclear operations against enemy naval bases and airfields and to support operations carried out by SACEUR.⁶

Initially, no naval forces were assigned to SACLANT. An attempt was made by the United States from 1961 to 1964

to establish what was to be known as the Multilateral Force (MLF). This concept called for a fleet of surface vessels carrying Polaris missiles and manned by mixed national crews under NATO "jurisdiction."⁷ One of the reasons for this force was to give the West Germans a sense of belonging to the nuclear club. But acceptance of the MLF concept was doomed from the start due to lack of support from the NATO allies, particularly from Britain and France, as they were building their own Polaris submarines. The idea also inevitably drew strong objection from the Soviets.

In December 1967 the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) was created under SACLANT.⁸ This force of destroyer and escort types from the various NATO nations has operated in the Atlantic region since 13 January 1968 when the first multinational navy squadron to operate permanently in peacetime was formed to have a ready--albeit small--NATO naval force in case of emergency.⁹ STANAVFORLANT also provides for the NATO allies to acquire experience in multilateral operations and command and control. Recently the force was augmented with two submarines and one replenishment ship.

In analyzing Table XI, two of the European NATO navies are worth examining, those of the United Kingdom and France. The United Kingdom possesses the third largest navy in the world and has declared its intent to remain the largest naval power in NATO other than the United States. James Morris

calls the Royal Navy, with its world-wide commitments, a "triple instrument: sea route defense, 'little war' police force, and nuclear deterrence."¹⁰ The Royal Navy is well rounded, and one might say it is structured on United States navy lines.

In maintaining its position as the third ranking naval power, the Royal Navy is in the midst of a modernization program including the possibility of through-deck cruisers to increase air defense and support at sea. This is particularly important inasmuch as serious consideration has been given by the British government to cutting carrier force levels. This move is all a part of reduced commitments and the reduction of world tensions. Such anticipated changes in the profile of the British Navy will depend on the political situation of Britain; i.e., whether the Conservatives or the Laborites are at the helm. The Conservatives have traditionally supported a strong navy.

The Royal Navy also possesses excellent amphibious warfare capabilities for policing limited wars or revolts in Commonwealth countries. To assist in providing logistics support to the Royal Navy on distant operations, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA), manned by merchant marine personnel, is available with its forty-odd modern ships of all sizes ranging the world's seas. Some of these vessels are as large as 42,500 gross tons.¹¹ And one cannot ignore the fact

that the United Kingdom possesses the third largest merchant marine in the world with 27.3 million gross tons.

The United Kingdom is also a nuclear power possessing its own strategic deterrence force of four nuclear powered Polaris submarines. These are maintained on a wartime footing with one on station at all times.¹² Britain, in addition, possesses eleven nuclear powered submarines with five more programmed.

Before going on, some comment is necessary as to why the United Kingdom decided to become a nuclear power.

Andrew J. Pierre offers this explanation:

The British alternated between two poles of fear: (1) The United States would not use nuclear weapons to defend interests vital to Britain unless its own safety and survival were threatened; (2) The United States would use nuclear weapons and destroy Britain in the process. The second fear was often associated with American involvements in the Far East (Korea, Vietnam) where it was thought that the 'local' use of nuclear weapons would escalate into a central war--hence, one of the reasons for wanting influence in Washington. But there were also intermittent fears that American actions in Europe would unintentionally push the Soviets over the brink. The first fear--that of abandonment by the United States--contributed to keeping Britain a nuclear power.¹³

Another motivation for developing a nuclear force was for world prestige and to ensure great power status as the British Empire slowly dissipated. The British nuclear force additionally allowed for a different priority of strategic targets independent of those of the United States. This was seen as particularly necessary after the Suez Crisis when the United States

refused to support Anglo-French objectives. In national security it further allowed the British government to reduce military force levels and to end national service.¹⁴

The second most significant navy of Western Europe is that of France. France, like Britain, still has residual world commitments and has fashioned its navy similarly to that of the United States and British navies with more emphasis on mine rather than amphibious warfare. France, too, has signalled its intentions of maintaining a strong naval posture. It was announced in 1972 that French President Pompidou

...has approved plans for enlarging the conventional fleet by building attack helicopter-carriers and A/A and A/S assault vessels. These will be served by faster support ships. The surface fleet will be complemented by nuclear-powered hunter submarines, capable of remaining submerged for much longer periods. Aircraft carriers are likely to be maintained but anti-aircraft defense will be based on guided-missile frigates deployed around the carriers.¹⁵

France too is a nuclear power and maintains a ballistic missile submarine force for reasons similar to those of the British. The only difference has been that France without U.S. nuclear assistance has been forced to follow a more independent course, whereas Britain--at least until her entry into the European Economic Community--has maintained a close relationship with the United States on nuclear matters.

Although still a member of NATO, France informed the NATO Permanent Council on 11 March 1959 that the French Mediterranean Fleet units which had been earmarked for NATO

use (one-third of the French Fleet) would remain under French control in time of war.¹⁶ (Figure 7 divides the French Fleet in half between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean). This action was primarily due to three reasons: United States refusal to share atomic secrets with France (although secrets were shared with Britain), and the failure of the United States and Britain to give France equal status in NATO affairs.¹⁷

After France successfully detonated her first nuclear bomb in February 1960 and voted to develop its own nuclear striking force later in the year, the United States sought to bring the French nuclear weapons under joint NATO control, but President de Gaulle refused. He later stated:

It is the duty and the right of...European powers to have their own national defense. It is intolerable to a great nation that its destiny be left to the decisions...of another nation, however friendly. The question of the use of nuclear weapons by the two nations that have them...must be clarified, for the continental European powers who are much more vulnerable must know exactly with what weapons and in what conditions their overseas allies will take part in the common battle.¹⁸

On 1 January 1964, French naval units earmarked for English Channel service were removed from NATO control in time of war. Only a few French submarines remained earmarked for NATO service. In July, de Gaulle reaffirmed his position as follows:

So long as the ambition of the Soviets and the nature of their regime brings a threat of terrible conflict to bear on the free world,...France is in danger of destruction and invasion without having any certainty that her American allies, themselves directly exposed to death, would know how to prevent this for her.¹⁹

The next year France orbited her first missile and gave notice that she would assume control over all NATO bases in France in April 1969. France further announced in February 1966 that it was also removing its armed forces from the NATO integrated command. On 1 July 1966, French forces withdrew to national control. In 1970, the first nuclear ballistic missile submarine became operational.²⁰

In response to the Soviet deployment of forty naval vessels to the Mediterranean in 1968, the NATO Atlantic Council meeting at Reykjavik, Iceland in June sought to seek ways to strengthen the southern flank of NATO. France did not support such action until after the Czech crisis when it endorsed a NATO joint communique warning the Soviets against further interference in Europe and the Mediterranean area.²¹

After President Nixon's visit to France in February 1969, France reaffirmed NATO ties but "intended to keep command of her defense" and "control of her policy." It is also interesting to note that since 1969, the French Navy has participated from time to time in NATO exercises and continues to do so even in bilateral informal type drills.²²

What type of contribution the French Navy will make in a NATO war is unclear. An educated guess would be, that in

view of her parallel interests with other NATO neighbors, France would join forces in a crisis, however, there would be no guarantee unless French security interests were seen to be at stake. Although they initially supported a NATO move for mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe in mid-1968 at Reykjavik, it is doubtful that they would extend such limitations to their naval forces.

It is additionally important to note that as a maritime power, France possesses the ninth largest merchant marine with a total tonnage of 11.5 million deadweight tons and 448 vessels. French shipyards are currently building two of the world's largest tankers of 530,000 tons each to be completed by 1976.²⁴

The Mediterranean Navies. A word should be said about NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean. Although there are considerable NATO country naval forces in the Mediterranean, unified operations suffer somewhat for a number of reasons. The primary difficulty is that each nation wants a hand in command and control of forces. Another difficulty is that there is no common policy for intervention. Consequently, this major force in the Mediterranean has no "political line."²⁵

This is primarily due to the fact that the United States with its Sixth Fleet has tended to be the policy maker in this area letting its ideals and national interests decide what was best for the area. As a consequence--outside of

joint exercises and war contingency plans--little encouragement has been given to the NATO allies until recently to make the Mediterranean a NATO lake and that encouragement has come only because the United States would like now to assume a lower profile and reduce its European commitments.

The time, however, may be too late for such a move, although the Italians have indicated a desire for a greater regional role in the Mediterranean,²⁶ Italy has always considered the Mediterranean her Mare Nostrum. The resurgence of this policy is due to a large extent to her Mediterranean power position. Italy is second in economic development to France and has the largest population in the Mediterranean region. Italy also has a substantial navy, but probably insufficient to challenge the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet alone. However, even if Italy did possess the military power, the Italian political situation does not appear stable enough for Italy to accept this responsibility at the present time.

The Soviet Bloc. The Warsaw Pact Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance came into being on 14 March 1955. It is significant that the formation of this Pact came almost immediately after West Germany joined NATO. Signatories of the Pact are the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, East Germany and Albania. Due to the Sino-Soviet rift in 1961, Albania broke diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and formally withdrew from the Pact in September 1968 following the Czech Crisis.²⁷

As already stated, NATO naval missions in time of war are to keep the sea lines of communications open for resupply and reinforcement of Europe, to attack enemy naval and air forces and bases, and to support allied ground forces. It is exactly these NATO objectives that the Soviet bloc navies want to deny to NATO and concomitantly to keep their own lines of communications open. In addition to these missions, offensive naval missions of the Soviet bloc include interdiction of allied merchant shipping and naval forces and support of their own amphibious operations and ground forces.

Keeping egress to the sea and choke points open in time of war has been a peacetime (and an arms control) objective of the Soviets. In 1971 the Soviets called for closing the Baltic Sea to warships of non-Baltic powers:

Warships of the Soviet Union and other countries bordering on the Baltic Sea must possess the unlimited right to sail the Baltic Sea waters as well as the Great and Little Belts (Straits of Denmark). In contrast to this the Baltic Sea must represent a closed sea for the warships of other nations.²⁸

The Warsaw Pact has a four-to-one advantage over the NATO navies directly involved in the Baltic, primarily in missile armed fast patrol boats operated by the Soviet Union, Poland, and East Germany. West Germany, in particular, seems to be building a significant missile force to counter this threat. Both sides have also paid considerable attention to mine-warfare in this area. The Soviets have conducted amphibious operations

with the East German and Polish navies in the Baltic should the need arise in the event of hostilities to take the Danish Straits with marine infantry.²⁹

The Black Sea has been another contested area in which the Soviets have tried to keep American ships out particularly those carrying anti-submarine rocket torpedoes (ASROC). Although the Soviets continue to protest, some 47 American ships have passed into the Black Sea since 1965 and as recently as October 1972.³⁰

In conjunction with the Black Sea, the Soviets would like to see a neutral Eastern Mediterranean Sea as well to ensure free egress through the Dardanelles in peace and war. The interest of the Soviet Union in this area is two-fold:

...the traditional one of insuring for itself a partial control over this strategically important area, adjacent to its southern flank; and the other deriving from its responsibilities as a superpower.

The second reason especially induces the USSR to insure a continuous strategic and political line, the most homogeneous possible, around China; and to seek a solid international position with regard to the Western world in an area of notable economic importance to the latter.³¹

The previous discussion has deliberately referred to "Soviets" rather than "Warsaw Pact," for the only navy that really needs free access in time of national emergencies is the Soviet Navy. All the other Warsaw Pact navies are defensive in composition and would contribute little to offensive operations outside of their own theater. (See Appendix VI.)

| | | | | | | | |
|----------------------|----|-----|----|----|-----|----|----|
| DESTROYERS & ESCORTS | 28 | 39 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 12 | 2 |
| SUBMARINES | 4 | 39 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 12 | 2 |
| MINESWEEPERS | 23 | 175 | 40 | 8 | 36 | 10 | 9 |
| FAST PATROL | 17 | 62 | 40 | 32 | 117 | 88 | 36 |
| AMPHIBIOUS | 14 | 89 | 33 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 0 |

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"MY INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO AVOID A CONFRONTATION."

FIGURE 8. A CARTOONIST'S VIEW OF SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

Strengths and Weaknesses. Strengths and weaknesses of the Warsaw Pact navies can be described as follows:

1. Strength: NATO will not strike first thus providing the Warsaw Pact with the opportunity to break out, close, or attempt to keep open choke points before NATO can bring to bear sufficient forces to counter such moves.

2. Weakness. Operations of northern fleet units are subject to severe weather, to being iced in, or to being denied transit through choke points.

3. Weakness. Because of the long seacoast frontiers, large forces, including naval forces, are essential for defense.

4. Weakness. Defense of off-shore zones is a ship-consuming task.

5. Weakness. The Soviets might not be able to depend on their Pact allies for support in view of the independent tendencies seen recently in the Soviet bloc.

Perhaps most significant of the Soviet weaknesses is that the Soviet Union as a sea power has ranged herself against all the major sea and nuclear powers in the world. And those sea powers--except perhaps for India--that are not associated with the West are not in orientation pro-Soviet.

The Neutrals. Of the two neutral Scandinavian powers, Sweden is a significant naval and maritime power in her own right. Sweden has been traditionally neutral and has

maintained that neutrality by possessing strong and balanced military forces. Although relations between Sweden and the United States have not been on the best of terms in recent years because of the Vietnam War, no trend toward a pro-Soviet attitude has emerged.

Sweden provides regional stability to the Baltic area; and, if not pressed or threatened by either side in the future, Sweden would probably remain neutral as she has done in the past. The Swedes also have the technical ability to become a nuclear power, if they conceived it to be in their national interest to do so.

Proceeding southward, Spain holds a strategic position guarding the Atlantic entrance into the Mediterranean. The United States possesses naval base rights at Rota on the Atlantic Coast of Spain. In a sense one might say that Spain is a tacit part of NATO although not a pro forma member of the alliance.

A move that might be considered as closer association with NATO was an accord agreed to by Britain and Spain to shelve their dispute over Gibraltar. The accord also included provisions for military cooperation.³³

Spain has a sizable navy with an extensive modernization program underway. (See Appendix V) With Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco taking over as Premier of Spain one could expect some further expansion in Spanish naval activity in the Mediterranean.

Spain also possesses the fifteenth largest merchant marine in the world with 3.9 million tons grossweight and 2,276 vessels. On top of this the Spanish shipbuilding industry ranks as the third largest in the world behind Japan and Sweden.³⁴

The last of the significant non-aligned nations in Europe is Yugoslavia. Although a Communist country, Yugoslavia has maintained a strict middleground position and will probably continue to do so unless threatened by either side. Of the non-aligned powers in the Mediterranean, Yugoslavia has the largest navy built around five submarines and 140 fast patrol boats.

Yugoslavia's strategic position has been described as follows by the Center for Strategic and International Studies:

Although Yugoslavia is not a member of NATO, it is adjacent to the strategic theater of the Alliance, and its continued status as a non-aligned nation is regarded as an important element of the existing balance of power. If Yugoslavia were overrun by the Soviet Union, Moscow's power would dominate the Adriatic, press against the borders of Italy, overshadow the Mediterranean, and endanger the Alliance support line to Greece and Turkey.³⁵

In the Eastern Mediterranean, Israel is slowly increasing her maritime prowess. In February 1973, the Haifa shipyard launched its first missile-boat for the Israeli Navy, with additional deliveries expected in the future. Israel also has on order 58 merchant vessels to expand its growing merchant marine.³⁶

The Indian Ocean Area.

The Indian Ocean Area for the purpose of this paper includes the Indian Ocean, the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. It also includes the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Malacca and other Indonesian Straits and the nations that border on these waters, including eastern Africa and western Australia. The strategic significance of the area is rooted in oil and the trade routes and sea lines of communications through the Indian Ocean. Were the Suez Canal opened the length of some of these sea lines of communications would be shortened, at least for smaller vessels (unless the Suez Canal were deepened and widened to handle super-ships).

The Indian Ocean area is of particular importance to the Soviet Union because it provides a year-round sea link connecting the Soviet European fleets and the Pacific Fleet at Vladivostok for reinforcement, replacement and logistics support. The Indian Ocean is also important as it provides a basin in which Soviet ballistic missile submarines can operate in order to "cross-fire" the Chinese mainland simultaneously from sea and land during time of war. And last of all, it provides opportunities for expansion of trade and influence for the Soviets among Third Country nations.

The Soviet Union is a major supplier of arms to such countries as Iraq, Yemen and India in the Indian Ocean. The Soviets have also taken over former British naval facilities




FIGURE 9 NAVIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA (SOURCE JANES FIGHTING SHIPS 1972-73)

on the Yemeni island of Socotra. Other economic and lesser military assistance has been provided within the region to Iran, the Malagasy Republic, and even to Pakistan by building naval facilities.³⁷

But again, the Soviets are handicapped by choke points. The Suez Canal is closed due to Arab-Israeli differences and the Straits of Malacca no longer allow for free and innocent passage without permission. Even if the Suez were opened the Soviets might be handicapped by a less friendly Egypt and increased Israeli naval presence in the Gulf of Suez. The Israelis have occupied the strategic uninhabited islands of Zuggar and Hanish within 20 miles of Yemen and 85 miles from the Strait of Babel Mandeb at the Southern entrance to the Red Sea,³⁸ (See Figure 10.) further complicating Soviet choke point problems.

Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean commenced in March 1968, two months after the British Government announced its decision to withdraw from the region in a matter of years.³⁹ Since then the Soviet Navy has generally maintained a force of about five warships in the Indian Ocean, primarily for presence, flag-showing, and training missions. This number has increased to as high as thirty, particularly during the Indo-Pakistani War in 1971. T.B. Millar, a noted specialist on Indian Ocean affairs, summarizes Soviet naval policy in the Indian Ocean as:




FIGURE 10 THE ISRAELI HELD ISLANDS

1. to be in a position to exercise effective influence over both ends of the Suez-Red Sea passage: this must strengthen their strategic and diplomatic-negotiating position;
2. to replace the United Kingdom as the dominant external power in the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf area: the Western oil companies and half of the West's oil supplies are then in a measure hostages to Soviet political and economic policies;
3. under Soviet 'protection' to foster self-defense and cooperative defense against China in India and Southeast Asia;
4. to obtain positions of political and military strength throughout the whole region, in order to exercise control over sea routes between the western and eastern Soviet Union, and to be able to influence the policies of local governments toward Soviet ends in a crisis or at other times of decision;
5. to provide arms to local governments to foster these ends, and to weaken or destroy the influence of competitive powers or ideologies;
6. to keep watch on American naval activities, especially Polaris submarines; and
7. to ensure increased access to certain raw materials, to trade extensively and profitably within the region, and to use trade for political ends if the occasion arises.⁴⁰

The United States on the other hand, has maintained a smaller force of one large amphibious ship and two destroyer types in the Indian Ocean. It did not attempt to assume the British role in this area. Opposition in Congress and in other government circles has limited the establishment of a larger, more permanent Indian Ocean force. One report on a Congressional hearing concerning the Indian Ocean opened as follows:

There was general agreement (among witnesses) that modernizing the ships in the task force, and perhaps increasing its size slightly, would be advisable. On the other hand, creation of a special fleet for Indian Ocean duty, or substantial augmentation of naval forces in the area, was deemed premature and impractical.⁴¹

Of the three American ships operating in the Indian Ocean one is permanently homeported at Bahrain under a base agreement signed in December 1971.⁴² The United States is also jointly building an air base and communications station with Great Britain at the strategically located island of Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago group approximately 1000 miles south of India. (See Figure 11.)

The United States is also a major supplier of arms in the area especially to Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Indonesia, and Australia and provides economic assistance to a number of other countries in the region (including India). The primary function of the United States in the Indian Ocean is that of protecting the Middle East oil supply and oil sea lines of communications, and of maintaining peace and stability.

In the Indian Ocean the United States has two political goals: to rebuild Pakistan economically, maintaining a close friendship; and to resume a traditionally close relationship with an independent, non-aligned India.

Of the many Indian Ocean nations only five will be discussed: India, Pakistan, Iran, Indonesia and Australia.




FIGURE II DIEGO GARCIA AMID THE TRADE ROUTES

India. Prior to the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, India did not perceive of any threat from the sea to its 3,500 mile-long coastline. However, the appearance of the USS ENTERPRISE in the Indian Ocean brought home the fact that the Indian Navy--the fourteenth largest in the world--could not stand up to potential great power pressure from the sea.⁴³

In reappraising its naval program, the Indian Government saw four primary missions for its navy: "(1) the defense of the Indian sea frontier, including offshore islands; (2) control of the sub-surface in the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal (3) control of the sea surface; and (4) a deterrence against big power pressure."⁴⁴ To support these roles India intends to double its number of missile boats to a total of 24, increase its ASW helicopter squadrons to four, attain a force level of 25 submarines, and purchase nine Soviet NANUCHKA's (32-knot missile corvettes). The missile boats are to be Indian designed and built. Four submarines will be procured from the Soviet Union with the remainder to be built in Indian shipyards. As part of the Indian do-it-yourself program, the first of six Indian-built LEANDERS was recently commissioned. Increases in amphibious capabilities and maritime reconnaissance aircraft are also planned.⁴⁵

Self-sufficiency is the aim of the Indians. With Soviet assistance they have built steel mills, shipyards, tank and aircraft factories. At the same time they have managed to

keep the level of Soviet technicians to a minimum and in-country for as short a technical training period as necessary. It should be noted that India pays in hard cash for military equipment and, therefore, must make purchases wherever equipment is least expensive.

India possesses the largest merchant marine on the sub-continent with 275 ships of 2.6 million gross tons. Half of the ships are less than eight years old. Her overseas trade was valued at three billion dollars in 1972. India ranks seventh in world annual fishing catch.⁴⁶ Both of these industries are expanding.

Even though India has formed links with the Soviet Union via the 1971 Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty and most of her foreign arms purchases are from the Soviet Union, India is strongly determined to remain non-aligned and to be a regional power in her own right. Additionally, the Indians have maintained an independent defense policy free of Soviet influence.⁴⁷ The maintenance of the fourth largest army in the world and an ever growing economy, navy and merchant marine point to these conclusions, at least on a regional level in the near future. India also has the capability of becoming a nuclear power were it in her interest to do so.

This goal of Indian great power status should be supported by the United States. A strong India would wish and might well be able to reduce Soviet presence and indeed create

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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

a natural counterbalance in the Indian Ocean. So far India has rejected probable Soviet overtures for base rights in India or on remote Indian islands - a further indication that India expects to set an independent course in foreign policy. The Soviets have, however, received docking rights at Vishakhapatnam.⁴⁸ This adds to the docking arrangements the Soviet Navy has in Singapore, Somali, and in both Yemens.

Pakistan. Pakistan emerged battle-scarred from the Indo-Pakistani War having lost half her nation with the establishment of Bangladesh. During the war, Pakistan suffered a major naval defeat losing some 34 warships, including two destroyers, one frigate and two submarines. India lost but one frigate sunk by a Pakistani submarine.⁴⁹

Since that time the Pakistanis have been attempting to reorganize what is left of their country, and they have made some progress, particularly in the economic field.⁵⁰ The major obstacles to peace however, between the two neighbors, India and Pakistan, are the Pakistani war prisoners still held by India and the Kashmir dispute.

In March 1973 the United States relaxed its embargo on arms to both India and Pakistan, with Pakistan the principal benefactor because of the imbalance resulting from the Indo-Pakistani War.⁵¹ Very little of the released equipment however included naval armaments.

The Pakistanis, on their own, have been upgrading their remaining destroyers and frigates with surface-to-surface missiles.⁵² Future expansion of the navy will probably hinge on further economic improvements and new sources of military aid.

As to alliance systems, Pakistan dropped out of the South-east Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) after the loss of East Pakistan, although her participation was minimal prior to this time because of lack of military support from SEATO during the Indo-Pakistani Wars in 1961 and 1965. She is still a member of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).

It is clear that with her new closer association with China and her own self-interests in the sub-continent, any future military assistance from Pakistan in time of war is questionable. Pakistan, like Iran and other United States treaty members, have themselves, for good reason, questioned what kind of support the United States would provide and what would be an American commitment. As a consequence, Pakistan has had to look elsewhere and through other arrangements for security (ergo China), even including new and modern armaments. But a relatively strong Pakistan should contribute to stability in the Indian Ocean by counterbalancing Indian power and preventing either China or the Soviet Union from gaining hegemony in the Asian sub-continent. A viable Pakistan would also ease the fears of neighboring countries of further regional

political instability and serve as a stumbling block to expansionist aims, political or otherwise, in the Indian Ocean area.

Iran. The Shah of Iran has been concerned primarily with the security of the Persian Gulf and the shipping lanes therein. Although Iran is capable of protecting the Persian Gulf area, protection of the sea lanes outside of the Gulf remains a potential problem. Sixty or more tankers pass through the Strait of Hormuz daily. The Persian Gulf is an area that could in the future become vital to the "national interest of every major industrial power."⁵³

The Strait of Hormuz is guarded by three small islands in the Persian Gulf: Abu Musa, and the Great and Little Thumb Islands. Fearing occupation of the islands by a foreign power, which could result in choking off Iranian oil exports, the Shah sent troops to occupy the islands in November 1971 after negotiations had failed to bring the Islands under Iranian control.⁵⁴ (See Figure 12.)

Iran is a member of CENTO. Although the Shah is strongly pro-Western and a supporter of CENTO, he fears that CENTO will not go to the aid of a member country in case of local conflict, as was the case with Pakistan. R. M. Burrell summarizes this situation as follows:

In other words, the Shah had begun to realize in the early 1960s that although the defense of Iran was assured in the face of any overriding Soviet threat,




FIGURE 12 IRANIAN NAVAL BASES: PERSIAN GULF AREA

local disputes which could seriously affect Iran's interests might not generate the necessary Western support, and that Iran had therefore better be able to defend its own interests. Any reduction in Iranian-Soviet tension would be welcomed in so far as it gave Teheran greater freedom for diplomatic maneuver and initiatives elsewhere.⁵⁵

As a consequence, Iran would probably welcome an increased American naval presence in the Indian Ocean, as would many of the other pro-Western states in the region. Should Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean threaten the oil sea lines, Iran may take it upon herself to establish a stronger Iranian naval presence in the Arabian Sea, either alone or possibly in conjunction with either Pakistan or India, or both. Certainly such a naval coalition would be of strategic benefit to the United States.

The Iranian Navy is relatively modern and still increasing. Most of the ships are small fast units primarily for use in the Persian Gulf and in the Caspian Sea. As stated, the Iranians are primarily concerned with the security of the Persian Gulf-Arabian Sea area. As a consequence, Iran is making substantial arms purchases to modernize and expand her military and naval forces. This shopping list includes:

- 700 helicopters
- 8 destroyers, 4 frigates, 12 high-speed gunboats and 2 repair ships
- 14 new Hovercraft to add to what is already the world's largest operational Hovercraft fleet
- 2 new air-sea bases⁵⁶

These new armaments should give Iran a formidable military force in the area, especially with its two new military complexes at Bandar Abbas and Chah Bahar in the Persia Gulf and Gulf of Oman respectively. (See Figure 12.)

The Shah is also deeply concerned with political developments in Pakistan, Arab terrorism and liberation movements, and the weakness of the rich little Arab kingdoms in the area. The fear is that these countries will collapse from political turmoil and China, India, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan will "pick up the pieces."⁵⁷

Iran has maintained good relations with the Soviet Union. This has been primarily through economic and military equipment trade agreements which have provided markets for both countries. But what is probably more important, is that as Iran's economy and modernization proceed she will be better capable of handling her own defense requirements and making her presence more strongly felt in the Indian Ocean. Above all, Iran has the will to do so.

Indonesia. Indonesia is strategically located between the eastern end of the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific guarding the Straits of Malacca along with Singapore and Malaysia. Indonesia is therefore both an Indian Ocean and Pacific power with its island complex of well over 3000 islands stretching like a necklace over a total distance of 3400 miles, a breadth of 1250 miles, and covering a total

sea area of almost four million square miles. Additionally, Indonesia has a population of well over 110 million and is blessed with vast mineral resources adequate to support industrialization. As Malcolm Caldwell points out:

It is quite clear that Indonesia must be by dint of situation and dimensions alone a power to be reckoned with in South-East Asia, the Pacific and the world. If her leaders can find the key to economic development Indonesia might one day become a great power.⁵⁸

This potential status might, however, be jeopardized by the lack of homogeneity of this vast nation of islands.

Since Sukarno's removal in February 1967, Indonesia has steered a neutral course, albeit a more pro-Western one, in order to receive financial aid, foreign investments and credits for development. Since 1967, the United States has provided Indonesia with military advisors and aid to modernize the Indonesian armed forces and billions of dollars to upgrade Indonesian bases.⁵⁹ Indonesia also joined Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines in forming the Association of South-East Asia States (ASEAN) and has since assumed a leading role as spokesman for the organization.⁶⁰ Indonesian membership in ASEAN was specifically directed at establishing good relations with her neighbors and mobilizing economic and political power rather than military power to influence future events in Southeast Asia. This position was spelled out by Suharto in his address to the House of Representatives in August 1969 when he stated "that his foreign policy position

with respect to nonalignment and Indonesia's hope to play a major role in world affairs had not changed." The first task, however, was to strengthen the economic base of the country and to maintain stability in the region.⁶¹

Indonesian defense policy is rooted in the army "for strengthening of the civil administration and defense of the nation." The navy and the air force support the army.⁶²

Indonesia had the most sizable indigenous navy in South Asia during the Sukarno era. These ships were primarily of Soviet origin and included one SVERDLOV Class cruiser and numerous destroyers and submarines. Lack of spare parts, maintenance and technical expertise resulted in the gradual deterioration of many of the fleet units. As a consequence many of the major units have been scrapped or cannibalized to provide spares for operational units. The remaining naval force, although still substantial, is used primarily for policing the nation's numerous islands. Consequently, naval forces, at least for the near future, will be centered around small, fast, well-armed patrol boats.

Further complicating her defense requirements, Indonesia's Archipelago Doctrine of 1957 declared "that all waters lying between the island's of Indonesia" were Indonesian territory, including part of the Straits of Malacca. The Doctrine allowed freedom of passage "provided that it did not endanger Indonesia's security or damage its interests."⁶³ With the increased

traffic of shipping, particularly supertankers enroute to Japan, the restrictions on passage through Indonesia's straits may require additional naval power to defend the Doctrine, should a major power attempt to force the issue. So far there have been only loud protests from the world's shipping powers.

Indonesia's future lies in putting her own house in order politically and economically and in achieving regional leadership before venturing into a bigger arena. Neutrality and the maintenance of communications links with all blocs for markets and credits will more than likely be the modus operandi of Indonesian foreign policy. As long as Indonesia remains non-aligned and pro-Western in outlook in achieving these foreign policy goals, the United States should continue its low level assistance to Indonesia's economic and political development and will doubtless respect the role that Indonesia wishes to play in the region. Indonesia's close association with the fifty-five governments in the proclaimed Non-Aligned Group should contribute to keeping the Group's rhetoric, and indeed actions, within the parameters of reality.

Australia. Australia is an island continent that, like Indonesia, also sits between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans stretching east and west 2400 miles with a total land mass of almost three million square miles. Justus M. van der Kroef brings attention to the fact that:

Australia's strategic location becomes obvious from a glance at the map. She forms the end of a great bridge from mainland Southeast Asia into the Pacific; and in this age of rapid communications, she is ideally situated to control major access routes into the Indian Ocean as well as the Pacific.⁶⁴

Further, Australia has vast mineral resources including the world's third largest iron ore reserves and the world's second largest bauxite reserves. But due to her limited population (approximately 12.7 million), Australia has had to look elsewhere for a strong nation to protect her national security. It is in this context--at least until recently--that the United States emerged as the "keystone" to Australian security planning after it became evident during World War II that Great Britain could not defend Australia.⁶⁵

As a result of this new alignment and new regional defense requirements, Australia joined the following alliances: ANZUS (1951 security treaty with New Zealand and the United States), ANZUK (1957 agreement with New Zealand and United Kingdom in the joint defense of Malaysia and Singapore), and SEATO.

With the drawdown of United States participation in the Vietnam War and with the advent of the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine, changes in Australian policies and outlook have been taking place. B. A. Santamaria states that for Southeast Asia, the Nixon Doctrine

...means that some regional alliance is desired, whether it is built around ASEAN, or the Commonwealth powers,

or a mixture of both. Since the United States clearly understands that Australia is the only technically advanced nation in the region, it would hardly be surprising if it expected Australia to be the pivot of whatever security arrangements can be elaborated...⁶⁶

Perhaps it was with this understanding of Australia's putative role, that Prime Minister Gorton, in September 1969, speculated that the Soviet presence in the Indian and Pacific Oceans might assist Australia in promoting nonaggression pacts in Southeast Asia. He said of the Soviet presence:

If such (Soviet) influence is exercised for helping to relieve the international debt burden of such countries as Indonesia, or other countries to build up their economic strength, I cannot regard such action as inimical to our interests.⁶⁷

Mr. Gorton's statements may have been aimed at arriving at a new security arrangement with the United States or at best getting a clarification of the Nixon Doctrine at a time when Anglo-American withdrawal from the region seemed imminent. Since no answer was forthcoming, the Gorton government undertook to expand Australia's military posture and to develop a full two ocean navy by the 1980's. At the same time, Australia could still count on the American nuclear deterrence in case of a Chinese nuclear threat.⁶⁸

Australia's need for both a larger navy and merchant marine is again quite evident by looking at a map. With few inland lines of communication, the bulk of trade and commerce must go by sea. As a consequence, most of Australia's 350-ship merchant fleet is engaged in coastal trade supporting

industrial production, with only a few ships engaged in international trade. With the merchant fleet so engaged there is little excess to provide support for the navy in time of emergency. The navy has not set down any specific functions or capabilities for itself. T. B. Millar suggests at least these functions:

the defense of continental Australia, and especially those parts of primary strategic significance (that is, the centers of population, industry, and government);

the defense of communication with other countries, so far as this is possible, because Australia depends on its exports to pay for essential imports of capital equipment and on some key raw materials, notably oil;

the security of coastal shipping and trade, especially coal (used in electric power stations and smelting works) and iron ore (the basis of secondary industry).

the security of offshore rights to fishing, pearling, and underseas mineral deposits.⁶⁹

Whether the present emphasis on expanding the Australian Navy (at the expense of the air force) with eight additional destroyers and two submarines will be adequate for sea lines control is questionable, even though almost all ships in the fleet will be helicopter equipped.⁷⁰

Australia, as the most technically advanced country in Southeast Asia, has the capability of joining the nuclear club. However, her nuclear development has not progressed as quickly as India's and Japan's.⁷¹ Regional leadership, if it results in competition with these two powers, might require Australia to accelerate her nuclear programs,

especially those dealing with peaceful purposes. Although a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Australia should not ignore this side of nuclear technology should India, Japan or some other regional power develop them first.

Albeit a part of Asian world, Australians had always considered themselves otherwise. E. H. Dar comments:

Australia has always been an Occidental island in an Oriental sea. As they formulate defense policies, Australia must try to see themselves and Asia-- through Asian eyes and face the hard reality that the present prevailing sentiment throughout Asia is anti-Western.⁷²

Perhaps because of a new awareness of her Asian identity, the first Labor government under a new Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, was elected in December 1972. He immediately took a stance less dependent on the United States, "less military oriented and not open to suggestions of racism."⁷³ Upon taking office, Mr. Whitlam: sent a strong personal letter to President Nixon protesting the December 1972 bombing of Hanoi; established diplomatic relations with China, North Vietnam and East Germany; ordered remaining Australian forces home from Vietnam; petitioned to the International Court of Justice to stop French nuclear testing at Mururoa Atoll in the South Pacific; supported a neutralized zone in Southeast Asia; called an end to the draft; and abolished "white" Australia. Further, Mr. Whitlam's actions seemed to be moving Australia away from traditional ties with Britain and the United States.⁷⁴

In an interview in March 1973, Prime Minister Whitlam laid out the direction of his foreign policy, as follows:

Regional cooperation will be one of the keystones of Australia's foreign policy for the '70s. We shall be charting a new course with less emphasis on military pacts. It will be based on an independent outlook in foreign affairs and will be directed toward a new regional community to help free the region of the great power rivalries that have bedeviled its progress for decades.

(On relations with the United States)...our mandate and duty to maintain the American alliance was equally clear. This we will do. But friendship does not require Australia to be subservient.⁷⁵

In May, trade with communist nations was resumed,⁷⁶ and on 6 June, at New Delhi, the Prime Minister stated that he was requesting a modification to the Australian-U.S. base agreements which do not run out until 1988. Additionally, he promised to work closely with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India "to work for the creation of a 'zone of peace' in the Indian Ocean, 'free from international tensions, great power rivalries and military escalation.'" In this regard, Mr. Whitlam felt that SEATO was no longer meaningful as its original objective of containing China was outdated in view of improved relations with China. He preferred the establishment of a non-military type regional organization for consultation either by expansion of the membership of ASEAN or on the model of the Organization of American States.⁷⁷

As a result of these new policy approaches, grave doubts have been raised within neighboring governments as to what

direction Australia will follow in the future. In New Zealand, the new Labor Government of Prime Minister Norman E. Kirk has followed a similar policy course as the Australians, moving towards greater Asian identity and contributing to the development of emerging nations in order to improve stability in the region. The Kirk government was, however, less enthusiastic about giving up its commitments to the present three military alliances (SEATO, ANZUS, and ANZUK) for the types Australia was recommending. Although Mr. Kirk had said earlier that "SEATO was not a factor in New Zealand's defense," his Defense Minister stated at the March 1973 SEATO conference that "New Zealand is withdrawing from nothing." Rather, he expressed the hope that SEATO would remodel itself to cope with the present changing world environment.⁷⁸ New Zealand, like Australia, wishes to expand economic cooperation and trade in Southeast Asia as a key to stability, but at a lower level.

Australian policies have also affected Singapore. Whereas New Zealand will continue to meet its defense commitments--albeit at a possibly reduced level--Australia will only provide logistics personnel to support New Zealand ground troops in Singapore and Malaysia. Combat troops will be deployed for training exercises only.⁷⁹

Fearing loss of military support from both New Zealand and Australia, Singapore, in December 1972, decided to initiate a major defense buildup to protect her 225-square mile

republic. This program calls for doubling the size of the air force and adding six locally built missile gunboats to the fleet. Singapore's Defense Minister Goh Kong Swee remarked that to remain neutral like Sweden meant "arming... to the teeth."⁸⁰

And within her capability this appears to be the way Singapore will go.

During Vice President Spiro T. Agnew's visit to Singapore in February 1973, Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew strongly supported retention of United States bases in Thailand to deter Communist expansion in the Krah Peninsula and Singapore. In May, Prime Minister Lee further recommended the formation of an allied air-naval task force to include United States, Japan, Australia and other Asian forces in order to keep open the Indian and Pacific Oceans and to act as a counter to increasing Soviet naval presence in the area.⁸¹

The pro-Western Prime Minister Lee has been mending fences throughout Asia and seeking additional support in order to give Singapore a greater regional role and to improve the security of the island. As yet, he has not recognized China and will probably be among the last to do so, because Singapore is heavily populated by Chinese. Recognition of China could therefore transform Singapore into an "outpost of Peking."⁸²

Many of the uncertainties that are developing in this region because of Australia's new policies and the Nixon Doctrine may be clarified once Prime Minister Whitlam visits President Nixon. So far President Nixon has put off seeing the new Australian Prime Minister perhaps because of his irritation over the Whitlam December letter and Australia's early recognition of China. Additionally, the President may feel that given time Australia will accept a larger regional role in creating regional stability in the spirit of the Nixon Doctrine. Whether it is either one or a combination of both these, key questions remain:

- . Is the establishment of a more active regional role for Australia, coupled with strained relations with the United States, in the best interests of the United States?

- . Although Australia has a sizable navy and air force, does she have the power base to compete effectively with the ambitions of other regional powers? Manpower-wise she does not. And, secondly, with such a vast coast line to defend, Australian naval and air forces might not be sufficient, as presently planned, to adequately meet security requirements.

- . With a reduced military presence in Singapore and Malaysia does Australia intend to maintain her forward defense concept in the Malayan barrier?⁸³

- . Is the Nixon Doctrine a viable solution for Australia without American conventional weapons support?

Perhaps some clue to the resolution of the current Australian-American rift is to be found in the 14 June 1973 statement of the new American Ambassador, Marshall Green, who suggested

...that the United States was willing to accept that allied 'may sometimes have to take a different path' toward common goals, provided that such divergences did not 'upset the basic relationship.'⁸⁴




FIGURE 13 AUSTRALIAN NAVAL FACILITIES AND THE MALAYAN BARRIER

The Pacific Area

Within the parameters of this paper, the Pacific Area includes the Western Pacific and East Asia south to Australia and New Zealand. There are three great powers in this area: Chins, the Soviet Union, and Japan. Although not indigenous to the area, the United States is also as Asian power. In his Report to the Congress dated 3 May 1973, President Nixon pointed this out, as follows:

The United States has been part of the Asian world since we became involved in the China trade in the early 19th Century, and especially after the Spanish-American War made the Philippines an American responsibility. But after the Pacific phase of World War II, our involvement in Asia deepened enormously. Through bilateral and multilateral arrangements, we became the guarantor of the security of many Asian nations--from Japan and Korea around the rim of Asia to Thailand and on southward to Australia and New Zealand. We also became the principal source of economic and military assistance for many countries in the region. It is against the background of this deep and broad involvement that Asia today has special meaning for most Americans.⁸⁵

The Pacific Area also possesses other powers vying for regional-power-by-courtesy status, because of the influence they hope to project in a regional balance. These have been discussed and include Indonesia and Australia.

Figure 14 shows the naval presence of all these powers in relation to each other and other Nth power navies. It should also be noted that the units listed for the United States Seventh Fleet reflect an average rather than present levels which at one time hit a high limit of six carriers and fifty destroyers during the Vietnam War.⁸⁶




FIGURE 14 NAVIES IN THE PACIFIC AREA.
(SOURCE JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS 1972-3)

United States foreign policy in Asia is based on the Nixon Doctrine. Continued presence of the United States in Asia as a major power is designed to contribute "to the creation of a stable framework of peace." President Nixon further pledged:

- to be steadfast and dependable in support of our friends;
- to continue to bear our fair share of the responsibility for the security of our allies;
- to develop, with realism and imagination, new and mutually beneficial relations with former adversaries in Asia;
- to help, within our limitations, the continued impressive economic progress of one of the world's most vital regions; and
- above all, to take every step within our power to prevent the recurrence of conflict in an area that has known so much suffering and sacrifice for so many centuries.⁸⁷

The President concluded: "We can do no more. We would not be true to ourselves or to our deepest interests if we did less."⁸⁸ Therefore, one can conclude that the United States will maintain its naval and air presence in Asia for a long time to come even though ground force reductions have been made in Vietnam, South Korea, and the Philippines. The object of this naval and air presence is to maintain a durable partnership and to promote economic and political stability within the area.

The Soviets also desire stability, but a kind of stability that will pave the way for Soviet objectives in Asia. The Soviets seek to further consolidate and strengthen Soviet Asia and to expand influence and trade in the Third World.

Faced with a recalcitrant, ambitious and ever stronger China, a Sino-American rapprochement, and the continued presence of the United States Seventh Fleet, the Soviets have had to create a semblance of detente in Europe in order to better provide scarce resources for improved security on the Sino-Soviet borders.

Relatively strong Soviet naval presence in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans is an extension of this security, done to counter containment, and at the same time to contain China (or any other power threatening instability not in the Soviet interest). This naval presence also provides protection to the Soviet sea lines of communication between east and west, a continuing problem for the Soviets. And last of all, it is to support Soviet interests in Asia while at the same time providing a balance against the United States Seventh Fleet. As a top Soviet naval officer truculently commented:

Among the United States Fleets, the 7th unquestionably holds first place for the intensity and duration of its use in combat and for the number, scale and gravity of its crimes. Three years of aggressive action in Korea, ten years of criminal adventures in Indochina, and provocative maneuvers along the shores of India and Bangladesh comprise only part of the record of this floating policeman of U.S. imperialism since the end of the Second World War.⁸⁹

In the Pacific, as in other oceans, the Soviet Navy is handicapped because of difficult access to the sea lines. Soviet access is indirect, requiring passage through waters

DRAWING BY V. KONSTANTINOV



A SOVIET VIEW OF THE SEVENTH FLEET--
"FLOATING POLICEMAN"

FIGURE 15. A SOVIET VIEW OF THE SEVENTH FLEET -- "FLOATING POLICEMAN"

of other states, not only throughout the Sea of Japan area, but even in the Malacca Straits area where they strongly protested Jakarta's retraction of freedom of passage for naval vessels through the straits.⁹¹

Of the five major power centers, two remain to be discussed: China and Japan.

China. Like the Soviet Union, China is essentially a land power with long frontiers to defend against such potential enemies as India and the Soviet Union. But unlike the Soviet Union, China has free access to the sea along its 7,580 mile and island studded coast. China has had more reliance on the sea than the Soviet Union because of poor internal lines of communication within China due to topographic factors. Further, whereas the Soviets can concentrate their defenses against attacks from the sea in limited areas, the Chinese must defend against seaborne attacks along almost the entire length of their sea coast. As a consequence, the Chinese surface navy is concentrated around her "mosquito fleet" of some 530 shallow draft motor torpedo boats and fast gunboats suited for short range operations for which the Chinese coast is well suited.⁹²

China was not even considered as a naval power until recent years. Today some even consider the Chinese Navy to be the world's third largest because of its large, relatively modern submarine force and manpower of 150,000 officers and

men.⁹³ Additionally, the Chinese Navy is considered by Jane's Fighting Ships to be building at least three nuclear attack submarines. There are some who doubt that this is possible for the near term, but, then again, no one believed that the Chinese would develop nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles as quickly as they did. The Chinese are also credited with having some diesel-powered ballistic missile firing submarines fitted out with short range missiles (350-400 miles).⁹⁴

It is interesting to note that in the latter part of the Nineteenth Century the Manchu Dynasty decided to build a modern navy for seaward defense. And it was a modern Chinese Navy built around two ironclad battleships that met with defeat at the hands of a more experienced Japanese Navy in the Sino-Japanese War in 1894.⁹⁵ Although the Chinese rebuilt their Navy, it existed in name only, but the desire to be a naval power did not die. In October 1908, when the American 4th Division of the Armored Cruiser Squadron visited Amoy, Liang Tun Yen (a later dictator of China) asked the United States for assistance in building a modern Chinese Navy. He also made the statement:

You know that China has no effective naval force...
We wish to start the building of a strong Chinese
navy.⁹⁶

But it was not until 1954 that the Chinese commenced to build this new naval force with the transfer of Soviet destroyers, submarines and motor torpedo boats from the

Soviet Union and the initiation of an indigenous naval shipbuilding program. This was also the first time that the Chinese ever owned a submarine.⁹⁷

Although the Chinese have been primarily interested in defense, Chinese warships, mainly destroyers and submarines, commenced limited operations in the vicinity of the Andaman Islands in the Indian Ocean in May 1970.⁹⁸ Construction of a naval base at Dar es Salaam on the coast of Tanzania in the Indian Ocean is also being undertaken by the Chinese. Further Chinese naval base construction is reported underway in the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, the ownership of which is claimed by South Vietnam, Taiwan and the Philippines as well. The Chinese have even expanded their interests to the Mediterranean where they are assisting Malta with the building of a new dry dock.⁹⁹

Under Chairman Mao's leadership, the Chinese People's Daily reported that China was embarking on a major shipbuilding program, as follows:


Whether or not we vigorously strive to develop the shipbuilding industry and build a powerful navy as well as a mighty maritime fleet is an important issue, depending on whether or not we want to (1) consolidate our national defense; (2) strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat; (3) liberate Taiwan and finally unify our motherland; (4) develop the freight business and marine products enterprises; (5) build socialism; and (6) support the world revolution.¹⁰⁰

G. Waring Herrick derives two naval strategic missions from this statement:

(1) to protect coastal shipping, and (2) to protect the coast against seaborne assault, whether by air or missile attack, artillery shelling, or amphibious invasion. These constitute the minimum strategic defense requirements to be afforded by naval power to any country with a sea frontier. Thus, development of an effective Chinese navy of coastal submarines, coastal patrol, antisubmarine ships, and coastal aviation can scarcely be interpreted as other than a legitimate effort to carry out the first of the objectives.¹⁰¹

The propaganda aspects of absorbing Taiwan and exploiting world revolution are not high on Red China's agenda for action, although the Chinese have been courting sympathetic nations and expanding their influence with economic assistance and trade agreements with twenty-four nations in Africa. These efforts have been in areas where Western and Soviet positions have been eroding.¹⁰² This expansion of Chinese influence among Afro-Asian neutrals and uncommitted nations has been possible because China has provided a model for modernization to the emerging nations and has been cautiously willing to share her achievements. Since China, too, is an underdeveloped nation, she is able to impress the emerging nations with her degree of economic progress.

President Nixon's trip to Peking in July 1971, China's seating on the United Nations Security Council as the "real China" in October 1971 and the expulsion of Taiwan from the United Nations gave implicit recognition to China as a great power. This great power recognition coupled with a reduced United States containment policy has permitted China to



"TALK FASTER..."

FIGURE 16. "TALK FASTER"

has permitted China to emerge as a growing power center in a multipolar world.

China has the largest land army in the world and is considered by some to have the third largest navy, yet as of this writing she has ignored the on-going arms limitations talks. In any case, she has not been seriously invited to participate. China apparently seeks parity with the super powers before joining such talks.

It is clear that with less United States presence, the Chinese will have a freer hand in exploiting the Sino-Soviet rift. As President Nixon pointed out.

Another factor determining Communist Chinese conduct is the intense and dangerous conflict with the U.S.S.R. It has its roots in the historical development of the vast border areas between these two countries. It is aggravated by contemporary ideological hostility, by power rivalry and nationalist antagonisms.¹⁰⁴

Improved relations with the United States was made possible with the reduction of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, which eased Chinese fears as to the possible loss of North Vietnam as a buffer state against a strong United States.¹⁰⁵ The Chinese were probably also relieved that in this "era of negotiations" that a Soviet-American detente was not made at their expense.

The growth of both the Soviet Union and Japan in the Far East jeopardizes Chinese security and it seems only natural that China would feel the time was ripe for improved relations with the United States, China's historic supporter.

As a result of the Nixon visit to Peking the two powers issued a statement which announced to the world that the great wall of isolation built around China was beginning to crumble. The joint communique declared:

--progress toward the normalization of relation between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;

--both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;

--neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and

--neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.¹⁰⁶

Fear of increased Soviet naval presence in the Pacific may be another reason why the Chinese have sought a modus vivendi with the United States and are indeed encouraging the United States to remain in Southeast Asia and the Far East, as has been reported.¹⁰⁷ Should the United States suddenly reduce its presence in the Far East, the Soviets would automatically become the dominant naval power.

Napoleon once said: "Let China sleep; when she awakens the world will be sorry."¹⁰⁸ Only time can prove the truth of these words. But for the present, China has entered into world affairs and into an international and regional balance of power environment in which the great and super-powers will be vying for power positions.

Japan. Japan emerged from the Second World War a defeated nation. By 1968 she had become the third ranking industrial power in the world. This rapid rise of Japanese industrialization has been due to two factors. One is the U.S. Japanese Mutual Security Treaty of 1951 which freed Japanese resources and energies from defense requirements. The second factor is that Japan realized that, because of the first, she could gain that wealth and status she craved through commercial rather than militaristic means.

An island nation, Japan has a population of over 100 million and few resources. As a consequence, Japan must live by the sea and trade using her own wits. And it is for these reasons that Japan has built the largest national merchant marine in the world and possesses one of the world's most modern major shipbuilding industries. One writer commented: "...Japan....is the largest builder of oil tankers, and it may soon outstrip all its competitors in the field of maritime transport."¹⁰⁹

Japan today is a superpower in the economic dimension. Between 1968 to 1971 her exports trade grew twenty percent per year. In 1971 alone, her world trade surplus was \$9 billion.¹¹⁰ This extensive trade, not only with Western and non-aligned powers, but also with communist nations, has allowed Japan to expand her political involvement world-wide. President Nixon commented on Japan's new status, as follows:

Japan's emergence is a political fact of enormous importance. Japan is now a major factor in the international system, and her conduct is a major determinant of its stability.¹¹¹

This statement, although true, when coupled with the do-it-yourself aspect of the Nixon Doctrine seems analogous to the mother robin forcing baby robin out of the nest telling it that it was now old enough to fly and fend for itself. The impact of this policy in a multipolar world seems likely to be the revival of all the old fears and balancing them off against one another while the United States retires to the balancer's position. One might also conclude that President Nixon intends to give Japan a freer hand in world affairs, less tied to the United States, when he further stated in his Report to Congress:

Japan's foreign policy will continue to be shaped by her unique prospectives, purposes and style. Japan has interests of her own, of which she herself will be the ultimate judge. Our foreign policies will not be identical or inevitably in step. What will present our alliance in the new era is not the rigidity of policy, but a continuing consciousness of the basic interest in stability which we have in common....

Japan's foreign policy is for Japan to decide. Both her security and her economic interests, however, link her destiny firmly to that of the free world.¹¹²

Although Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira stated in late August 1972 that Japan desired more freedom of action and less dependence on the United States, Japan takes a dim view of this new role in which she has been cast. Japan's intent is probably in the direction of increased trade

world-wide without major political involvement. Additionally, the three "Nixon shocks" have caused the Japanese to make a further reassessment of United States support. The first "shock" was the President's surprise visit to China without prior consultation with Japan. The Japanese might have suspected Sino-American collusion against Japan.¹¹³ They probably felt that the United States wanted to counter rising Japanese dominance in Asia. Additionally, the Japanese might have been fearful on an outcome of what appeared to be a new friend or thrust of United States foreign policy away from the familiar and comfortable to the new and unpredictable. Just feeling less important to the United States was probably enough to cause a "shock."

The second "shock" was the new economic policy commencing in 1971 aimed at reducing Japanese imports into the United States. The imbalance in this bilateral trade is, according to President Nixon, the "most urgent issue in U.S. - Japanese relations today..."¹¹⁴ The last "shock" was the two devaluations of the dollar which increased the value of the yen by thirty-five percent.

This newly found independence may place Japan in a better bargaining position to negotiate a peace treaty with the Soviet Union for the return of four of the southern Kurile Islands (Etorofu, Kanashiri, Shikotan and Habomi Islands) which the Soviets took as a result of World War II. Although the Soviets

would be extremely hesitant to return these islands, because of their strategic value as a natural barrier to Vladivostok and the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk, they might do so in exchange for Japanese credits and technical assistance or just to reduce their potential enemies by one in the Far East.

In the naval arena, the Japanese Maritime Defense Force is the largest navy among the non-communist countries (discounting Australia's carriers). Additionally, Japan has the technical base and shipbuilding industry to build larger ships, including nuclear powered, should it be in her interest to do so. It is apparent that the larger role President Nixon has given Japan is a mandate to increase her navy to a level and type that Japan might consider necessary for her security and foreign policy goals. This might even extend to nuclear weapons, since the Japanese, like all other American allies, have come to the conclusion that, in some conceivable future emergencies, the United States nuclear commitment might fail them. Nevertheless, thus far, despite a booming economy, there has been much opposition in Japanese government circles for increased defense spending.¹¹⁵

In the face of this dilemma of opposition to arming on the one hand and insecurity because of the inherent uncertainty in the Nixon Doctrine on the other hand, Japan was reported to have prepared its first defense plan since World War II.

Japan foresees two possible types of attacks because of her vulnerability. One is an airborne type attack from the Soviet Union (similar to the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia). The second type would be internal insurgency fomented by China. If American military assistance was not forthcoming in the former case, it was said that Japan would surrender. The proposed defense plan does not call for sending forces abroad, has no provisions for nuclear weapons, and does not call for expansion of the military forces. The Navy's role is limited under the plan to protecting ports and delaying enemy seaborne reinforcement.¹¹⁶

One reason why Japan might opt for a larger navy is to protect her vital tanker sea lanes in the Indian Ocean and through the Malacca and Sunda Straits. In November 1971, Malaysia and Indonesia claimed 12-mile territorial limits and effectively made these straits territorial waters. Although innocent passage is still allowed for some vessels, tankers over 200,000 deadweight tons (because of their deep draft) are barred from passing through the Malacca Straits, and foreign warships must have transit permission from Indonesia in advance. Tokyo protested the action because of the resulting longer voyage required of Japanese tankers, which carry ninety percent of Japan's oil supply from the Middle East.¹¹⁷ It should be noted, however, that the protest was probably pro forma since Japanese super tankers

have been using the Sunda Straits because of the dangerous passage through Malacca. Should Indonesia close all of her straits to Japanese shipping, a strong naval force might be useful to pressure Indonesia. B. A. Santamaria suggests that since this area is of strategic and commercial value to both Japan and Australia, it would behoove both to act in concert in defending and controlling the Straits.¹¹⁸

Another spur to Japan's rapid rearming might be to forestall any Sino-American understanding at Japan's expense. In striking some kind of balance, Japan might more closely cooperate with the Soviet Union, possibly defeating the purpose of a Nixon balance. Perhaps the Soviets perceive such a situation. On 20 March 1972, Soviet party leader Leonid Brezhnev made the following statement:

Complete normalization of Sino-Japanese relations is in complete accord with not only the interests of both people, but also peace and security in the Pacific and Far East region.¹¹⁹

The increasing economic and technical cooperation between the Japanese and the Soviet Union definitely points to normalization of relations. How deeply Japan will allow itself to get involved with the Soviets in trade agreements and in search of nearby oil and mineral resources only time will tell. More than likely, Japan will proceed along the course suggested by George G. Thomson:

As Japan cannot dominate the Pacific to ensure her national interests, her strategy must be to play her part in preventing its domination by any of the great powers, and to work for a consortium of the great powers to which she would have a claim to belong and in which her voice would be heard.¹²⁰

Commenting on Japan's dilemma, the Japanese newspaper Nihon Keizai Shimbun stated after the Nixon-Tanaka Conference at Honolulu in August-September 1972:

The relationship between Japan and China is like opening up a road where there is no road. The relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union is like paving a road that has already been opened. And the relationship between Japan and the United States is like repairing a highway.¹²¹

CHAPTER VI

THE ON-GOING ARMS TALKS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS ON STRATEGY

The empiric evidence is that arms control, and in particular naval arms limitations remains a labyrinth. Just as arms races are inexorably tied up in political, economic, and strategic considerations, so too are arms limitations deeply tied up in political, economic and strategic implications. The quest for peace and world stability to achieve security for one nation may, in fact, result in a perceived lack of security in another. Moreover, sometimes this lack of security may become almost total insecurity for a third nation. It is analogous to Oriental wall building -- in ancient times it was believed that the more defensive walls or buffers emplaced, the greater the security. Today, the great powers protect themselves through option-building, the "walls" of Twentieth Century negotiations.

Another thing that should be clear by now is that history and geography have a large role to play in arms limitations, and technology has not transcended either one. A nation -- and in particular an island nation -- that depends on the sea for its livelihood and as its first line of defense may be less willing to accept naval arms limitations agreements than a power that does not depend on the sea. Conversely, a land power with extensive borders to defend against potential land

enemies might be just as hesitant to accept agreements on land and air forces and armaments. Interestingly, a land power may be eager to agree to naval arms limitations in order to reduce the projection and presence of naval powers in areas of political interest of the land power. Sea powers may also have the same objectives vis-a-vis other sea powers. The land power might even build a navy well over that level required for defense against seaborne attack or protection of national interests in order to confront the projection and presence of a major seapower. This surplus naval strength may then be used as a bargaining chip in arms control negotiations to achieve some political, economic or strategic end. Conversely, a sea power may do the same thing with land armies for similar ends.

The point is that nations do not go into arms agreements for altruistic reasons. Each has a motive, whether the nation is an initiator or an attendee, and the motive might be as simple as hearing what the other governments have to say. Quite often, as history has shown, one can also determine at the negotiating table the fears and military emphasis of other nations and develop a strategy accordingly. As Eugene Tarlé, a Soviet historian, so aptly conjectured:

From time immemorial the idea of disarmament has been one of the most popular means of disseminating the true motives and plans of governments. The explanation of this is very clear...Every proposal for the limitation of armaments can always count on wide popularity and support from world opinion.¹

Generally speaking, then, some of the major reasons why nations enter arms control negotiations are as follows:

1. To gain some national advantage.
2. To decrease armament budgets and spending, so that funds saved can be applied in some other area for the general good of the nation. Often as in the case of the Soviets today so much of the national resource base is invested in the armed forces and armaments that little is left for economic or social development.
3. To gain comparability or parity in forces in respect to potential antagonists.
4. To allay the fear of outbreak of war either due to accident or miscalculation with catastrophic results. (Usually limited to nuclear weapons).
5. To reduce the intensity of war initially, should it occur, by limiting the level of armaments in peacetime.
6. To use the agreement in order to establish a status quo so that gains can be made elsewhere. This might include cheating in an arms buildup unbeknown to the other side.
7. To cause a slowdown of the other side's buildup or implementation of a weapons breakthrough by using delaying tactics until similar or more improved systems have been developed.

8. To find out what the other side is thinking.

In order to see how such reasons impact on strategy, it is necessary to examine briefly the aims of the two

superpowers in arms control negotiations, their negotiating positions, the directions in which arms limitations talks can go today, and finally how the Nixon Doctrine and the balance of power affect these ongoing negotiations.

Before proceeding, however, it must be pointed out again that the emphasis here is on conventional naval weapons systems. Another point that should be recognized is the problem of asymmetry which exists between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Asymmetry

Asymmetry according to Webster's Dictionary means "want of...correspondence in size, shape, and relative position, of parts that are on opposite sides of a dividing line or median plane." And clearly there is a want of correspondence between the Soviet Union and the United States in the sphere of arms control, and they have implications both in negotiations and on strategy.

1. Land Power vs Sea Power. The Soviet Union is a land power, self-contained and not necessarily dependent on the sea. Conversely, the United States is a sea power -- or better put, a sea-logistics nation -- much more dependent on sea lines of communication for trade, commerce, and defense. As a land power and with their form of government the Soviet Union can control their own population and contiguous allies

in the Warsaw Pact area. However, there are indications that domestic problems in these areas may be pushing the Soviet Union into some kind of accommodation with the West.

2. Intelligence. The United States is at a disadvantage in this area because the Soviet defense programs and budget are not a matter of public record. Consequently, new classes of warships, ship improvements, or new weapons are not discovered until they are spotted at sea or big enough (such as the KIEV) to spot by satellite after they have been almost completely laid down in a shipyard. On the other hand the Soviets need only pick up the New York Times, Aviation Week or the Washington Post to learn almost our every move in warship building programs, ship improvement programs and weapons systems. The amount of information disseminated through advertising in professional journals alone is phenomenal. In addition it is very difficult to make special deployments or to introduce capabilities without the press reporting it. While the Soviets know almost everything about United States plans and programs, the United States is left wondering what the other side is doing and whether they are living up to their agreements.

3. Semantics. Semantics poses a problem in naval discussions as there are differences in Soviet-American word usage applicable to ship type, size, and ship missions. United States warships of 8000 tons are called destroyers,

while Soviet ships of 6000 tons are called cruisers. Even the weapons systems are built for different purposes. The Soviet Navy is heavily equipped with ship-to-ship missiles, for example, whereas the United States Navy is just getting into this field. On top of all this, the mission of the United States Navy general purpose forces is offensive, whereas the Soviet general purpose forces are built for defensive missions.

Another factor in semantics is that the Soviets consider anything that can deliver a weapon from a long range against the Soviet Union as "strategic." Therefore, a carrier and its aircraft -- with or without nuclear weapons -- is termed strategic. And any ship-to-ship or ship-to-air missile that can also go ship-to-shore might also be labeled strategic by the Soviets.

On the propaganda front, semantics plays a major role as well. For instance, what we call "projection" forces are described as "intervention" forces by the Soviets. Since the Soviets do not "intervene," their forces are "peace-loving" and not, therefore "projection." Soviet propaganda pronouncements enlist much international public sympathy against American projection even in its more altruistic form as it occurred during the Lebanese, Jordanian and Dominican crises, where American forces were invited in to help restore order by the affected nations. The label that the Soviets place

on events clearly depends on whose ox is getting gored at the time.

Even Latinisms are subject to differing interpretations. For instance, the Soviets consider status quo to mean the continuous and inevitable moving forward of the socialist forces in the world. The United States views status quo as meaning "stability." Therefore, when the United States moved into Jordan, we defended the status quo and conversely the Soviets said we overturned the status quo. Is it any wonder that ambiguities exist even in signed treaties because of the nuances of words? As Humpty Dumpty told Alice in Through The Looking Glass, "When I use a word...it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less."

Soviet Arms Control Aims

What do the Soviets seek in naval arms limitations today? Let us view this question in its historic context beginning with the world environment at the time of the Hague Conference of 1899. Three major naval powers were emerging - Japan, the United States, and Germany. Japan had recently won a naval battle in the Sino-Japanese War in 1894 and was increasing her navy. The United States had just won the Spanish-American War; and with the acquisition of the Philippines she too was engaged in a naval building program to defend this newly won empire. In Europe, Germany - against whom Russia had entered the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894 - was also engaged in a

large naval building program, establishing a colonial empire, and bying for world power.

In the midst of all this frenzied naval activity - with England who sought to contain Russia building ships too - Russia found her Treasury almost bare. Russia stood strapped with supporting an enormous military force, economically weak and dependent on the outside world for almost all of its manufactured goods, armaments and technical assistance, and overextended with the new territorial acquisitions in the Far East which required consolidation. It was politically expedient under the circumstances for the Russians to propose limitations on armaments in order to create an easing of world tensions, to reduce defense spending, to improve the economic base of the country, to encourage outside investment and technical assistance, and to invest moneys saved to the building of the Trans-Siberian railroad in order to consolidate the Far Eastern gains. Russia's call for arms limitations was a maneuver calculated to end an arms race in which she was too poor to participate.

Today, almost 75 years later, we have new major power centers emerging in the form of Japan, China and Western Europe. Japan and Western Europe are already established economic giants, and China wants a piece of the action. All three are expanding and/or modernizing their navies. Even the peripheral powers aspiring for greater status regionally

are building larger navies, generally concerned about Soviet naval presence in the area. They, too, must keep sea lines of communications open.

The Soviet Union - like Russia in 1899 - is again in need of economic assistance, probably because she has spent more than she can afford for armaments and economic and military assistance in her race to gain parity with the United States. As Roman Kolkowicz points out:

The economic burdens of the arms race have long worked to constrain the Soviet Union's ability to satisfy consumer needs and to make the investments in new plant and machinery necessary to ensure future economic growth. Military expenditures have increased annually since 1965, and, relative to the growth of the economy as a whole, investments have declined during this same period. The military drain on the economy has affected precisely those high-quality resources, human and material, needed for economic modernization.²

Further, Brezhnev in 1966 was quoted as admitting that "expenditures for the army and armaments are a great burden for the budget, for our national economy" and suggesting that "at least part of this load" should be dropped. Of course, the Soviet view of the world situation did not permit such an economically prudent course at that time.³ Consequently it is fairly certain that the Nixon-Brezhnev talks in June 1973 will deal extensively with economic factors. The Soviets have a long shopping list which they would like the United States to help fill. As one decadent hyena of capitalism remarked, "If all the world were communist, where would Russia get her wheat?"



TABLE 17. A VIEW OF SOVIET AIMS AT THE
NIXON-BREZHNEV JUNE 73 SUMMIT

The New York Sunday News warns:

...His [Brezhnev's] goal will be assured, long-term help for the faltering Soviet economy via trade deals for American products and technology on E-Z Credit terms.

...with the Soviet Union, we suggest he [Nixon] keep a watchful eye on those Americans, including some of his own colleagues, who see sweetness and light radiating from the Kremlin.⁴

Strategically, the Soviets are still anxious to consolidate their position in the Far East. The rift with China has widened and the teeming Chinese population must have Lebensraum. Economic assistance, primarily from the United States and Japan would help consolidate Asian Russia, vast areas of which China claims as part of her lost territory. On the other hand, both the United States and Japan are in need of resources for their industries. The Soviet Union has these resources, but they are undeveloped. Japanese assistance in such things as modernizing Soviet Pacific ports to handle Soviet resource deliveries to Japan and financing of an oil pipeline from the Tumen oil fields to the Far East,⁶ though of great advantage to the Japanese because of a possible closure of the Malacca Straits, would in fact involve not only considerable economic and political risks, but also strategic ones as well. The pipeline, for instance, would most certainly greatly strengthen Soviet air and naval power in the Far East, and lessen Soviet dependence on sea lines of communication through the Indian Ocean which are

already subject to restrictions on free passage through the Malacca Straits. Additionally, the Soviet Navy might one day lose the use of facilities in the Indian Ocean as they lost the ones in Egypt. The Soviets are quite aware of these facts of life.

Lastly, if the Soviet Union could get the other major power centers to reduce their naval forces, maintain them at present levels, or agree to operational limitations of some sort, she could achieve a reasonable regional balance in which her naval strength would be sufficient vis-a-vis other naval powers. Siegfried Breyer, a German naval expert, commenting on Soviet naval strategy points out in this regard that:

The aim of the present-day Red fleet is to reduce the offensive power of the Western allies by forcing them to commit far greater forces to the defense of the sea lanes than the Soviet Union commits to their attack.⁷

At the same time by showing a willingness to negotiate the Soviet Union will enhance its image "as the leading peace-long force in current international affairs" and thus gain world support for one of its main long-term aims, that of isolating China.⁸

It was suggested earlier that history and geography play a significant role in Soviet strategy. And, if history and geography remain ingredients in negotiations - accepting Tarle's conclusion that disarmaments talks disseminate "the

true motives and plans of governments" - then it becomes apparent that Russian goals have not changed. The Russian foreign policy drive to maintain their power relative to all their potential adversaries, to expand spheres of influence, to break out into warm water, to have weak friendly states around her, to avoid major confrontations with other major powers, and to develop a viable economic and industrial base to "bury" the West are all still there. The Soviets have learned, just as the Japanese did in World War II, that fighting does not always get you what you want. Negotiations sometimes do, and the Soviets have had success in this arena.

At the same time the Soviets have not ignored the fact that the maintenance of a large force capability is essential to negotiations. More significantly, fear that they might use this very real force without warning provides them with an additional bargaining chip in negotiations.

The specific arms control aims of the Soviet Union then can be summarized as follows:

1. To create a detente with the United States. In this regard they would probably like to keep arms control discussions on a bilateral level and separate from political or economic problems. Three objectives fall out of this aim: (a) to maintain bipolarity in a multipolar world; (b) to maintain continued parity with the United States in strategic weaponry until their technology catches up; and (c) to

negotiate willingly on arms control issues so as to use United States idealism and influence as leverage in coercing China and NATO to reduce their armaments.

2. To stabilize the Soviet western flank (United States, NATO, and Eastern Europe) in order to free Soviet military and economic resources required to confront a troublesome China with greater force along their 4000 mile common border. Fear of China certainly plays a big part in the Soviet desire to placate her potential European antagonists. Further, Europe, geographically, has always been considered crucial to Soviet security. In this regard the Soviets may consider relaxation of tensions as a possible way to break up NATO.

3. To limit United States conventional naval forces so as to reduce their overseas presence, containment and projection value. Any backing off of United States forward based systems would be in the Soviet interest. The Soviets would also be pleased to see anything that can deliver nuclear weapons remain in the continental limits of the United States.⁹

4. To establish neutral zones in order to further reduce or eliminate United States naval presence and forward bases which might be aimed at the Soviet Union. This would give the Soviets a freer political hand without strong external opposition in their historic areas of interest, such as: the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean and South Asia. One might also include the North African littoral, the Suez Canal and the Bosphorous-Dardanelles area.

5. To reduce spending limited resources on armaments in gaining and maintaining strategic parity with the United States. Continued successful arms agreements could result in more economic investment, while at the same time safeguarding Soviet security.

6. To gain economic, financial and technical assistance in order to develop Soviet resources, to improve technology and the Soviet economy, and expand and improve internal communications, thus reducing her dependence on the outside world and consolidating her internal and strategic posture vis-a-vis the world.

7. To gain parity in general purpose forces with the United States in the absence of strategic and political considerations.

Lesser aims associated with Soviet arms limitation agreements include their desire for unlimited research and development (and probably warship prototypes), and for no inspections to ensure compliance to agreements. "On sight-inspections" continue to mean "spying" in the Soviet strategic lexicon.

A continuation of the arms race - including expensive warships, such as the KIEV and nuclear attack submarines - would most certainly not be in the interest of the Soviet Union whose economic and strategic position at this time seems to be worsening as new power centers emerge vying for

industrial and economic viability and building impressive naval forces to protect their own ever expanding national interests.

Above all, it might be concluded that the Soviet Union is still seeking equal status with the United States as a superpower. The inferiority complex of the Russians vis-a-vis the West is as much a reality today as it ~~was~~ was in Tsarist times. Russia's prestige plays to the uncommitted nations were ridiculous during the Stalinist period when Russia was claiming that her scientists invented the airplane, radio, automobile and so forth. Since her achievements in 1957 in the space field, the Soviet Union has been able to show material evidence that she is worthy of prestige and admiration, but she still feels inferior to the West and still is suspicious of Western motivation, and she still wants to best the United States.

United States Aims in Arms Control

United States arms control aims which involve general purpose naval forces are generally the antithesis of those of the Soviet Union. The Soviet positions are geared to enhance their defensive forces against seaborne attacks, whereas the American aims are directed at maintaining projection and presence as far forward as possible. President Nixon stated in his 3 May 1973 report to Congress that:

The United States cannot protect its national interests, or support those of its allies, or meet its responsibilities for helping safeguard international peace, without the ability to deploy forces abroad.¹⁰

Consequently, the United States has steered clear of making conventional naval forces an agenda item at any of the various official arms limitations forums underway. Since the United States does not wish to discuss naval arms limitations at the present time, then it is necessary to examine the basis of this position.

One of the primary national interests of the United States is to maintain freedom of the seas, anywhere, anytime, not only for itself, but for all nations. Any limitations on forward based systems, neutral zones, limitations on freedom of passage, or restrictions on deployments and/or operations necessarily impinge on freedom of the seas. Mr. Richard Shearer, a SALT committee member, commented in an interview:

Freedom of the seas to me is as sacred as any other international obligation we have. We guarantee it to other people and its going to be reciprocal.¹¹

A second interest is to protect and defend American overseas territories. To agree to limit defenses on these territories would be to revive precepts of the 1922 Washington Conference which left overseas possessions in the Pacific virtually indefensible because the powers agreed not to fortify or improve fortifications on many of them.

A third interest is to support our overseas commitments through deployment of our forces abroad. In defining commitment, Senate Resolution 85 dated 25 June 1969 stated:

...a national commitment for the purpose of this resolution means the use of the Armed Forces of the United States on foreign territory, or a promise to assist a foreign country, government, or people by the use of the Armed Forces or financial resources of the United States, either immediately or upon the happening of certain events...¹²

"If it is in the national interest," though not stated, is understood. To this interest must be added United States overseas bases on foreign soil. These bases plus United States deployed naval forces constitute part of what the Soviets refer to as forward based systems, since they form a forward ring around the Soviet Union (and China).

Lastly, although it should be high on the list, is the fact that the navy is still regarded as the first line of defense. If the navy is limited in its capability to carry out its missions, then a prime area of defense is reduced in its effectiveness.

The On-Going Arms Control Talks

Although the subject of limiting conventional or general purpose naval forces has not been presented as a formal agenda item at any of the various official arms control forums, those same forums do have implications for strategy. Some of these same forums similarly have implications for the use of conventional naval forces, and therefore agenda

discussions could transcend into that area. It must be remembered that arms limitations are not made for the sake of arms limitations alone. Other factors including political, psychological, strategic and economic matters are lurking in the background and cannot be ignored. And it must be remembered, too, that a warship is not just another piece of equipment. It is considered a piece of sovereign territory, and its presence in foreign waters symbolizes the interest of that country in an area. It can be a presence as simple as showing the flag during a friendly visit or patrolling innocently off the coast, within sight of shore, of a nation on the verge of internal disorder. In fact, the shortest war in history was won after a thirty-eight minute naval bombardment on Zanzibar by the Royal Navy in August 1896.¹³ Therefore, it becomes obvious that in a low-profile peacetime environment, surface naval forces have a larger role as far as political utility is concerned than the army and air force.

With this background, it is worth looking at the on-going arms control forums, their purposes, their accomplishments and their implications on strategy and/or general purpose naval forces.

Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT). The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are bilateral discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union on limitations of strategic armaments. These talks, which began at Helsinki in November

1969 and are known as SALT I, culminated on 26 May 1972 with the signing of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms. The ABM Treaty limited each side to two anti-ballistic missile sites (at least 800 miles apart) with a limit of 100 interceptor missiles at each site. The five-year Interim Agreement set limitations on the number of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and sea launched ballistic missiles each side could have. SALT II discussions commenced in November 1972 to work out more permanent arrangements.

Although neither of these agreements dealt with general purposes forces, they do require comment on the broader aspect of strategy. One need only look at a globe of the world to see that the United States is a sea power and to see why the United States has traditionally looked to the sea for defense. On the other hand, the Soviet Union is a land power surrounded by a sea of land or ice. The wealth, industry and population of the United States are primarily in a corridor stretching along the coastline. The industrial heart of the Soviet Union is well in the interior, surrounded by a land mass with its defenses, whether they be interceptors or missiles, on the outside of the population-industrial centers. In contrast, the United States must now place its defenses behind or within the wealth, population and industrial centers.

This situation exists because the strategic use of the sea for missile defense was given up when the United States

signed the Seabed Treaty of 1971 which forbade the emplacement of offensive weapons of destruction on the ocean floor outside of the seabed zone (12 miles). Of course any defensive weapons emplaced would be challenged on the grounds that they might be offensive. Then the ABM Treaty signed away once and for all any opportunity for sea-based ABMs.¹⁴

Another area in strategic arms limitations which could affect conventional naval forces is limitations on strategic antisubmarine warfare (ASW) in order to enhance SSBN survivability and thereby increase their deterrence value. This notion is to create SSBN neutral zones into which entry by attack submarines and/or other ASW ships which could detect and track SSBNs would be forbidden. Other curbs on ASW might include limitations or restrictions on improvements in ASW capabilities. The problem here is that strategic ASW immediately affects the conventional area by ignoring multi-capabilities of ASW submarines and surface ships and by restricting improvements in capability for a possible conventional war at sea. The proposal would also limit freedom of the seas by restricting where a nation can send its warships. Conversely, if restrictions are agreed to limiting where SSBNs can deploy in international waters, then once again freedom of the seas is conceded. The essential question is whether a nation is more concerned with increasing the survivability of its nuclear deterrence force at the

expense of flexibility for its conventional ASW forces for all contingencies or visa versa.

Yet another area might be to stop further development and deployment of Soviet SS-9 (range over 4000 miles) and SS-17 (range over 6000 miles)¹⁵ intercontinental ballistic missiles (range over 4000 miles) in exchange for reductions in United States forward based systems, such as forbidding attack carrier operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. One must measure survivability and deterrence against the political utility of the carrier in presence roles in this area in peacetime rather than its vulnerability in wartime. Many will argue that once out of the Eastern Mediterranean, the carrier could always move back in in contingencies. But it may be the initial removal that would have the greatest political and strategic implications. It would appear as though the United States were giving the Soviets a free political hand in the Middle East. It would also reduce Soviet concern over possible carrier air attacks on Odessa and other Black Sea industrial areas. And most of all it would appear as though we were reducing our will to meet our commitments.

These are but a few of the possible quid pro quo trade-offs in strategic arms limitations which could have implications on strategy and conventional naval forces if in fact they were agreed to. There are many more schemes and probably many more strategic implications.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR). Since 1967 the NATO Alliance has pursued mutual and balanced force reductions with the aim of achieving "a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees."¹⁶ But it was not until January 1973 that the Soviet Union accepted the United States invitation to attend exploratory MBFR talks,¹⁷ and preparatory talks began on 14 May 1973.¹⁸ The aim of NATO in these NATO-Warsaw Pact multilateral discussions is to reduce ground and perhaps air forces in Central Europe in a phased and balanced manner.

Naval forces have been purposely omitted as an agenda item for MBFR discussion, because it is realized that any NATO force reductions in Central Europe, especially by the United States, would require a capability to reintroduce troops and equipment rapidly should such a contingency arise due to some action by the Warsaw Pact. President Nixon commented on this problem of reinforcement as follows:

How quickly each side could restore its forces to a pre-reduction level through mobilization and reinforcement becomes a significant factor. Compensation for advantages that one side may have should be considered.¹⁹

Therefore, any troop and air power reductions by the United States in Europe would require additional air/sea transport capability for reinforcement and naval projection forces to supplement NATO air power. Sea lines of communications also become more critical and might require additional sea control forces. Reduction of forces in Central

Europe might also weaken NATO's northern flank. Again, a new requirement for additional naval forces and/or presence emerges.

Another possibility that should be considered is that the Warsaw Pact might not agree to force reductions in Europe unless naval forces are considered. Again, the Soviets (or one of their client states) might propose a quid pro quo of reducing only Soviet troops in Central Europe in exchange for the removal of American carriers from the Mediterranean Sea: security for NATO's northern flank in exchange for the security of the Warsaw Pact's southern flank. But once again one must give grave consideration to the meaning of what is being given up in the political and strategic sense. Making the Mediterranean a Soviet lake has implications on the political situation on the southern flank of NATO, which is politically weak due to instability in their governments. Removal of United States carrier forces could have a deleterious affect on the viability of the pro-western governments of Italy, Greece, and Turkey and as a consequence they may bow out of the NATO Alliance.

The SALT section alluded to the expansion of Soviet influence in the Middle East as a result of the removal of American naval forces from the Mediterranean. Should the Soviets gain political control of the oil in the Middle East, Western Europe could be blackmailed into further concessions.²⁰

An interesting trade-off might be for the United States to remove its carrier from the Eastern Mediterranean and then support one under the Greek or Turkish flag. Chances are, whichever one gets it, the other nation will insist on one too to maintain parity and stability in the area. As a consequence, one carrier has been replaced by two to confront the Soviets. If presented with the fait accompli, the Soviets doubtless would protest and then insist on a right to maintain her own KIEV carriers in the Black Sea.

Many other proposals could be made involving naval limitations, and even if these were on a type basis, such as KIEVs for American carriers, political, strategic, psychological and economic implications would still be involved. This is because of the asymmetries of national interests regionally and in the missions of each carrier. This fact, based on Soviet arms control aims, points out a tendency on the part of the Soviets to prefer to deal on the basis of deployments rather than on capabilities. Again geography and national interest.

Conference on European Security and Cooperation (C.E.S.C.).
At the invitation of Finland, thirty-two European countries plus Canada and the United States met at Helsinki "to determine whether enough mutual interest exists to justify" a conference. The Western powers are seeking trade and economic cooperation with Eastern Europe. A primary goal of the Soviets,

who first proposed the conference in 1966 in order to exploit detente in Europe,²¹ is to get present borders in Central and Eastern Europe and Soviet hegemony over the region recognized by the participants. The Soviets could then concentrate on confronting the Chinese with greater military force without fear of losing territory in Europe. An easing of tensions in Europe might result in sufficient public pressure to request the removal of American troops from Europe. C.E.S.C. is also another avenue through which the Soviet Union hopes to gain Western technology and economic assistance.²² If the Soviets are successful in gaining Western European support for the removal of United States forces from Europe, this could also include the United States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. At the present time such Soviet success seems highly unlikely.

Though separate from MBFR but with almost the same membership, it appears that in the preparatory phase, at least, there is a wait-and-see attitude -- particularly by the West -- on MBFR progress and Warsaw Pact positions before proceeding on to a formal C.E.S.C.²³

Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). CCD is an United Nations affiliated arms control forum which replaced the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in 1969. The CCD is presently concerned with a comprehensive ban on all nuclear testing and in a treaty on chemical warfare.

CCD has steered clear of other arms control conferences and will probably not get into naval arms limitations unless one of the big powers tables a proposal.

Law of the Sea Conference. Although the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference is not an arms control conference per se, it does have arms limitations implications. John R. Stevenson, the United States representative to the Law of the Sea Conference commented that:

The present crisis in the Law of the Sea is of vital importance not only to international lawyers and lawyers generally, but to all citizens of the United States. It affects the mobility of U.S. naval and air forces, particularly our nuclear submarines and our aircraft; the development of the most important available new sources of petroleum and hard minerals at a time when we are facing an energy crisis and nationalization of traditional sources of hard minerals; and the availability of animal protein from fish to feed the world's increasing population. This crisis is leading to escalating bilateral conflicts between countries because of the increasing importance of their disagreement over legal rights in the ocean.²⁴

There are two basic problems in this regard. One is on territorial sea limits; and the other is seabed resources.

Briefly the territorial sea issue is based on varying national claims of territorial limits, which run from three to 200 miles, in order to benefit from possible seabed resources or to protect fishing areas for their own use. These extended territorial seas claims have already resulted in numerous cases of confrontation between states over fishing rights, most recent of which is the Anglo-Icelandic fishing dispute which has resulted in very strained relations within

NATO, because NATO allies continue to violate Iceland's 50-mile sea boundary. The Icelanders point out that, conversely, the Warsaw Pact fishermen have respected the limit.²⁵ These extended claims could also restrict free passage through and overflights rights over narrow straits (See Appendix VIII) and along coastal routes, for warships and military aircraft. Closing off straits such as Gibraltar would literally prevent entry into the Mediterranean in time of emergency.

The United States and the Soviet Union both recognize a twelve mile-limit, with an increasing number of states generally agreeing to that limit and including freedom of passage and overflight rights. Those states claiming 200-mile limits have generally acceded to freedom of passage beyond the 12-mile limit.²⁶ China has kept her options open by calling for flexible limits thus supporting Third World positions.²⁷ The doctrine of the freedom of the seas provides

...that all states have equal rights to use the high seas subject to reasonable regard for each other's use of the seas, and prohibits the establishment of national sovereignty over the high seas.²⁸

The mining and exploitation of seabed resources, depending on distance from shore, would require not only additional shipping to control but also some type of naval force for protection, inspection and policing.

Neutral Zones. Many schemes on this line have been proposed with the intent of limiting either the presence of

one or both of the superpowers. Limiting the Baltic to contiguous navies was one already mentioned and one which, if accepted, would give the Soviet navy and even more dominant position in the region.

Since the Soviets are more interested in deployments than in capabilities it can be expected that more proposals along this line may be forthcoming in order to improve the strategic viability and security of the Soviet Union. Again, deployments pertain to geography and geography to strategy.

One that has received much more support is the Sri Lanka (Ceylon) Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZP) proposal which was presented to the United Nations General Assembly in December 1971. The proposal calls for the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean by the littoral and hinterland states with the removal of Soviet and American naval forces included. The United States is opposed to this proposal because of its new base at Diego Garcia and its policy of freedom of the seas.

The IOZP has however, progressed to a fifteen nation Ad Hoc Committee in the United Nations to investigate the limits of and security interests in the Indian Ocean region.²⁹

United Nations General Assembly and a World Disarmament Conference. The only other forum is the United Nations General Assembly which is charged under the United Nations Charter to make recommendations on disarmament matters.

So far it has served only as a sounding board for Soviet propaganda proposals such as calling for a World Disarmament Conference (WDC). Although the United States position is that the General Assembly is in itself an adequate forum "it would favor a World Disarmament Conference at an appropriate time...but that time has not come."³⁰ The Soviets feel the time has come. On the other hand, the Chinese have completely rejected a "Soviet-style WDC." Any world forum would, therefore, be meaningless without Chinese participation.

Any discussion at a World Disarmament Conference, if and when it was established, would certainly consider naval armaments.

Unilateral Reductions of Naval Forces. Although this is not a forum for arms control, it is a method practiced extensively by nations in order to reduce defense budgets. By reducing defense budgets a greater share of the national budget can be put into other sectors for the well-being of the population or to enhance the national image. Unilateral reductions especially allow a nation to make cuts without being constrained by international agreements on tonnage or numbers limits should that nation decide to build back up again.

The United States has taken this route to cull out obsolescence in the Navy and to use limited resources to modernize. These cuts have also been necessary because of

budgetary limitations, the high cost of ships and weapons systems, public pressures to reduce spending, and the high cost of manpower in an all volunteer force. The cost of an all volunteer force has in itself been considered a type of unilateral arms limitation. (See Figure 17.) By the end of fiscal year 1974, the navy will have reduced its number of ships by approximately forty-four percent since 1969.³¹

As to the Soviet Union, one writer suggests that the Soviets should either reduce or freeze defense spending in order to put more money into their grandiose plan to correct their economic woes and improve their economy and trade. The writer also cites that Soviet defense spending has increased at least eight percent per year and perhaps higher in the past decade.³² The Soviet Union, although it is not subject to an articulate public opinion demanding reduced defense budgets, still must face up to internal domestic pressures for a better standard of living. The West remains a symbol of economic excellence to which the Soviet Union aspires.

The Implications of the Nixon Doctrine for Arms Control

President Nixon has consistently stated that United States foreign policy must move from confrontation to an era of negotiations, the third leg of the three pillars for peace. Arms control has been an area in which the President feels that progress has been made, particularly in the field of



'He Doesn't Come Wholesale!'

TABLE 18 THE HIGH COST OF THE ALL VOLUNTEER FORCE

nuclear weapons. In his 3 May 1973 report to Congress, he stated:

The responsibility for controlling arms does not rest with the great powers alone. As the United States and the Soviet Union seek to curb the nuclear arms race, and the nations with forces in Central Europe seek to reduce conventional forces, other countries should develop regional arms control arrangements which will enhance mutual security and reduce the danger of local conflicts. External powers should respect such arrangements by restricting the flow of weapons into such areas. The United States is prepared to do so.³⁵

Conversely, the Nixon Doctrine calls upon all the American allies to assume a greater share of the responsibility for their own security. Supporting this same line, the President commented in his report to Congress that "weakness has been the incentive for aggression much more frequently than the arms race."³⁵ It would seem that on one hand the United States is saying reduction in armaments creates peace and limits conflict and on the other hand saying that conflict can be avoided by being militarily strong. And while these same allies are talking force reductions, they continue to expand and modernize their armed forces. What has caused this situation to come about where regional powers see that they must arm and not disarm?

The Nixon Doctrine calls on nations to do more for themselves in defending their own interests, and suggests that the United States will provide support if it is in its national interest to do so. Since no other nation can predict what the American national interest will be at any particular

point in time in the future, there is understandably a tendency to discount the probability of United States support in future crises.

The Nixon Doctrine also provides a nuclear shield for those allies who might be threatened by another nuclear power. But in the light of recent history, these same allies probably do not believe that the United States would use its nuclear weapons. Rather the United States has used conventional weapons to meet its commitments.

The Nixon Doctrine and President Nixon's Peking visit have taken the world out of an age of bipolarity and into one of multipolarity in which regional powers and aspirants must vie for both position and security. The Nixon Doctrine and American domestic pressures to reduce overseas commitments have also tended to weaken the American alliance system by creating uncertainty as to the United States resolve to meet treaty commitments, regardless of how many times the President reiterates his pledge.

Similarly, the United States can no longer depend on its allies, who still want the intent of the American commitment, but at the same time want to go their own way to fulfill their own national interests because of their domestic pressures for easing of tensions, trade with the communist bloc, and anti-American feeling engendered by the Vietnam War.

In a true balance of power system in which a multipolar world must operate, "the first rule of conduct for each nation (is) to seek security for itself."³⁶ The second rule is to maximize power: military, economic and political. Power, as described by one writer:

...has come to symbolize the capacity of a state to coerce others or to avoid coercion by them. Such an emphasis on coercion leads naturally to concentration on the most obvious and final form of coercive capability--military force."³⁷

Therefore to seek security and to protect national interests, nations have for the most part seen a need to increase rather than decrease armaments in the world environment today. A nation's ally today may be its enemy tomorrow or at best stand off looking on as an uninterested neutral. Nations must depend upon themselves more and more to have their own power so as not to be subject to coercion. A nation must maintain the capability to protect its national interests singly, if need be.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The objective of this study has been to provide an awareness that history endures and that arms control negotiations cannot take place without considering these historic factors bearing thereon. As Henry A. Kissinger so aptly comments:

One of the most difficult challenges a nation confronts is to interpret correctly the lessons of the past. For the lessons of history, as of all experience, are contingent: they teach the consequences of certain actions, but they leave to each generation the task of determining which situations are comparable.¹

This writer has offered some trade-offs to be considered in the field of naval arms limitations and has sought to point out some pitfalls inherent in naval arms limitations which should be avoided by a pre-eminent sea power such as the United States. However, the objective of this study has not been to provide hard and fast solutions to the arms control dilemma or dogmatically to propose acceptable areas in which limitations might be palatable.

This study further argues that one cannot discuss naval arms limitation in technical terms such as tonnages, numbers, or gun-calibre in a laboratory-type setting without regard for the historic component. History teaches us that powerful nations are past masters at playing games with

quality and quantity limitations and the development of innovative weapons systems so as to circumvent, sometimes in secret, both the letter and the spirit of any arms control treaty. In the past, where limitations were placed on quantity and size per vessel, nations sought to improve quality so as to regain superiority. Where limitations were placed on quality, nations turned to quantity. And when quality and quantity were limited, nations developed new weapons, always seeking to maintain an edge on superiority and on perceived increased security. The same situation exists today where SALT I established quantitative limitations only. As a result, each side is pursuing what might be a quality arms race to produce the ultimate "Cadillac" missile.

Any naval arms limitation agreement in the face of the growing number of sizable navies in the world today must be a trade-off. It is important to know what has been given up and what it will do to perceived security. The tendency too often has been to approach naval arms control from a purely mechanical and tactical point of view trying to feed it into some kind of a computer scenario vis-a-vis other navies while ignoring the broader political, strategic and economic factors that impinge thereon.

As one experienced arms control expert described this tendency to this writer:

There are a lot of people working on SALT today who have not yet learned that SALT is a political matter. They have made a technical hobby shop out of it. They'll analyze anything to death - the wilder the scheme the better - schemes which have absolutely no political chance in hell of surviving.

Naval arms limitations cannot be accomplished in isolation of strategy, politics and economics for, in the final analysis, navies are the instrument of policy and economics. A warship is a symbol of sovereignty, of cost, and of political utility whether it is supporting a national interest by its presence or policing the sea lines of communications. As Mahan said, "Naval strategy differs from military strategy in that it is necessary in peace as in war."² Further, Henry A. Kissinger points out that:

Such a separation of strategy and policy can be achieved only to the detriment of both. It causes military policy to become identified with the most absolute application of power and it tempts diplomacy into an over concern with finesse.³

History is replete with examples of the fact that no nation sits down at an arms control conference table to bargain for peace alone. There has always been some deeper motivation for being there or not being there, whether it be economic to reduce arms spending in order to improve the national economy or industrial base, political to achieve parity, to create a detente or to gain time for other purposes, or strategic to consolidate some gain or to improve one's position vis-a-vis other nations. The motivation might

well be a combination of these. As Tarle¹ so aptly points out, one can usually tell what a nation seeks by what they propose at arms control conferences.

History has also shown that a nation must attempt to project its strategic thinking ten or twenty years into the future. It must try to synthesize long and short-term goals, decide why these goals are crucial, and where they will be applicable. Such strategic planning can only be ascertained by national interests, more specifically by what the leadership groups perceive and enunciate as national interests. This is especially important when planning naval forces because of the time it takes to build warships. Therefore, a nation should not allow itself to be lulled into arms control negotiations ignoring the political and strategic implications involved, for "what still counts in strategy... is whose ships are where."⁴ Additionally, history has shown that governments, whether they be in the Western camp or the Communist camp, can change faster than armaments can be built. Therefore a nation must tailor its forces to meet such altered contingencies.

An all-important facet of history is geography; and once again, the tendency has been to ignore geography in seeking arms control agreements. Geography, also, has not been transcended by ideology and technology as many believe.

Geography has had an overriding influence on civilization for both land and sea powers. All land-powers have been short-lived, whereas great sea powers, who have maintained their interests in the sea and used the sea for defense have endured as great powers. As W. J. Ruhe states:

Maritime powers have dominated the past. Those who wish to master and use the ocean environment through its entirety may similarly control their destiny.⁵

In a geographic framework, the Soviet Union is still a land power. Any sea power she might be willing to trade-off at an arms limitation conference would not reduce her security as long as she had sufficient naval forces for deterrence and defense. The Soviet strength as a land power is rooted in her army. Conversely, the United States is a sea power still dependent on the sea for trade and commerce, still dependent on the sea as the first line of defense. Any retreat from use of the seas by the United States would therefore be tantamount to surrender. This precisely has been the keystone of Russian policy throughout history: to push back those naval powers constantly present, constantly thwarting and containing Russian ambitions, whether it be through general and complete disarmament or through easing of tensions.

Sea powers need to be vigilant of this policy. As Thucydides said, "...the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept."⁶

Clearly, the Nixon Doctrine and multipolarity will have an impact on the direction arms limitations will take in the future as a balance of power environment world-wide emerges. Reduced perceived security, tendencies toward realignment of nations, desires for regional leadership, and protection of the trade routes carrying oil to feed national industries are factors causing-- or that in the future may cause-- nations to improve and expand their navies to support their national interests. Further, new great powers, such as China, would probably not wish to engage in arms limitations until a level of parity with other great powers were attained, especially as long as the Sino-Soviet confrontation continues over borders and ideology.

Historic factors bearing on naval arms limitations agreements should provide the negotiator with an intuitive facility to perceive the motivations of nations and the direction in which to proceed. He will see that he must deal from a position of strength, neither appeasing nor accommodating, considering any limitations within the framework of strategy, politics, economics, and geography.

FOOTNOTES

NOTES

Chapter II

1. Anthony Nutting, Disarmament: An Outline of Negotiations (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. vii.
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
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

RUSH - BAGOT AGREEMENT

(16 April 1818)

The naval force to be maintained upon the American lakes by His Majesty and the Government of the United States shall henceforth be confined to the following vessels on each side, that is--

On Lake Ontario, to one vessel, not exceeding one hundred tons burden, and armed with one eighteen-pound cannon.

On the upper lakes, to two vessels, not exceeding like burden each, and armed with like force.

On the waters of Lake Champlain, to one vessel not exceeding like burden and armed with like force.

All other armed vessels on those lake; shall be forthwith dismantled and no other vessel of war shall be there built or armed.

If either party should be hereafter desirous of annulling this stipulation, and should give notice to that effect to the other party, it shall cease to be binding after the expiration of six months from the date of such notice.

The naval force so to be limited shall be restricted to such service as will in no respect interfere with the proper duties of the armed vessels of the other party.

APPENDIX II

RUSSIAN CIRCULAR NOTE PROPOSING THE PROGRAM OF THE FIRST HAGUE CONFERENCE

St. Petersburg, December 30, 1898.*

When, during the month of August last, my august master commanded me to propose to the Governments which have representatives in St. Petersburg the meeting of a conference with the object of seeking the most effective means of ensuring to all peoples the benefits of a real and lasting peace and, above all, of limiting the progressive development of existing armaments, there appeared to be no obstacle in the way of realization at no distant date of this humanitarian scheme.

The cordial reception accorded by nearly all the Powers to the step taken by the Imperial Government could not fail to strengthen this expectation. While highly appreciating the sympathetic terms in which the adhesions of most of the Powers were expressed, the Imperial Cabinet has been also able to collect, with lively satisfaction, evidence of the warmest approval which has reached it, and continues to be received, from all classes of society in various parts of the world.

Notwithstanding the strong current of opinion which exists in favor of the ideas of general pacification, the political horizon has recently undergone a decided change. Several Powers have undertaken fresh armaments, striving to increase further their military forces, and in the presence of this uncertain situation it might be asked whether the Powers consider the present moment opportune for the international discussion of the ideas set forth in the circular of August 12/24.

In the hope, however, that the elements of trouble agitating political centers will soon give place to a calmer disposition of a nature to favor the success of the proposed conference, the Imperial Government is of the opinion that it would be possible to proceed forthwith to a preliminary exchange of ideas between the Powers, with the object:

(a) Of seeking without delay means for putting a limit to the progressive increase of military and naval armaments, a question the solution of which becomes evidently more and more urgent in view of the fresh extension given to these armaments; and

(b) Of preparing the way for a discussion of the questions relating to the possibility of preventing armed conflicts by the pacific means at the disposal of international diplomacy.

* January 11, 1899, new style.

In the event of the Powers considering the present moment favorable for the meeting of a conference on these bases it would certainly be useful for the cabinets to come to an understanding on the subject of the program of its work.

The subjects to be submitted for international discussion at the conference could in general terms, be summarized as follows:

1. An understanding stipulating the non-augmentation, for a term to be agreed upon, of the present effective armed land and sea forces, as well as the war budgets pertaining to them; preliminary study of the ways in which even a reduction of the aforesaid effectives and budgets could be realized in the future.

2. Interdiction of the employment in armies and fleets of new firearms of every description and of new explosives, as well as powder more powerful than the kinds used at present, both for guns and cannons.

3. Limitation of the use in field fighting of explosives of a formidable power, such as are now in use, and prohibition of the discharge of any kind of projectile or explosive from balloons or by similar means.

4. Prohibition of the use in naval battles of submarine or diving torpedo boats, or of other engines of destruction of the same nature; agreement not to construct in the future war-ships armed with rams.

5. Adaptation to naval war of the stipulations of the Geneva Convention of 1864, on the base of the additional articles of 1868.

6. Neutralization, for the same reason, of boats or launches employed in the rescue of the shipwrecked during or after naval battles.

7. Revision of the declaration concerning the laws and customs of war elaborated in 1874 by the Conference of Brussels, and not yet ratified.

8. Acceptance, in principle, of the use of good offices, mediation, and voluntary arbitration, in cases where they are available, with the purpose of preventing armed conflicts between nations; understanding in relation to their mode of application and establishment of a uniform practice in employing them.

It is well understood that all questions concerning the political relations of States, and the order of things established by treaties, as in general all questions which do not directly fall within the program adopted by the cabinets, must be absolutely excluded from the deliberations of the conference.

In requesting you, sir, to be good enough to apply to your Government for instructions on the subject of my present communication, I beg you at the same time to inform it that, in the interest of the great cause which my august master has so much at heart, His Imperial Majesty considers it advisable that the conference should not sit in the capital of one of the Great Powers, where are centered so many political interests, which might, perhaps, impede the progress of a work in which all countries of the universe are equally interested.

I have, etc.,

COUNT MOURAVIEFF.

APPENDIX III

THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE PROPOSING THE PROGRAM OF THE SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCE

IMPERIAL EMBASSY OF RUSSIA,
WASHINGTON, April 12, 1906.

Mr. Secretary of State: When it assumed the initiative of calling a Second Peace Conference, the Imperial Government has in view the necessity of further developing the humanitarian principles on which was based the work accomplished by the great international assemblage of 1899.

At the same time, it deemed it expedient to enlarge as much as possible the number of States participating in the labors of the contemplated conference, and the alacrity with which the call was answered bears witness to the depth and breadth of the present sentiment of solidarity for the application of ideas aiming at the good of all mankind.

The First Conference separated in the firm belief that its labors would subsequently be perfected from the effect of the regular progress of enlightenment among the nations and abreast of the results acquired from experience. Its most important creation, the International Court of Arbitration, is an institution that has already proved its worth and brought together, for the good of all, an areopagus of jurists who command the respect of the world. How much good could be accomplished by international commissions of inquiry toward the settlement of disputes between States has also been shown.

There are, however, certain improvements to be made in the Convention relative to the pacific settlement of international disputes. Following recent arbitrations, the jurists assembled in court have raised certain questions of details which should be acted upon by adding to the said Convention the necessary amplifications. It would seem especially desirable to lay down fixed principles in regard to the use of languages in the proceedings in view of the difficulties that may arise in the future as the cases referred to arbitral jurisdiction multiply. The *modus operandi* of international commissions of inquiry would likewise be open to improvement.

As regards the regulating of the laws and customs of war on land, the provisions established by the First Conference ought also to be completed and defined, so as to remove all misapprehensions.

As for maritime warfare, in regard to which the laws and customs of the several countries differ on certain points, it is necessary to establish fixed rules in keeping with the exigencies of the rights of belligerents and the interests of neutrals.

A convention bearing on these subjects should be framed and would constitute one of the most prominent parts of the tasks devolved upon the forthcoming conference.

Holding, therefore, that there is at present occasion only to examine questions that demand special attention as being the outcome of the experience of recent years, without touching upon those that might have reference to the limitation of military or naval forces, the Imperial Government proposes for the program of the contemplated meeting the following main points:

1. Improvements to be made in the provisions of the Convention relative to the pacific settlement of international disputes as regards the Court of Arbitration and the international commissions of inquiry.

2. Additions to be made to the provisions of the Convention of 1899 relative to the laws and customs of war on land--among others, those concerning the opening of hostilities, the rights of neutrals on land, etc. Declarations of 1899: one of these having expired, question of its being revived.

3. Framing of a convention relative to the laws and customs of maritime warfare, concerning--

The special operations of maritime warfare, such as the bombardment of ports, cities, and villages by a naval force; the laying of torpedoes, etc.;

The transformation of merchant vessels into war-ships;

The private property of belligerents at sea;

The length of time to be granted to merchant ships for their departure from ports of neutrals or of the enemy after the opening of hostilities;

The rights and duties of neutrals at sea, among others, the questions of contraband, the rules applicable to belligerent vessels in neutral ports; destruction, in case of *vis major*, of neutral merchant vessels captured as prizes;

In the said convention to be drafted, there would be introduced the provisions relative to war on land that would be also applicable to maritime warfare.

4. Additions to be made to the Convention of 1899 for the adaptation to maritime warfare of the principles of the Geneva Convention of 1864.

As was the case at the Conference of 1899, it would be well understood that the deliberations of the contemplated meeting should not deal with the political relations of the several States, or the condition of things established by treaties, or in general with questions that did not directly come within the program adopted by the several cabinets.

The Imperial Government desires distinctly to state that the data of this program and the eventual acceptance of the several States clearly do not prejudice the opinion that may be delivered in the conference in regard to the solving of the questions brought up for discussion. It would likewise be for the contemplated meeting to decide as to the order of the questions to be examined and the form to be given to the decisions reached as to whether it should be deemed preferable to include some of them in new conventions or to append them, as additions, to conventions already existing.

In formulating the above-mentioned program, the Imperial Government bore in mind, as far as possible, the recommendations made by the First Peace Conference, with special regard to the rights and duties of neutrals, the private property of belligerents at sea, the bombardment of ports, cities, etc. It entertains the hope that the Government of the United States will take the whole of the points proposed as the expression of a wish to come nearer that lofty ideal of international justice that is the permanent goal of the whole civilized world.

By order of my Government, I have the honor to acquaint you with the foregoing, and awaiting the reply of the Government of the United States with as little delay as possible, I embrace this opportunity to beg you, Mr. Secretary of State, to accept the assurance of my very high consideration.

ROSEN.

APPENDIX IV

US AND USSR OPERATIONAL COMPARISONS

| U.S. | | | |
|--|--------------------------------|--|---|
| <u>Normal Operations</u> | <u>Est. No. of Major Units</u> | <u>Major Facilities</u> | <u>Climatic or Geographic Limitations</u> |
| FIRST FLEET: Extensive training operations in eastern Pacific year-round | 125 | San Diego, Long Beach, San Francisco. | None |
| SEVENTH FLEET: Extensive training operations in Western Pacific year-round. Frequent operations in Sea of Japan and South China Sea. Operations in Gulf of Tonkin and Philippines Sea. Infrequent operations in Indian Ocean. Patrols U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. | 61 | Pearl Harbor, Guam, Midway, Japan, Philippines, Formosa, Vietnam. | None |
| SECOND FLEET: Extensive training operations in Western Atlantic, Norwegian and North Seas, and in the Caribbean Sea year-round. Annual operations around South America. Deploys around Mediterranean Sea and to the Indian Ocean. | 179 | Norfolk, Newport, Charles- ton, Mayport, Key West, New London, Spain, Scotland, Iceland, Cuba, Bermuda, Puerto Rico, Azores. | None |
| SIXTH FLEET: Extensive training operations throughout the Mediterranean Sea year-round. Quarterly deployment of 2-3 destroyers into the Black Sea. | 23 ¹ | Ports in Italy, Greece, France, Spain, Turkey, Malta. | Narrow exit via Strait of Gibraltar |

¹ Includes two attack carriers and amphibious landing ships with embarked Marine Battalion Landing Team.

| <u>Normal Operations</u> | <u>Est. No. Of Major Units</u> | <u>Major Facilities</u> | <u>Climatic or Geographic Limitations</u> |
|--|--|--|---|
| MIDDLE-EAST FORCE: Normal training operations in Persian Gulf. | 3 | Bahrain, Diego Garcia (Indian Ocean). | Narrow exit from Persian Gulf via Strait of Hormuz. |
| <hr/> | | | |
| USSR | | | |
| BLACK SEA FLEET: Normal in-area training operations in Black Sea year-round. Extensive deployments to Mediterranean Sea. Infrequent operations in Atlantic or Caribbean Sea. | 123 | Batumi, Sevastopol, Novorossiik (USSR) | Narrow exit via Turkish Straits. |
| MEDITERRANEAN FLEET: Normal operations in Eastern and Central Mediterranean Sea. Extensive time spent at anchorages or in ports. Submarines deploy from North or Baltic Fleets. Most surface combatants deploy from Black Sea Fleet. | 21 | Egypt | Narrow entrance via Strait of Gibraltar and Turkish Straits. |
| BALTIC FLEET: Normal in-area training operations in Baltic Sea year-round. Out-of-area operations in North Sea. Infrequent operations in the North Atlantic or Caribbean Sea. | 74 | Riga, Kaliningrad (USSR) | Partial winter freeze in both ports. Narrow exit via The Sound. |
| NORTH FLEET: Normal in-area training operations in White and Barents Seas during summer months. Out-of-area exercises in Norwegian Sea. Infrequent operations in North Atlantic and Caribbean Sea. | 197 | Kola, Murmansk, Severodvinsk (USSR) | Partial winter freeze in all ports. |

| <u>Normal Operations</u> | <u>Est. No. Of Major Units</u> | <u>Major Facilities</u> | <u>Climatic or Geographic Limitations</u> |
|--|--------------------------------|---|--|
| PACIFIC FLEET: Normal in-area training Operations in Seas of Japan and Okhotsk. Infrequent out-of-area operations in North and Central Pacific during summer months only. Deployments to the Indian Ocean. | 161 | Vladivostok, Nakhodka, Petropavlovsk (USSR) | Partial winter freeze in all ports. Narrow exits via Kuril Islands and Korea and Tsugaru St. |
| INDIAN OCEAN DETACHMENT: Extensive time spent at anchor in the Socotra Island area, or in Seychelles and Maldiv Islands. Minor training operations in Arabian Sea. | 5 | None. Use friendly ports for support. | Narrow entrance via St. of Malacca/ Long distance from Pacific and North Fleets. |
| GUINEA PATROL: Off west coast of Africa. | 3 | None. Use Conakry, Guinea for support. | None. |

APPENDIX V

NAVIES OF U.S. ALLIES AND COMMITTED TO COUNTRIES

ACTIVE (BUILDING AND PROGRAMMED)

| COUNTRY | Attack & ASW Carriers | Helicopter Carriers | Cruisers | Destroyer & Escort Types | Submarines | Patrol Craft Types (Gun, Missile, Torp) | Mine Warfare | Amphibious (Over 100') | Fleet Auxiliaries | Merchant Vessels | Merchant Tonnage ^a |
|---|-----------------------|---------------------|----------|--------------------------|----------------------|---|--------------|------------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------------------|
| <u>NATO AND MEDITERRANEAN AREA</u> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| NATO (Less U.S.) | 4 | 4(1) | 11 | 280(36) | 119(20) ^b | 220(36) | 439 | 152 | 106(2) | 19,825 | 122.6 |
| Spain ^c | 1 | 0 | 1 | 28(18) | 4(2) | 17(28) | 23 | 14 | 0 | 2,276 | 3.9 |
| Israel ^d | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 36 | 9 | 0 | 2 | 102 | 0.6 |
| Totals | 5 | 4(1) | 12 | 308(54) | 125(22) | 273(64) | 471 | 264 | 108(2) | 22,203 | 126.1 |
| <u>OTHER ATLANTIC NAVIES (Rio Treaty Less Cuba)</u> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Argentina | 1 | 0 | 3 | 13(4) | 2(2) | 11 | 6 | 6(1) | 7 | 335 | 1.3 |
| Brazil | 1 | 0 | 2 | 26(20) | 2(4) | 0(25) | 6(14) | 0(1) | 26 | 420 | 1.7 |
| Columbia ^e | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0(2) | 0 | 0 | 9 | 4 | 50 | 0.2 |
| Dominican Republic | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5(5) | 0 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | - | - |
| Ecuador | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 2 | 1 | - | - |
| Mexico ^e | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 0 | 2 | 185 | 0.4 |
| Venezuela | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 1 | 10 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 109 | 0.4 |
| Totals | 2 | 0 | 5 | 72(29) | 5(8) | 31(25) | 29(14) | 25(2) | 40 | 1,099 | 4.0 |

NAVIES OF U.S. ALLIES AND COMMITTED TO COUNTRIES

ACTIVE (BUILDING AND PROGRAMMED)

| COUNTRY | Attack & ASW Carriers | Helicopter Carriers | Cruisers | Destroyer & Escort Types | Submarines | Patrol Craft Types (Gun, Missile, Torp) | Mine Warfare | Amphibious (Over 100') | Fleet Auxiliaries | Merchant Vessels | Merchant Tonnage |
|--|-----------------------|---------------------|----------|--------------------------|------------|---|--------------|------------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|
| PACIFIC AND FAR EAST (Rio Pact, SEATO, ANZUS, Japanese Treaty, Nationalist China Treaty, Republic of Korea, and Republic of Vietnam) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Chile ^f | 0 | 0 | 3 | 8(2) | 2(2) | 9 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 135 | 0.4 |
| Peru | 0 | 0 | 2 | 9 | 4 | 8 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 582 | 0.4 |
| Australia ^g | 2 | 0 | 0 | 14(8) | 4(2) | 20 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 350 | 1.1 |
| Japan | 0 | 0 | 0 | 43(14) | 11(5) | 30 | 43 | 4 | 86 | 8,851 | 30.5 |
| New Zealand | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 11 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 118 | 0.2 |
| Philippines | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 42 | 2 | 11 | 2 | 318 | 0.9 |
| Republic of Korea | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 36 | 11 | 20 | 0 | 337 | 0.9 |
| Republic of Vietnam | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 29 ^h | 2 | 24 | 4 | - | - |
| Taiwan | 0 | 0 | 0 | 31 | 1 | 9 | 14 | 49 | 20 | - | - |
| Thailand | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 31 | 4 | 17 | 17 | 62 | 0.1 |
| Totals | 2 | 0 | 5 | 131(24) | 22(9) | 222 | 86 | 129 | 148 | 10,753 | 34.5 |

NAVIES OF U.S. ALLIES AND COMMITTED TO COUNTRIES

ACTIVE (BUILDING AND PROGRAMMED)

| COUNTRY | Attack & ASW Carriers | Helicopter Carriers | Cruisers | Destroyer & Escort Types | Submarines | Patrol Craft Types (Gun, Missile, Torp) | Mine Warfare | Amphibious (Over 100') | Fleet Auxiliaries | Merchant Vessels | Merchant Tonnage |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------|--------------------------|------------|---|--------------|------------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|
| INDIAN OCEAN (SEATO and CENTO) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Iran | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11(2) | 0 | 16 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 77 | 0.1 |
| Pakistan | 0 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 177 | 0.6 |
| Total | 0 | 0 | 1 | 17(2) | 3 | 17 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 254 | 0.7 |
| Sub-Total | 9 | 4(1) | 23 | 528(105) | 155(32) | 543(89) | 600(14) | 418(2) | 296(2) | 34,309 | 165.3 |
| United States | 16(3) | 7(19) | 9 | 170(96) | 84(18) | 37 | 10 | 58 | 150(13) | 1,204 | 15.0 |
| Grand Total | 25(3) | 11(20) | 32 | 698(205) | 239(57) | 580(89) | 610(14) | 476(2) | 446(15) | 35,513 | 180.3 |

Source: Jane's Fighting Ships 1972-73

- Million tons gross weight.
- Does not include 6 SSBNs active and 2 programmed.
- Basing agreement.
- Possible U. S. support.
- Also a Pacific power.
- Assistance may be doubtful, although Chile participates in UNITAS operations.
- Also an Indian Ocean power.
- Does not include 850 coastal patrol and riverine vessels.
- Primary interest in Persian Gulf.

APPENDIX VI

NAVIES OF U.S.S.R. ALLIES AND COMMITTED TO COUNTRIES

Active (Building and Programmed)

| COUNTRY | Attack & ASW Carriers | Helicopter Carriers | Cruisers | Destroyer & Escort Types | Submarines | Patrol Craft Types (Gun, Missile, Torp) | Mine Warfare | Amphibious (Over 100') | Fleet Auxiliaries | Merchant Vessels | Merchant Tonnage |
|---|-----------------------|---------------------|----------|--------------------------|------------|---|--------------|------------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|
| EUROPE, MEDITERRANEAN AND ATLANTIC AREA (WARSAW PACT, EGYPT AND CUBA) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bulgaria | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 23 | 6 | 6 | 0 | 148 | 1.7 |
| East Germany | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 101 | 55 | 20 | 0 | 430 | 1.0 |
| Poland | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 78 | 24 | 16 | 7 | 606 | 1.7 |
| Rumania | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 16 | 26 | 10 | 0 | 71 | .3 |
| U.A.R.a | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 12 | 55 | 10 | 14 | 0 | 124 | 0.5 |
| Cuba | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 62 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 264 | 0.4 |
| Totals | 0 | 0 | 0 | 26 | 18 | 335 | 141 | 66 | 7 | 1643 | 4.6 |
| PACIFIC OCEAN AND FAR EAST | | | | | | | | | | | |
| North Korea | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 88(1) | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | - |
| North Vietnam | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 46 | 0 | 24 | 0 | - | - |

NAVIES OF U.S.S.R. ALLIES AND COMMITTED TO COUNTRIES

Active (Building and Programmed)

| COUNTRY | Attack & ASW Carriers | Helicopter Carriers | Cruisers | Destroyer & Escort Types | Submarines | Patrol Craft Types (Gun, Missile, Torp) | Mine Warfare | Amphibious (over 100') | Fleet Auxiliaries | Merchant Vessels | Merchant Tonnage ^e |
|--------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------|--------------------------|------------------|---|--------------|------------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------------------|
| INDIAN OCEAN | | | | | | | | | | | |
| India ^b | 1 | 0 | 2 | 24 | 4 | 23 | 9 | 0 | 17 | 387 | 2.5 |
| Sub-Total | 1 | 0 | 2 | 50 | 25 | 446(4) | 152 | 66 | 24 | 2030 | 6.1 |
| U.S.S.R. | 0(2) | 2 | 21 | 195 | 283 ^c | 603 | 330 | 100 | 46 | 6575 | 16.3 ^d |
| Grand Total | 1(2) | 2 | 23 | 245 | 308 | 1095(4) | 482 | 166 | 70 | 8605 | 22.4 |

Source: Jane's Fighting Ships 1972-73

- a. Political situation strained at present time.
- b. Most probably would follow an independent course.
- c. Does not include 60 SSBNs.
- d. Does not include latest merchant tonnage.
- e. Tonnage in million tons gross weight.

APPENDIX VII

NEUTRAL NAVIES

Active (Building and Programmed)

| COUNTRY | Attack & ASW Carriers | Helicopter Carriers | Cruisers | Destroyer & Escort Types | Submarines | Patrol Craft Types (Gun, Missile, Torp) | Mine Warfare | Amphibious (Over 100') | Fleet Auxiliaries | Merchant Vessels | Merchant Tonnage |
|--|-----------------------|---------------------|----------|--------------------------|--------------------|---|--------------|------------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|
| <u>EUROPE AND MEDITERRANEAN AND ATLANTIC AREAS</u> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Finland | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 38 | 2 | 0 | 14 | 390 | 1.5 |
| Sweden | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13(2) | 22(5) | 65(32) | 35(3) | 48 | 0 | 937 | 5.0 |
| Albania | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 32 | 8 | 0 | 2 | 17 | 0.2 |
| Libya | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 7 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | - |
| Morocco | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | - | - |
| Tunisia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - |
| Yugoslavia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 140 | 40 | 33 | 12 | 356 | 1.5 |
| Nigeria | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 1 | 0 | - | - |
| Total | 0 | 0 | 0 | 26(2) | 30(5) | 301(32) | 87(3) | 83 | 28 | 1700 | 8.2 |
| <u>PACIFIC AREA</u> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| China (PRC) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 24 | 42(3) ^a | 532 | 27 | 54 | 33 | 265 | 1.0 |

NEUTRAL NAVIES

Active (Building and Programmed)

| COUNTRY | Attack & ASW Carriers | Helicopter Carriers | Cruisers | Destroyer & Escort Types | Submarines | Patrol Craft Types (Gun, Missile, Torp) | Mine Warfare | Amphibious (Over 100') | Fleet Auxiliaries | Merchant Vessels | Merchant Tonnage |
|---------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------|--------------------------|------------|---|--------------|------------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| INDIAN OCEAN | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Indonesia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 10 | 70 | 26 | 18 | 18 | 501 | 0.6 |
| Malaysia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 ^b | 0 | 32 | 6 | 0 | 0 | - | - |
| Singapore | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 185 | 0.5 |
| South Africa | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8(6) | 3 | 0 | 11 | 0 | 9 | 249 | 0.5 |
| Total | 0 | 0 | 0 | 25(6) | 13 | 109 | 43 | 21 | 27 | 485 | 1.6 |
| Grand Total | 0 | 0 | 0 | 75(8) | 85(8) | 942(32) | 157(3) | 158 | 92 | 2450 | 10.8 ^c |

Source: Jane's Fighting Ships 1972-73

a. Three projected are nuclear powered.

b. One is used as a training ship.

c. Tonnage is million tons gross weight. Does not include Liberia with 2,060 ships at 38.6 million tons gw nor Panama with 1,031 ships at 6.3 million tons gw.

APPENDIX VIII

(184 Martin)

WIDTHS OF SELECTED STRAITS AND CHANNELS

| Passage | Sovereignty (on either side) | Geographical situation | Least width (in nautical miles) |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|
| Bering Strait | United States/USSR | Between Alaska & Siberia | 19 ^a |
| Strait of Magellan | Argentina/Chile | Between Tierra del Fuego and Mainland South America | 2 |
| Bosporus | Turkey | Between Turkey in Europe and Anatolia | (b) |
| Dardanelles | Turkey | Between Gallipoli Peninsula and Anatolia | (b) |
| Karpathos Strait | Greece | Dodecanese: Between Karpathos and Rhodes | 23 |
| Strait of Otranto | Albania/Italy | Between Albania and Italian Peninsula | 41 |
| Strait of Messina | Italy | Between Sicily and Italian Peninsula | 2 |
| ----- | France/Italy | Between Corsica & Elba | 27 |
| Strait of Bonifacio | France/Italy | Between Corsica & Sardinia | 6 |
| Canale de Piombino | Italy | Between Elba and Italy | 5 |
| Strait of Gibraltar | Morocco/Spain | Between Morocco & Spain | 8 |
| Strait of Dover | France/United Kingdom | Between England & France | 18 |
| St. George's Channel | Ireland/United Kingdom | Between Ireland & Wales | 42 ^c |
| North Channel | United Kingdom | Between Northern Ireland and Scotland | 11 |
| Skagerrak | Denmark/Norway | Between Denmark (Jutland) and Norway | 61 |
| Ore Sund | Denmark/Sweden | Between Sjaelland and Sweden | 2 |
| Bonholmsgat (Hambarne) | Denmark/Sweden | Between Bornholm & Sweden | 19 |
| Kalmar Sund | Sweden | Between Oland Island & Swedish Mainland | 2 |
| Entrance to Gulf of Bothnia | Finland/Sweden | Between Aland Islands and Sweden | 17 ^d |

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| 7. AUTHOR(s) ZIRPS, Christos, CDR, USN | | 6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER |
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| 20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The concern for the dangers of a nuclear war has preoccupied arms control talks since World War II. With the signing of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms in 1972, a new era of arms control negotiations seems to have been ushered in with Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks, which in turn may lead to further talks concerning limitations on conventional weapons. The purpose of this study is to review the naval arms limitations conferences and proposals since the Hague Conference of 1899 and to point out the pitfalls. | | |

(Cont. A)
(P. 1238A)

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20. ABSTRACT (cont.)

which can result from being too willing to negotiate in search of accommodation or peace without due regard for both political and strategic factors. This study also looks at the newly emerging multipolar world and how the Nixon Doctrine has affected these new power centers and created a need for armaments rather than reductions in armaments. The perceived need for security by these emergent powers has led them to turn to the sea and acquire sizable navies throughout the world to protect their national interests and sea lines of communication. This naval build-up could very well trigger a naval arms race and lead to naval arms limitations negotiations, at least regionally.

Lastly, this study discusses the historic and geographic factors which have caused the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, to build large navies. The study further compares the probable aims of these two powers in possible future naval limitations negotiations from the standpoint the needs of a land power versus a sea power.

X

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

| Passage | Sovereignty (on either side) | Geographical situation | Least width (in nautical miles) |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|
| Entrance to Gulf of Finland | USSR/Finland | Between Estonia & Finland | 17 |
| Bab el Mandeb | France/Yemen | South entrance to Red Sea | 14 |
| Strait of Hormoz | Iran/Muscat & Oman | Entrance to Persian Gulf | 21 |
| San Bernardino Passage | Philippines | Between Luzon & Samar | 8 |
| Makassar Strait | Indonesia | Between Borneo & Celebes (without regard to offshore islands) | 62 ^e |
| Selat Lombok | Indonesia | Between Bali & London | 11 |
| Selat Bali | Indonesia | Between Bali & Java | 2 |
| Selat Sunda | Indonesia | Between Java & Sumatra (not taking into account Pulau Sangiang in middle of strait) | 12 |
| Strait of Malacca (North) | Indonesia/Malaysia | Between Malaysia & Sumatra | 20 |
| Strait of Malacca (South) | Indonesia/Malaysia | Between Malaysia & Sumatra opposite Singapore | 8 |
| Formosa Strait | CPR/CNR | Between Taiwan & Mainland China | 74 ^f |
| Pescadores Channel | CPR/CNR | Between Pescadores & Mainland China | 17 |
| Cook Strait | New Zealand | Between North Island & South Island | 12 |

NOTES. ^a Distance given in table is that between Big Diomed Island (USSR) and Mainland Siberia. Other distances: (i) Between Little Diomed Island (US) and Big Diomed Island, 2 miles. (ii) Between Little Diomed Island and Mainland Alaska, 20 miles. (iii) Between Mainland Alaska and Mainland Siberia, 45 miles.

^b Less than a nautical mile.

^c Distance given in table is between mainlands; between South Bishop Rock (Wales) and Tuskar Rock (Ireland), 36 miles.

^d Distance given in table approximately correct; several small islands in strait makes precise measurements difficult.

^e Distance between Borneo and Pulau Tuguan, 55 miles.

^f If offshore islands taken into consideration, 64 miles.

Source. Derived in part from U.S. Department of State, Sovereignty of the Sea.